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Preface
Ten years ago, as co-Director of the Temple-Penn Philadelphia Economic
Monitoring Project, I was surprised to find that Philadelphia had not experienced as much growth in income inequality during the 1980s as the rest of the
nation (Madden and Stull 1991). The transition of the Philadelphia economy
from manufacturing to producer services spawned an increase in employment
in service industries that provided jobs for those who had not been employed,
including African-American men and women of all races. As many of these
jobs offered relatively low wages, the earnings distribution became more
unequal. Because these lower wage workers disproportionately resided in
households with incomes at the lower end of the distribution, the post-industrialization of Philadelphia employment appeared to reduce poverty rates. In
addition, another demographic factor, a slight decrease in the proportion of
households headed by women, also operated to decrease the proportion of
Philadelphia households in a demographic group that experienced a high risk
of poverty.
These findings for Philadelphia led me to ask whether there were similar relationships between metropolitan characteristics and household income distribution in other metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas, whose boundaries
define unique local labor markets, provide a database for testing the connections between labor market characteristics, demographic compositions, poverty rates and income distributions. This book, the culmination of my
investigation of these relationships in 182 U.S. metropolitan areas, provides
evidence that the Philadelphia experience can be generalized. While the earnings distribution is an important component of household income inequality
and poverty rates, household formation patterns are also critical components.
The growth of low wage jobs in the service sector, even with declines in
higher wage jobs in manufacturing, reduces poverty and income inequality if
the new service sector jobs go to those who previously had no jobs.
Several research assistants were involved in the project, and I am grateful to
all of them. Early on, Andrew Haughwout used the Current Population Survey data to compute Gini coefficients for several large metropolitan areas and
demonstrate that there were interesting differences across areas; he also
shared with me his data on changes in the physical size of cities in the 1980s.
Pierre Vilain wrote the programs that computed the various Gini coefficients
and the quintile shares for the 182 metropolitan areas in this study, using the
1980 and 1990 Public Use Micro Samples. Rosa Gross reviewed maps and

xi

documentation on changes in metropolitan area boundaries between the 1980
and 1990 Census. Carlos Grushka assisted in running several of the regression analyses. Kate Offutt provided final checks on the data reported here; she
re-ran all of the analyses included in this text.
Several colleagues provided comments and suggestions on various parts of
this work. Participants in the Penn Population Studies Colloquium, the Penn
Department of Real Estate Seminar, the Society of Labor Economics meeting,
and the North American Regional Science Association meeting provided useful comments on presentations of this work. I am particularly grateful to
Joseph Gyourko, Jerry Jacobs, Janet Pack, and Anita Summers for their comments. Special thanks are due to Timothy Bartik for his faith in this project
and his numerous suggestions of ways to improve it. David Nadziejka provided careful and patient editorial assistance.
My research was funded by the University of Pennsylvania, the Department of
Real Estate at the Wharton School, the National Science Foundation (SBR9348793), and the W.E. Upjohn Foundation for Employment Research.
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1

Income Inequality, Earnings
Inequality, and Poverty

During the 1980s, a wide variety of measures showed trends
toward rising economic inequality. Inequality in the distribution of
income among households within U.S. metropolitan areas increased by
almost 11 percent.1 The average poverty rate increased by over 9 percent in metropolitan areas and by almost 18 percent in their central cities.2 These disparities grew while mean real 3 per capita household
income increased by 22 percent. The distribution of earnings among
workers also diverged; for example, inequality grew by almost 10 percent among male workers.
As disparities grew in income (among households) and in earnings
(among workers) as well as between cities and their suburbs throughout the nation, there were also sizeable differences among metropolitan
areas. Some experienced only slight increases in the inequality of their
income distribution, and a few experienced a slight decrease; 4 but for
others, there was substantial growth in inequality.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the change in household income inequality
for some U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) between 1979 and
1989. 5 Pittsburgh experienced the greatest percentage increase in
income inequality, 23 percent; on the other side of the state, Philadelphia experienced a much lower increase of only 4 percent. Of the large
MSAs in Figure 1.1, Washington and San Diego had the least growth in
household income inequality; Cleveland and Buffalo in the Midwest
and New Orleans, Houston, and Miami in the South experienced fairly
large increases.
The reasons for the wide variation in MSA income inequality during the 1980s are not clear. Regional location is not obviously associated with the differences. Western MSAs (e.g., Seattle, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and San Diego) are represented in the entire range of
experiences, as are Eastern MSAs (e.g., Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington). Large metropolitan areas experienced greater
increases in inequality (e.g., Houston) and also lesser increases (e.g.,
Philadelphia).

1
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Figure 1.1 Percentage Change in Household Income Gini Coefficient,
1979–1989
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Neither do local labor market conditions provide an obvious explanation. Figure 1.2 shows the percentage change in earnings (wage or
salary) inequality among individual workers in the same MSAs for
1979–1989. A comparison of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 yields no obvious
pattern. While Pittsburgh had the greatest growth in both income inequality and earnings inequality, there is no pattern for the other MSAs.
Dallas experienced a greater increase in earnings inequality than
Atlanta, even though Atlanta had a much greater increase in household
income inequality. Seattle, Minneapolis, and Baltimore had only a
slight growth in earnings inequality. It is not obvious why Los Angeles
and Dallas had relatively large increases in earnings inequality while
Phoenix, Miami, and Boston experienced lesser increases.
The poverty rate varies among MSAs and also within MSAs,
because central city poverty rates exceed the rates in the surrounding
suburbs. In 1979, 11.7 percent of persons in the average MSA had
incomes below the poverty line; the percentage grew to 12.7 percent in
1989. Poverty rates in the central cities of MSAs were higher, an average of 15.9 percent in 1979 and 18.5 percent in 1989. The highest poverty rate in 1989 for the 182 largest MSAs was in McAllen, Texas, and
the highest rate for central cities was in Benton Harbor, Michigan. The
lowest poverty rate for an MSA with a central city was for Stamford,
Connecticut, at 6.3 percent. Overall, the poverty rates within cities
have exceeded both the national rate and the rate for their surrounding
suburbs.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the tendency over the last 20 years for poverty to concentrate within the central cities of MSAs. The figure portrays the ratios of central city poverty rates to the overall MSA rates in
1969, 1979, and 1989 for 50 of the largest MSAs. In 1979, central city
poverty rates for the 182 largest MSAs averaged 40 percent higher than
the rates for their metropolitan areas. The largest difference was in
Hartford, where the 1979 central city rate was 319 percent of the metropolitan rate and the lowest was in McAllen, Texas, where the 1979
central city rate was lower than the MSA rate. The difference between
the average central city poverty rate and the rate for its MSA grew by 8
percent over the decade 1980–1989, continuing the trend of the prior
decade. The increases between 1969 and 1989 appear most dramatic
among those MSAs that had the greatest concentration of poverty in
the central city in 1969. Philadelphia, Birmingham, San Diego, and
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Figure 1.2 Percentage Change in Earnings Gini Coefficient, 1979–1989

Pittsburgh
Cleveland
Buffalo
New Orleans
Houston
Miami
Seattle/Everett
Boston
Denver
San Francisco
Atlanta
Detroit
New York
Chicago
St. Louis
Phoenix
Minneapolis
Los Angeles
Dallas/Ft. Worth
Baltimore
Philadelphia
Washington DC
San Diego
-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

Changes in Income Inequality within U.S. Metropolitan Areas

5

Albany stand out as exceptions, cities with less concentration in 1969
that grew more dramatically in concentration.
There is no pattern that links the MSAs and central cities having
the most or the least poverty to those having the most even or the most
uneven income distributions. We do not understand why poverty rates,
household income inequality, and earnings inequality vary across these
local economies. Although there has been little investigation of differences in the rates of change in income inequality across U.S. MSAs,
there has been extensive research on rising income inequality within
the nation as a whole. It is now widely accepted both that the distributions of income across households and of wages/salaries across workers (Levy and Murnane 1992) have become more unequal in the 1980s,
and that the differences in income and several other social and economic characteristics between suburban and city residents have
increased (Reich 1991; Getis 1988; Cutler and Glaeser 1995; Massey
1999).
Knowledge of the circumstances surrounding changes in metropolitan income inequality is essential to our understanding of how the
larger economy (the “macro-environment” of the marketplace) affects
income distributions. We cannot respond with economic or social policies (or even decide not to respond) to changes in income inequality
and other metropolitan economic issues without such knowledge. To
show why this is so, it is helpful to briefly review the reasons policymakers and scholars are concerned with inequality in the first place.
Those reasons clarify why household income inequality in particular is
of concern and why a metropolitan area is an appropriate unit to use
when measuring such inequality as an outcome of the economy or marketplace.

WHY IS INEQUALITY OF CONCERN?
The concerns about rising inequality arise from fundamental
notions of fairness and social justice based on philosophical premises,
on the desires of the electorate, or on more pragmatic concerns. The
most influential scholarship that develops criteria for evaluating alternative distributions is John Rawls’ (1971) landmark book, A Theory of

6
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Figure 1.3 Ratio of Central City to MSA Poverty, 1969–1989
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Figure 1.3 (continued)
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Justice. Rawls proposed that a desirable or fair distribution is one that
the average citizen would prefer over all others if his or her own position in the distribution were not known (i.e., an “original position” in
which there is a “veil of ignorance”). Rawls argued that the original
position represents impartial and fair judgments of outcomes. Rawls
acknowledged that, in the absence of other assumptions about a citizen, the rational risk-neutral citizen would choose the distribution that
maximizes the welfare of the average person, the utilitarian approach.
Under utilitarian criteria, the desirable distribution is the one that maximizes total income in the economy, and equality is not of concern.
For equality to be of concern, one must introduce a concept of justice (or risk aversion). If this same citizen were also motivated by “justice,” a motive that values fairness and benevolence toward each
individual, then Rawls argued that he or she would be more likely to
prefer the distribution which maximizes the absolute welfare or consumption level of the poorest members of the society. Rawls argued
that justice, in this sense, implies that improvement of the welfare of
society as a whole (as represented by an increase in total income) cannot compensate for the losses experienced by poor members. If citizens are rational, risk-neutral, and motivated by justice, distributions
that maximize the well-being of the poorest (i.e., maximin criteria) are
preferred. A more unequal distribution is preferred to a more equal one
only when it results in additional income for poor individuals. The distribution which yields the greater total income (or average income) is
preferred only when sufficient additional income is allocated to the
poor to make them absolutely better off than with the more equal distribution. Because “just” social institutions must produce fair outcomes
or distributions that maximize the welfare of the poor, Rawls’ theory
implies that economies having lower poverty rates, or which produce a
more equal distribution of the same total income, are more desirable.
If concerns with equality are based on Rawlsian-type principles of
fairness and justice, then policymakers seek political/organizational
strategies and social institutions that maximize the welfare of the poor
in the society. The characteristics of institutions and societies that
yield more equal distributions are of central interest to scholars.
The mandate for policymakers to pursue such strategies from the
U.S. electorate is less clear. Thurow (1975) argued that income equality is a public policy concern because everyone’s well-being is affected
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by it. Public opinion polls have indicated that although Americans
desire more income equality, they are not sufficiently concerned to see
governmental intervention, specially federal intervention, as desirable. A 1982 Trendex Inc. poll found that the majority of Americans
desired more income equality: 49 percent of Americans thought the
difference between the incomes of the rich and the poor was much too
great and another 23 percent thought it was somewhat too great (Shapiro, Patterson, and Russell 1987, pp. 126–127). A 1976 Harris Poll
showed that only 41 percent of Americans favored using the federal
government to make a fairer distribution of wealth in the country (Shapiro, Patterson, and Russell, p. 127). Richard C. Michel (1991) noted
that a poll reported in the Washington Post in April of 1990 indicated
that only 29 percent of Americans “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that it
is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income.
These data contrast with those from other industrialized nations, where
the proportions responding that they agreed or strongly agreed with the
need for government to reduce differences in income ranged between
60 and 80 percent.
These polls of American opinion do not necessarily conflict with
the desirability of egalitarian distributions developed by Rawls. The
polls show that Americans favor more equal income distribution, but
they lack confidence that government can effectively make income
more equal. These results are consistent with a preference for equality
that is tempered by fears that government programs to promote greater
equality will come at too great a loss in total income.6
If concerns with equality are based upon the desires of the American electorate as evidenced in public opinion polls, the implications for
both policymakers and scholars are similar to those for concerns with
equality based on Rawlsian-type principles of fairness and justice.
Given the lack of support for national government intervention but the
desire for greater income equality, scholarship that helps to define the
characteristics of institutions and societies that yield more equal distributions are of central interest.
Nozick (1974), in a contrary position, contended that income
equality is not a government or a public policy concern because government has no income to distribute. Rather, he holds that government
defines the rules of operation, and those rules (not the resulting distribution) should be the target of public policy. Even if one grants
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Nozick’s position, it is difficult to envision how we evaluate or judge
“the rules” without reference to their result, the equality of income.
Beyond philosophical ideals, there are more-pragmatic reasons
why income inequality is of concern. Rising income inequality undermines political stability (Sommers 1995; Starobin 1995), and some
recent studies have indicated that inequality may also lower future economic growth rates (e.g., Benabou 1996; Persson and Tabellini 1994).
Such pragmatic reasons for promoting equal distributions lead policymakers and scholars to the search for pragmatic ways of achieving
equality: the characteristics of institutions and societies that yield more
equal (or less equal) distributions are of central interest.
The concerns about inequality, whether they are based on premises
developed by political philosophers, on the desires of the electorate, or
on pragmatic concerns with stability or economic growth, are about the
well-being (that is, the consumption levels) of individuals. Because
the consumption level of individuals depends on the income received
by their household, it is the distribution of household income that is the
outcome of concern to policymakers and scholars. The distribution of
wages or salaries to individual workers is of policy concern only to the
extent that it affects consumption or the household income distribution.
This issue is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

WHY ANALYZE METROPOLITAN AREAS?
Policies to encourage greater equality in the distribution of wellbeing are more than policies to improve the well-being of a set of individuals; they are policies to change the larger (macro) environment in
which goods and services are produced and distributed. But, what constitutes the appropriate macro-environment?
There are two considerations in conceptually determining the
appropriate dimensions of the macro-environment for which inequality
matters. The first is based on information flows and is determined by
the physical dimensions of the macro-environment or the distances
over which the outcomes (the effects of income differences) are perceived or received by households. The second is based on the dimen-
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sions of the environment or unit that produces or transmits the
inequality.
Because people are more likely to be aware of how their own
income or consumption levels compare with those of fellow MSA residents than with residents of the entire nation, and because well-being is
affected (at least in part) by the relationship of one’s own consumption
to that of one’s community, income inequality within the MSA is a
more relevant outcome measure for concerns based on fairness and justice or on the electorate’s desire for equality. The importance of the
characteristics of the MSA to the well-being of residents is reinforced
by the tendency of most individuals to stay in the same MSA. While
U.S. census data indicate that almost half of Americans residing in
metropolitan areas changed their residence between 1985 and 1990,
the large majority of these residential moves were within the same
MSA. There was much less residential mobility between MSAs: only
16 percent of Americans residing in an MSA in 1990 were living outside that MSA five years earlier. Most Americans stay in the same
metropolitan area, even when they change residence and/or job location.7
If the social and political cohesiveness of the national electorate is
affected by the national distribution of income, the cohesiveness of
state and local electorates should be even more susceptible to such
influence because the effects of inequality are more immediately obvious.
To the extent that economic or market conditions generate income
or wage distributions, metropolitan areas are more “interesting” units
than the nation to use in studying inequality. Unlike the nation, or census regions, or states or counties whose boundaries are administratively
or politically determined, the definitions of (and the boundaries for)
metropolitan areas are based on market or economic criteria. U.S. metropolitan areas are the ideal geographic unit on which to base a subnational analysis of the role of markets, because they are the only
subnational areas that represent an economic market. MSA boundaries
are drawn based on the degree of economic and social integration of
the counties.8
The state of Pennsylvania, for example, includes part of the fourth
largest metropolitan area in the nation, Philadelphia, but it also
includes a large number of rural areas with neither proximity nor
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strong economic linkages to the Philadelphia economy. Pittsburgh and
Erie, metropolitan areas with economies that are more similar in industrial structure and in overall performance to midwestern MSAs such as
Cleveland or Indianapolis than they are to Philadelphia, are also
included within the Pennsylvania boundaries. Similar descriptions
apply to most of the states, especially New York, Georgia, Washington,
Texas, Florida, and Illinois.
County boundaries, like state boundaries, are based on political,
rather than market, relationships. Furthermore, counties vary widely
around the nation, sometimes including several municipalities (such as
Allegheny County, which includes the city of Pittsburgh, and Harris
County, which includes the city of Houston) and other times being
smaller than the city (New York City, which includes Manhattan,
Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island counties, is an obvious
example).
It is also problematic to study areas that are smaller than MSAs.
Poverty and the distribution of income within cities cannot be analyzed
apart from the MSAs in which the cities are located. MSAs constitute
the labor market for city and suburban residents. Their very delineation is based on the commuting ranges of workers in the local labor
market. Because salaries and wages account for most household
income, conditions in the metropolitan labor market, combined with
the decisions of individuals to join or leave households and to live in
the central city or in the suburbs, influence income distribution and
poverty within the central city. Obviously, if municipalities and cities
are too small a unit to encompass the relevant labor and housing markets, then smaller units such as census tracts are even more problematic.
In addition to the conceptual reasons for measuring equality within
an MSA, the measurement of income inequality within an MSA is
more likely to reflect accurately differences in consumption than is inequality measured for the nation. Because the cost of living varies
across regions in the United States, differences in income or earnings
across the nation do not translate into equivalent differences in consumption when they arise from regional differences in the price of
goods and services. Inequality measured within an MSA reflects real
differences in consumption because residents of the same MSA have
the same cost of living.
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THE PLAN OF THE STUDY
This study identifies and quantifies the characteristics of metropolitan economies that are associated with changes in economic inequality
in the 1980s. An understanding of how metropolitan characteristics are
associated with metropolitan income inequality must underlie any public policy proposals to move toward greater equality of distribution.
The uses of such knowledge in guiding policy efforts to alter the trend
toward rising inequality are also discussed.
Specifically, the study explores how the demography, the labor
market, and the geographic structure of a metropolitan area are related
to changes in income inequality.
• Demographics—changes in the age and ethnic composition of the
population, as well as changes in the way Americans form families and households—define how income is shared across generations and how earnings and other income flows translate into
economic well-being.
• Wages and salaries are the primary source of income for most
American households. Changes in the supply of workers, in the
demand for workers, and in the way that wages and salaries are
determined in the labor market strongly influence the income that
flows to U.S. households.
• The neighborhoods and communities where Americans live influence their local tax liabilities, their access to publicly provided
goods and services (especially educational opportunities), their
personal security and safety, their ability to commute to work,
and their understanding and knowledge about occupations, jobs,
how to “get things done,” etc. Increasing income segmentation
and racial segregation of neighborhoods and communities—that
is, the locational isolation or concentration of households of different income levels—may affect the growth in inequality in an
economy.
Each of these three elements of the macro-environment are “likely
suspects” among the factors that could be associated with the increase
in income inequality and poverty in U.S. metropolitan areas during the
1980s.

14
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Chapter 2 reviews the explanations for rising inequality that have
been proposed for the nation as a whole. I review theories of the role
of labor markets, education and skills, economic growth, location, and
demographic composition of the population in affecting the extent of
inequality.
Chapter 3 introduces data on measures of inequality, poverty, and
economic, social, geographic, and demographic characteristics and
their changes in U.S. MSAs over the 1980s. The chapter discusses
ways that these characteristics of MSAs may be related to one another.
Chapter 4 identifies the problems that must be addressed when
studying inequality within U.S. MSAs, including the difficulties inherent in empirically measuring inequality and the determination of the
appropriate geographic boundaries of an economic system.
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 report the results of statistical analyses of
the relationships between changes between 1979 and 1989 in income
inequality, wage inequality, and poverty rates of MSAs, as well as the
demographic composition, skill composition, geographic structure, and
labor markets. In Chapter 5 household income inequality (as measured
by changes in the Gini coefficient of household income) and the shares
of income accruing to each quintile of the income distribution are analyzed. Chapter 6 addresses changes in the Gini coefficients for wages
and salaries for various groupings of workers and also analyzes the
household income Gini coefficient for subgroupings of the population.
Chapter 7 addresses changes in the metropolitan poverty rate, and
Chapter 8 changes in the concentration of poverty within the central
cities of metropolitan areas.
Chapter 9 compiles the results from the analyses of all of the measures of inequality and reviews the public policy implications of the
results.

Notes
1. As measured by the mean percentage change in the Gini coefficient for metropolitan household income (see Table 3.1).
2. See Table 3.2.
3. After correcting for the effects of inflation.
4. Stockton, California; Norfolk, Virginia; and Waterbury, Connecticut, were the
only metropolitan areas studied here that experienced an increase in household
income equality between 1979 and 1989.
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5. The measure of inequality is the percentage change between 1979 and 1989 in the
Gini coefficient; this coefficient is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
6. These polls are also not polls of Rawls’ citizens in the original position, behind “a
veil of ignorance.” Americans responding to the surveys know where they have
ended up in the distribution. Analyses of opinion polls show that social position
affects opinions about the desirability of income equality: poorer individuals are
more supportive than richer individuals of government efforts at redistribution
(Bobo 1991).
7. But, with 16 percent of the typical MSA’s population shifting in a five-year
period, mobility may change the characteristics of the population of any metropolitan area.
8. MSAs are defined in terms of counties (except for New England, where they are
defined in terms of cities and towns). An area is an MSA if it includes either at
least one city of at least 50,000 inhabitants or if it includes an urbanized area (as
defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census) of at least 50,000 inhabitants and a
total MSA population of at least 100,000. The outlying counties included in an
MSA are defined based on their commuting patterns to the central city (or cities)
in the MSA and their population density.
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Income Inequality, Earnings Inequality, and Poverty

2 Why Poverty Rates and Income
and Earnings Distributions Change
A Survey of Explanations
The obvious sources of household income inequality include
unequal inherited wealth; unequal wage rates arising from unequal
abilities and/or unequal education and training; dispersion in tastes,
especially in relative preferences for leisure versus material goods;
unequal rates of return on wealth; racial or sexual discrimination in
employment and wages; uneven incidence of unemployment; monopolies and monopsonies, such as powerful trade unions, that alter wage
rates; and unequal distribution of wage earners across households. 1
The roles of each of these factors in accounting for income inequality differ in terms of the effects of income inequality on social stability and on the quality of life. Inequality arising from differences in
tastes or stages in the life cycle is of a different social and political concern than inequality arising from inherited wealth, discrimination, or
institutional practices. The latter reflect characteristics of the macroenvironment that the individual or the household cannot change; it is
these sources of inequality that are of primary policy concern.
The research literature on the sources of poverty and of income
and earnings inequality for the nation has produced evidence on how
the national economic environment contributes. In some cases, the
findings are in agreement; in other cases, they conflict. The environmental influences that are studied are seldom those of the immediate
(local) economy. In this chapter, I review what we know about how the
macro-environment—i.e., demographic structure, characteristics of the
labor market (including wages and employment and industrial and
market structure), region, and intrametropolitan structure—relates to
inequality and poverty.
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LOCAL LABOR MARKET EFFECTS ON INCOME
DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY
Because wages and salaries are the principal source of family
income, debate over the causes of increases in household income inequality has centered on changes in the labor market, specifically shifts
in labor demand, in labor supply, and in institutional regulations. The
debate is not about the appropriate conceptual framework. There is
consensus on the forces that can account for these phenomena: the
facts that earnings have increased more for highly paid workers and
less for lower-wage workers must arise either from shifts in labor
demand or in labor supply that alter market-determined wages, or from
an institutionally induced change in wage-setting practices. There are
really two questions at issue in this context: What is the contribution of
each of these factors to rising earnings inequality? How does rising
earnings inequality affect income inequality?
Sources of Earnings Inequality
Supply Shifts
In their review and evaluation of the research on growing earnings
disparity in the nation, Levy and Murnane (1992) cited a simple test of
the relative roles of shifts in demand for labor versus shifts in supply of
labor in affecting relative wages. If there are two groups of workers,
educated and uneducated, and these two groups are the only factors of
production, the effects of demand and supply can be distinguished by
what Levy and Murnane (p. 1342) call the “Economics 1 Test”: “If the
group with the slower growing wages is also the group whose numbers
grew faster, it suggests wage changes were driven by supply.”
In spite of a relative increase in the average level of education and
in the proportion of workers who have graduated from college, there is
general consensus that the earnings premium placed on skill—represented by education and experience (actually age)—increased during
the 1980s, contributing to the growth in earnings inequality. The available evidence indicates that quantity shifts (changes in the proportion
of the population with various categories of skill) had greater effects
than quality shifts (changes in the quality of the education represented
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by a specific level of schooling). Katz and Murphy (1992) demonstrated that the fluctuations in earnings premiums associated with education and age in the 1970s and 1980s can be explained in large part by
the shifts in the relative supply of persons in specific age and education
groups. Bound and Johnson (1991) identified a decrease in the supply
of experienced workers as accounting for increases in the returns on
experience. Topel (1994) found that male wage inequality increased
between 1972 and 1990 because the relative supply of low-skilled
workers increased as a result of an increase in international in-migration and the increased labor force participation of women. He also
found evidence that technological change favored highly skilled workers.
Because there has been increasing inequality of earnings within
skill groups (based on education, age, and gender), most researchers
agree that demand and other sources also contribute.
Demand Shifts
Increases in total labor demand have been linked clearly to
increases in earnings equality. It is well established that the equality of
the earnings distribution is affected by the national business cycle, and
therefore that demand shifts affect the wage distribution. Burtless
(1990) and Moffitt (1990) documented that for the nation, inequality in
male earnings rises with increasing unemployment rates. Burtless
found that a 1 percentage-point rise in the civilian unemployment rate
is associated with a 0.7 percent rise in the Gini coefficient for men’s
earnings. There is no similar significant effect for women, however.
Burtless attributes this gender difference to the greater overall variability in work hours per year for women. Because there is less variability
in work hours for men, the decreases caused by unemployment have a
greater effect on earnings inequality.
While the overall level of labor demand (the tightness of the labor
market) influences earnings equality, there is also evidence that there
have been shifts in the nature of the workers demanded, which also
influence the distribution. “Deindustrialization,” a term referring to the
relative or absolute decrease in manufacturing employment, is a labordemand explanation for the increasing inequality of earnings. Bluestone and Harrison (1986) argued that deindustrialization contributed
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to rising inequality, and they used national data to show an increase in
the number of persons with low earnings during the 1980s.2
It is doubtful, however, that deindustrialization (at least in the
sense that the term refers only to declines in manufacturing employment) accounts for increasing earnings inequality. Earnings inequality
increased in manufacturing as much as in other industries.3 Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1994), Juhn (1999), and Bound and Johnson (1992)
found little growth in industry-specific wage differentials in the 1980s.
As Levy and Murnane (1992) concluded, the decline in the relative
demand for less-educated workers occurred within industries, most
notably in manufacturing. Decreases in the relative demand for lessskilled workers are due more to changes in the technology of production than to industry or product-demand changes.
Several studies have examined the connections between labor
demand and income distribution by studying subnational labor markets. Most recently, Partridge, Rickman, and Levernier (1996) analyzed published data on income inequality among families in 1969,
1979, and 1989 in the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Because they studied
subnational data, they were able to examine the effects of variation in
the macro-environment. They found that the proportion of the state
population in metropolitan areas increases inequality. They argued that
the urbanized population effect is a combination of economic development and of the role of a larger service sector that rewards high-skilled
workers; that is, their finding of an “urbanization effect” is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that an increase in total demand (or economic
development) reduces earnings inequality, and it supports the hypothesis that deindustrialization increases earnings inequality.
Bartik (1991) studied 89 metropolitan areas between 1979 and
1986 and found that an increase of 1 percent in local employment
reduced the long-run local unemployment rate by 0.1 percent, raised
the long-run labor force participation rate by 0.1 percent, and increased
hourly wages by 0.2 percent. He concluded that increases in the level
of local economic development (i.e., higher growth rates) had progressive effects on the distribution of nontransfer income.
From the mid 1970s through mid 1980s, there were several
attempts to measure empirically the effects of economic growth
(macroeconomic performance) on income inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas. These studies were primarily focused on determining
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how economic development affects the equality of the income distribution. In these studies, economic development was characterized by
population size (to measure economies of scale or extent of monopoly power) and average income. The results showed that increasing
intrametropolitan inequality in family income occurred in metropolitan areas with lower median incomes. 4 There was no consensus on
the effects of population size.
These studies of metropolitan areas did not resolve how local labor
demand influences earnings inequality for several reasons. First,
because the studies were all cross-sectional, they could not sort out
unmeasured metropolitan characteristics that may be highly correlated
with the population or mean income.5 Second, the studies did not sort
out the determinants of earnings inequality (which arises from labor
market conditions) from the determinants of family or household
income inequality (which arises from the household formation decisions of income producers, as well as earnings inequality among those
producers). The equations used in the studies were not correctly specified for sorting out the influences of economic, social, and demographic structures on the earnings distribution versus the same
influences on the family or household income distribution. The dependent variable, the distributional measure, was a Gini coefficient computed from household income (rather than individual earnings 6 ),
although the independent variables (such as industry and occupation of
employment, city size, and population density) were labor market
characteristics that directly influence the earnings distribution and
therefore affect the household income distribution more indirectly.
Variables that influence the household income distribution, specifically
those that reflect household formation patterns (such as female head of
household, household size, and multiple earners or no earners in the
household) were frequently excluded. Third, the measures of income
inequality were not precisely measured. In many cases, the measures
were computed from published aggregations of frequencies of observations within broad income categories, rather than on the basis of the
individual incomes and earnings reported in the Public Use Micro
Sample of the U.S. Census.
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Shifts in Wage-Setting Practices
Changes in wage-setting practices have also been seen as a potential cause of rising inequality. Two institutional changes may be
important. First, as unions have historically reduced wage variation,
the decreasing role of unions in influencing wage levels may contribute
to rising earnings disparity. Second, the new human resource management techniques that emphasize productivity-related compensation
such as bonuses, merit increases, and commission-based pay may contribute to earnings dispersion.
Several recent studies (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990;
Freeman 1996, 1992; Card 1996) using a variety of techniques have
estimated that about 20 percent of the increase in earnings inequality in
the last 20 years is due to the decrease of collective bargaining as the
means of setting wages. Freeman (1996, p. 163) argued that the
broader issue is the use of institutional wage-setting practices versus
reliance on market forces to determine wages:
. . . institutions operate on averages; they represent average workers or firms, whereas markets operate on margins; they represent
the pressure of supply and demand on the marginal firm/
employee. Institutions are insurance mechanisms for employers
and firms; they may reject changes that reduce the well-being of
the average employee/firm even though this change fits with the
marginal calculus.

Another study provides an example of this point. Card (1989)
reported that earnings inequality among pilots, flight attendants, and
mechanics within the same firm in the airline industry increased following deregulation of the industry in 1978.
Earnings Inequality and Household Income Inequality
While most studies do not explicitly examine the link between
earnings inequality and household income or poverty, those that do so
argue for a direct link. Sawhill (1988) concluded from her review of
poverty studies that earnings inequality increases poverty. Karoly and
Burtless (1995) attributed the growth in family income inequality in
the 1979–1989 period, in largest part, to earnings inequality among
working men.
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Another recent study reported that the relationship between jobs
and income distribution may be changing. Blank and Card (1993)
demonstrated that the link between the reduction of poverty and economic growth, which is premised on a link between poverty and the
availability of jobs offering better wages, has seemingly been reduced
as the effects of regional location and family demography have become
more significant.
It is quite possible that total employment within many MSAs has
increased by adding relatively more low-wage jobs. If these jobs
employ persons who previously would not have been employed (that
is, persons who would have had no earnings had the employment patterns of prior years persisted), then persons like these newly added
workers were not included in the computations of earnings inequality
in earlier time periods. Had such persons been included as earners
having zero wages, the measures of earnings inequality in the past
would have been higher, possibly higher than current levels. If growth
in employment, which has been disproportionately in low-wage jobs,
has created jobs for persons who previously had no jobs (as opposed to
persons who previously had higher-wage jobs), then the increase in
wage inequality is not real, but is an artifact of the way inequality is
measured.
The argument that persons who previously had zero income (and
were “not counted”) and now have low positive incomes (and are
“counted”) inflate estimates of the growth in inequality can only be
valid with respect to earnings inequality measures. Earnings (wage/
salary) inequality measures are defined with respect to employed individuals; household income inequality measures include the entire population, including those with no income. An expansion of low-wage
employment to persons (residing in low-income households) who previously had no wages must reduce household income inequality
(unless there are offsetting changes in household formation patterns).
In this case, rising earnings inequality could result in decreasing household income inequality.
In sum, recent research on national inequality has clearly demonstrated that increases in the wage premiums placed on skills have contributed to the increase in earnings inequality. The increases in the
returns on skills arise from changes in labor supply (i.e., a relative
decrease in experienced, educated workers) and from a skill-biased
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shift in labor demand that appears to arise from skill-biased technological changes. There have also been increases in earnings inequality
within skill groups, but there is no consensus on the sources of those
increases. There is some agreement that the decline of unionization
and collective bargaining agreements has reduced earnings equality.
There is less evidence on how national earnings equality translates
into household income equality or poverty rates, and the evidence that
exists does not clearly demonstrate the connections for the nation. No
one has addressed the issue for metropolitan areas.
These findings for the nation do not translate into clear expectations about how intermetropolitan variations in earnings inequality or
in household income inequality and poverty are affected by changes in
the distribution of education and skills among workers or by changes in
industrial composition. Even if there is a “shortage” of a particular
skill group within a metropolitan area, intermetropolitan migration is
expected to attract workers with these skills, reducing wage differentials both with respect to other metropolitan areas and with respect to
other groups within the metropolitan area, thus reducing inequality.
Intermetropolitan mobility of workers acts to reduce regional differentials in wages so that differences in proportions or quantities of workers with a given set of skills or education levels may not affect the
measured level of earnings inequality within a metropolitan area. If
this is the case, and if within-MSA income equality is a better measure
of the desired equality of outcomes than national income inequality,
then the growing inequality within the nation that is attributable to
changes in the national demand for and supply of skilled workers may
not be of policy concern.
Intermetropolitan variations in earnings inequality will persist,
however, if they arise from a production process that is based on immobile inputs. For example, metropolitan areas with natural resource
endowments that are complementary to production with low-skilled
workers will have relatively more low-wage workers. For example, if
climate or beaches or mountains attract tourists and if the tourist industry creates more low-skill jobs, then tourist-serving MSAs will have
more earnings inequality. The wage distribution effects of industrial
differences will also depend on the extent to which markets versus
institutions are used to set wages within the MSA.
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EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHICS ON INCOME
DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY
There are a variety of ways that the demographic characteristics of
the population may affect or be affected by income and earnings distributions. Some characteristics that individuals cannot alter (such as
race, gender, or age) affect income or earnings distributions if they
affect productivity or perceptions of productivity, or if there is social or
economic discrimination with respect to such characteristics. Inequality associated with these characteristics is of policy concern.
Studies of income inequality within metropolitan areas have found
that areas having a larger proportion of African Americans, 7 a larger
proportion of families headed by women, 8 or a larger proportion of
households headed by persons over age 65 9 have more household
income inequality.
Demographic characteristics that individuals or households are
able to change, such as household composition or labor force participation decisions, also affect income and earnings distributions. For
example, decreases in the proportion of adults who are married
increase the proportion of adults and children who live in households
with one or no earners. Increases in the labor force participation and
work hours of married women increase the proportion of adults (and,
depending on the numbers of children of employed versus unemployed
women, may decrease the proportion of children) in households with
two or more earners. To the extent that the number of earners affects
household income and the number of hours affects wages, these
changes in earners per household potentially alter the household distribution of income and the distribution of earnings among workers.
Karoly and Burtless (1995) attributed rising family inequality for
the nation between 1979 and 1989 in part to the positive correlation
between women’s earnings and family income. Levy (1989) and Juhn
and Murphy (1992) also found that earnings and employment growth
have been greatest for the wives of high-wage men.
Most studies have found that increases in households headed
solely by women contribute to rising household income inequality and
poverty. Sawhill (1988), in her review of the poverty literature, cited
numerous studies that demonstrate the importance of increases in
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female-headed households. Karoly and Burtless (1995) attributed
about 25 percent of the growth of inequality in family income between
1979 and 1989 to changes in family composition, especially the
increase in the proportion of families headed by a single woman. Partridge, Rickman, and Levernier (1996) reached similar conclusions
studying family income inequality in the 48 contiguous U.S. states in
1969, 1979, and 1989. Gottschalk and Danziger (1993) argued, however, that the potential effects of rising proportions of female-headed
households on poverty rates were offset by the decreasing numbers of
children in those households.
Previous research leads us to expect that the demographic composition of metropolitan areas may affect income distribution and poverty
rates. Households headed by men or couples are expected to have
more income as the result of gender differences in earnings and the
potential for more earners in households with more adults. The proportion of households headed by African Americans or retired persons
may also have an effect on overall equality.

LOCATION EFFECTS: REGIONAL AND
INTRAMETROPOLITAN
Regional Variation in the United States
There is evidence that geographic disparities in household income
and in individual earnings have been increasing across a broad range of
geographic units, including between U.S. census regions and within
U.S. metropolitan areas.
Recent data show increases in income disparity across U.S. census
regions since the late 1970s, as average income levels on the East and
West coasts (especially since 1982) increased relative to the levels in
other regions (see Eberts 1989).10 This trend is particularly surprising
in the historical context. Except for the 1920 to 1940 period (Nourse
1968), there had been continuous convergence in regional income levels between 1870 and 1979; since 1979, however, there has been
increasing disparity. Browne (1989) argued that earnings are the principal component of the divergence. Eberts (1989) and Farber and
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Newman (1987) attributed the divergence in earnings by region to differences in the returns on worker’s skills. Carlino (1986), Gerking and
Weirick (1983), and Roback (1982), among others, have argued that
amenity differences between regions also contribute to wage differences. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) found that the recent divergence
in state incomes can be attributed to sectoral composition or industry
differences.
Getis (1988) documented a growing income disparity at a more
finely delineated regional level, that of cities and their suburbs. Reich
(1991) cited increasing intrametropolitan residential segmentation by
income. Mayer (1996) reported that, in 1964, an American family in
the lowest fifth of the income distribution was 1.2 times more likely
than the average family in the metropolitan area to live in the central
city, and that this ratio has grown gradually over 30 years to a high of
almost 1.4 times by 1994.
These geographic studies have mostly focused, however, on
changes in the distribution of income between (as opposed to within)
regions. Karoly and Klerman (1992) found that the rising disparity
between regions accounts for about 5 percent of the increasing disparity among families nationwide. Unlike the other geographic studies,
however, Karoly and Klerman also examined intra-regional disparity
within U.S. census regions and found that income inequality had also
increased within each region.
Nielsen and Alderson (1997) analyzed family income inequality
within U.S. counties for 1970, 1980, and 1990. They found that economic growth decreases family income inequality within counties,
although the effect is lessening due to increasing inequality in the most
prosperous counties. They also found that increases in female labor
force participation decreases inequality and that increasing educational
inequality increases inequality. The study does not address the issues
raised here because it uses counties rather than MSAs and families
rather than households. (As discussed in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 4,
counties are a problematic observational unit because the boundaries
are not drawn with respect to market activity. Families are a problematic unit because they exclude persons who do not reside with relatives,
a phenomenon that may strongly affect the distribution of income
among individuals.)
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The most recent analyses of intermetropolitan variation in income
distribution are those of Cloutier (1997) and Galster, McCorkhill, and
Gopalan (1988). The Cloutier study, of changes in the distribution of
family income within 216 metropolitan areas between 1980 and 1990,
found that most of the increase in inequality was accounted for by
increases in the inequality of the distribution of education, in the proportion of female-headed families, and in the proportion of metropolitan area jobs in the managerial/professional occupations, and by
decreases in the size of the manufacturing and public sectors. He also
found that increases in the number of workers per family decreased the
growth of inequality.
While Cloutier addressed many of the same issues I study here,
there are important differences. Cloutier analyzed the distribution of
family income, rather than household income or poverty rates, and he
used an approximation of income inequality that underestimates the
true variation in income (to be discussed below). Although there has
been a substantial decline in the proportion of the population living in
families and this proportion differs among MSAs, Cloutier does not
account for these differences over time or between MSAs in the selection of the population into families. Because Cloutier excludes a substantial proportion of the MSA population from his study, it is difficult
to evaluate his results. Cloutier’s analysis of family income inequality
suffers from the same problem of selective exclusion of the population
that complicates the interpretation of studies of changing wage/salary
distributions.
Galster, McCorkhill, and Gopalan found that the proportion of
metropolitan area jobs in nonproduction sectors, the proportions of the
population aged 18 to 34 and over 65, and the female proportion of the
workforce were the predominant forces increasing household income
inequality within 120 metropolitan areas in 1980. Population was of
marginal statistical significance and bore an inverted-U-shaped relationship to inequality, increasing inequality with rising population followed by decreasing inequality. Because the study combines data on
the workforce with data on the entire residential population and uses
household income (rather than earnings) as the distributional variable,
the study does not resolve any of the issues raised here.
Both the Galster and the Cloutier studies compute the measure of
inequality (the Gini coefficient) on the basis of published aggregations
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by income category, rather than on the basis of the individual incomes
and earnings reported in the Public Use Micro Sample. The use of
such aggregations results in systematically lower estimations of inequality than when inequality is computed using individual data.
Intrametropolitan Location
Relatively recent literature has examined the links between residential or neighborhood locations and income and earnings. Abramson, Tobin, and VanderGoot (1995) reported an 8.1 percent increase in
the extent to which the poor were isolated in the 100 largest MSAs
between 1980 and 1990.11 They also found that the poor are more isolated in those metropolitan areas with larger representations of African
Americans in their population. Kasarda (1993) also found increased
concentrations of poverty in the largest metropolitan areas for the same
time period. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) concluded that a 13 percent
reduction in residential race segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas in
1990 would eliminate one-third of the income gap between whites and
blacks, mostly by increasing black income. They found weak evidence
of a small positive influence on white income. Racial segregation
appears to have diminished slightly in the same period, however, as
reported by Abramson, Tobin, and VanderGoot (1995) for their 100
MSAs (and in Chapter 3 of this study).
There is much agreement that racial segregation affects job outcomes (e.g., Massey and Denton 1993; Ihlanfeldt 1992). Fears that
racial discrimination in housing contributes to greater spatial concentration or isolation for poor African-American households has motivated a substantial portion of the research. The mechanisms by which
location can influence poverty and inequality are more controversial.
John Kain (1968) argued that a “spatial mismatch” between workers’ residences and job sites increased unemployment rates for urban
ghetto residents. He developed the” spatial mismatch” hypothesis,
which states that housing discrimination restricts African-American
residential locations to inner-city ghettos, which in turn inhibits their
ability to obtain employment in the suburbs, where metropolitan job
growth is concentrated. This spatial mismatch is thought to account
for at least part of the higher unemployment rates and lower earnings
of African Americans in metropolitan areas. Kain’s analysis of
employment and residential data from Detroit and Chicago in the
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1950s led him to conclude that housing discrimination reduced nonwhite employment by 9,000 in Detroit and 24,000 in Chicago.
William Julius Wilson (1987) wrote of the “urban underclass,”
arguing that the social isolation of ghetto residents has increased as the
African-American middle class has moved into suburban and/or moreintegrated, higher-income neighborhoods. 12 This social isolation is
argued to produce externalities for ghetto residents by increasing
unemployment, decreasing earnings and household income, and escalating social pathologies among residents beyond those that would
have occurred in a neighborhood with a more economically and
socially diverse population. As with the spatial mismatch hypothesis,
the urban underclass hypothesis also attributes some of the unfavorable
income and labor market outcomes for ghetto residents to housing discrimination, but the underlying mechanisms differ. Under the urban
underclass hypothesis, it is the social/economic climate of the neighborhood (for example, the lack of employed persons to serve as role
models or informants about job opportunities; the presence of disruptive persons who increase crime and make the provision of services,
including public education, more difficult, and often decreasing the
quality of that available) and not its physical distance from job sites
that contribute to higher unemployment, lower earnings, and lower
household incomes of ghetto residents.
The agreement that residential segmentation and economic outcomes are linked has not led to agreement on these two hypotheses,
however. Recent reviews of the empirical research testing these two
hypotheses demonstrate a lack of consensus on their validity. Ihlanfeldt (1992), Kain (1992), and Holzer (1991) have reviewed the evidence for the spatial mismatch hypothesis and document the lack of
consensus. Jencks and Mayer (1990) document the lack of consensus
on the urban underclass hypothesis after an extensive review of the evidence.
A variety of studies have explored the ways that segregation affects
the working of the economy. Benabou (1993) argued that segregation
is socially costly because it eliminates spillovers between highly
skilled and less-skilled individuals. Crane (1991), Case and Katz
(1991), and Borjas (1995) showed an empirical relationship between
where people live, who they associate with, and their quality of life.
Manski (1993) argued, however, that it is difficult (if not impossible) to

Changes in Income Inequality within U.S. Metropolitan Areas

31

obtain reliable empirical measurements of such neighborhood effects. 13
One problem is that the observed correlations between neighborhood
of residence and economic outcomes do not establish cause and effect.
People may live in ghettos because they have not succeeded in the
labor market, or they may not succeed in the labor market because they
live in ghettos. Another problem is that ghettos, racial segregation, and
income segmentation may hurt everyone’s economic opportunities,
both residents of poor areas and residents of richer areas, because these
phenomena interfere with the quality of the match between worker
characteristics and job requirements. If that is the case, then a comparison of ghetto residents with non-ghetto residents does not identify the
loss.
O’Regan and Quigley (1996) have directly tested whether the
social and economic characteristics of a neighborhood’s residents or its
physical proximity to jobs better explain the labor-market outcomes of
neighborhood residents. Based on intra-urban variation of census tract
characteristics for four New Jersey metropolitan areas (Newark, Bergen-Passaic, Middlesex, and Monmouth), they found much stronger
effects of neighborhood social and economic characteristics than they
did of job proximity in determining youth employment.
Cutler and Glaeser (1997) examined the effects of residential segregation across the 209 largest MSAs in 1990. By examining the
effects of residential segregation on a variety of social and economic
outcomes for persons aged 20–24 and 25–30, and using a series of
instrumental variables to identify causality, they found support for both
the underclass and spatial mismatch hypotheses. They also found a
substantial unexplained residual for each of these outcomes.
In summary, although the correlation between racial segregation,
income segmentation, and poor job outcomes that contribute to low
incomes and poverty is well established for individuals, the mechanisms that account for the correlation are not understood. The evidence on correlation among individuals needs to be supplemented by
evidence that explores whether MSAs with more racial segregation
have higher poverty rates, higher concentrations of poverty in the central city, and greater income and earnings inequality.
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SUMMARY
There are no studies that have examined changes in household
income inequality or earnings inequality among MSAs. Although
there are numerous studies of the national change in household income
inequality, few have sorted out the effects of changes in earnings equality from the effects caused by other sources.
Prior research does provide guidance on which characteristics of
MSAs are likely to be related to changes in inequality. Obviously, the
labor market (including both changes in wages and in employment)
and demographic shifts (including race, age, and changes in household
structures) must be investigated. The geography and structure of the
MSA, including population and indicators of race and income segmentation, are also potential correlates of changes in household income
inequality and earnings inequality.

Notes
1. Blinder (1974) articulated much of this listing.
2. This study spawned much debate and research, including Blackburn and Bloom
(1987), Burtless (1990), Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), and Kosters and Ross
(1987, 1988).
3. Table 3.1 shows that earnings inequality increased, on average, by 4.0 percent
among blue-collar men in MSAs during the 1980s, compared with 4.1 percent
among professionals/managers and 2.7 percent among salesworkers of both genders for the same time period. Earnings inequality actually declined in the producer service industry.
4. See Farbman (1975), Danziger (1976), Nord (1980a, 1980b), and Haworth et al.
(1978, 1982). Garofalo and Fogarty (1979) found a U-shaped relationship, with
inequality declining through some income range, reaching a minimum, and then
increasing as median income increased.
5. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this problem.
6. An exception to this is Long, Rasmussen, and Haworth (1977) who presented an
analysis using income of males for 1969 (but not restricted to earnings).
7. See Farbman (1975), Danziger (1976), Nord (1980a, 1980b), Haworth et al.
(1979, 1980), and Garofalo and Fogarty (1979), for example.
8. See Nord (1980a, 1980b), Galster, McCorkhill, and Gopalan (1988), Nielsen and
Alderson (1997), and Cloutier (1997), for example.
9. See Garofalo and Fogarty (1979) and Galster, McCorkhill, And Gopalan (1988),
for example. Nielsen and Alderson (1997), in their study of income inequality
within U.S. countries, found that the proportion of the population over age 65
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10.
11.
12.

13.
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increased inequality in 1970, had no effect in 1980, and increased inequality in
1990 cross-sectional analyses.
Dickie and Gerking (1988) have summarized the rather extensive research on
earnings differentials across U.S. regions.
Actually, they reported the indexes: 19.7 for 1980 and 21.3 for 1990.
Mayer (1996) found that high-income African Americans have been leaving central cities at rates comparable to those of whites since the later 1960s, but that the
concentration of high-income African Americans in the central city remains about
30 percent above that of other U.S. families.
Neighborhood effects occur when the propensity of an individual to behave in
some way—e.g., to be poor—varies with the prevalence of that behavior in a reference group containing the individual, such as the residential neighborhood.
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Why Poverty Rates and Income and Earnings Distributions Change

3

The Data and the Variables

A central problem in trying to understand the effects of the macroenvironment, or the structure of the economy, on rising inequality in
earnings and income and on increasing poverty rates has been the lack
of data points. Because the data for most scholarly studies of income
distribution are national time-series data, the empirical evidence for
correlation between characteristics of the macro-environment and
changes in income distribution have been based on statistical analyses
of data sets that often include only 25 to 50 annual observations, or on
a handful of observations of measures of inequality that are compared
with a handful of changes in the labor market or in demographic circumstances. In this chapter, we examine income inequality and poverty in U.S. metropolitan areas.

THE DATA
The 5 percent Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS) of the 1980 and
the 1990 U.S. censuses provide data on the earnings, income, demographic characteristics, household characteristics, labor market characteristics, and metropolitan locations of individuals. These data on
individuals permit one to compute, for each metropolitan area (MSA),
measures of the inequality of the distribution of earnings for individuals and of income for households or families; they also permit the computation of inequality measures for subpopulations within each MSA.
The data used for this study are from the 182 largest U.S. MSAs in
1980 and 1990;1 data on earnings and income reflect the experiences of
respondents in the prior calendar year (i.e., 1979 for 1980 census data).
Gini Coefficients
Figures 3.1a and 3.1b illustrate the patterns of earnings inequality
and household income inequality across selected U.S. MSAs in 1989.
The measure of inequality used in these figures is the Gini coefficient. 2
Figure 3.1a shows earnings inequality and household income inequal-
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Figure 3.1a MSAs with Similar Household Income Inequality and Earnings Inequality, 1989

Figure 3.1b MSAs with Larger Differences between Household Income Inequality and Earnings Inequality, 1989
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ity in 1989 for selected MSAs in which these two measures have similar values; Figure 3.1b shows the same measures for selected MSAs in
which there are greater differences between these two measures. In
both figures, the MSAs are ordered by the level of household income
inequality. As in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the irregular variation of earnings
inequality shows that earnings distributions do not translate simply into
household income distributions. For example, New York City and Fall
River in Figure 3.1a have similar levels of earnings inequality but different levels of household income inequality. Johnstown and Santa
Cruz, and Lansing and Lowell are MSA pairs in Figure 3.1b that have
similar levels of household income inequality, but very different levels
of wage inequality. More generally, for the MSAs with greater differences between earnings inequality and household income inequality
(Figure 3.1b), there appears to be greater earnings inequality and less
household income inequality.
For all the MSAs in Figure 3.1b, but only for six MSAs in Figure
3.1a (Lafayette, Shreveport, Savannah, Birmingham, New Haven, and
Waterbury), household income distributions are more equal (i.e., have
a lower Gini coefficient) than the earnings distributions. These data
suggest that household formation patterns of wage earners or the labor
force participation decisions of household members mitigate the
effects of greater earnings inequality on household income inequality.
These patterns are consistent with lower-end wage earners (such as
young adults) remaining in households with higher-end wage earners,
or higher-end wage earners being more likely to be the sole earners in
their households.
One can also notice that Figure 3.1b includes a number of college
towns and state capitals, while Figure 3.1a includes more MSAs that
are located on the East Coast or in the South.
Table 3.1 reports the means and the standard deviations of the Gini
coefficient for household income inequality for all of the 182 metropolitan areas in this study for various income/earnings categories and
population groups, from the 1980 and 1990 censuses. The coefficients
reported are the means for the 182 metropolitan areas, not the national
Gini coefficients computed for individuals who are members of the
identified groups.

Table 3.1 MSA Gini Coefficients for Household Income and Individual Earnings
Mean

Standard
deviation

1979

0.374

0.026

0.439 New York NY

0.294 Lowell MA

1989

0.412

0.026

0.488 McAllen TX

0.360 York PA

4.9

0.279 Lowell MA

Category

Highest value

Lowest value

Household income

a

change (%)

10.6

–0.024 Stockton CA

Earnings
All earners
1979

0.453

0.020

0.535 Provo UT

0.398 Fall River MA

1989

0.466

0.022

0.537 Provo UT

change (%)

2.7

3.3

0.101 Pittsburgh PA

–0.089 Bridgeport CT

1979

0.316

0.020

0.370 Stamford CT

0.269 Duluth MN
Lawrence MA

1989

0.338

0.023

0.405 Stamford CT

0.265 Lawrence MA

change (%)

7.1

4.4

0.203 Green Bay WI

–0.081 New Haven CT

1979

0.404

0.031

0.522 Gainesville FL

1989

0.442

0.030

0.537 Gainesville FL

change (%)

9.4

5.3

0.240 Racine WI

0.382 Waterbury CT

Full-time, year-round

All men
0.332 Lorain OH
0.342 Waterbury CT
–0.073 New Haven CT
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Mean

Standard
deviation

1979

0.333

0.033

0.457 Gainesville FL

1989

0.346

0.028

0.426 McAllen TX

change (%)

4.0

6.6

0.198 Lorain OH

–0.138 New Haven CT

1979

0.435

0.021

0.519 Provo UT

0.380 Fall River MA

1989

0.441

0.023

0.510 Provo UT

change (%)

1.4

3.1

0.117 Beaumont TX

1979

0.363

0.023

0.463 Provo UT

1989

0.364

0.025

0.451 Provo UT

change (%)

0.3

4.7

0.152 Lima OH

1979

0.366

0.018

0.437 Chico CA

1989

0.372

0.023

0.455 Salt Lake City UT

change (%)

1.5

4.9

0.197 Flint MI

0.452

0.020

0.534 Provo UT

Category

Highest value

Lowest value

Blue-collar men
0.254 Gary IN
0.284 York PA

All women
0.388 Fall River MA
–0.079 Atlantic City NJ

Clerical women
0.308 Fall River MA
0.308 Lawrence MA
–0.157 St. Cloud MN

Earners aged 25–34
0.323 Fall River MA
0.320 Waterbury CT
–0.120 Atlantic City NJ

Whites
1979

0.398 Fall River MA
Jersey City NJ

1989

0.463

0.022

0.536 Provo UT

change (%)

2.5

3.2

0.099 Pittsburgh PA

1979

0.432

0.045

0.621 Jackson MI

1989

0.449

0.044

0.593 Eugene OR

change (%)

4.7

0.376 Waterbury CT
–0.093 Bridgeport CT

African Americans

10.8

0.605 Richland WA

0.243 Fall River MA
0.314 Fall River MA
–0.370 Provo UT

Professionals/managers
1979

0.399

0.021

0.464 Provo UT

0.327 Lawrence MA

1989

0.416

0.025

0.472 Chico CA

0.306 Waterbury CT

change (%)

4.1

4.7

0.190 Racine WI

–0.117 Waterbury CT

1979

0.533

0.021

0.613 Gainesville FL

1989

0.547

0.022

0.604 Ann Arbor MI

change (%)

2.7

4.2

0.150 Macon GA

0.515

0.026

0.574 Flint MI

0.506

0.030

0.571 Flint MI

3.8

0.125 Alexandria LA

Salesworkers
0.471 Albany NY
0.475 Waterbury CT
–0.144 Waterbury CT

Producer services
1979
1989
change (%)
a

–1.7

0.404 Reno NV
0.380 Reno NV
–0.156 Atlantic City NJ

The change rows are computed by taking the mean of the change rates for all MSAs in the study. The MSA change rate is computed by
subtracting the 1980 mean income or earnings for the category in the MSA from the 1990 mean and dividing this difference by the 1980
mean.
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The category with the most equal distribution within the metropolitan areas—i.e., the lowest mean Gini coefficient reported on Table 3.1
(0.316)—is the 1979 earnings income for full-time, year-round workers.
At least part of the reason for less variation in income among full-time,
year-round workers is that there is less variation in total hours worked.
The category with the most unequal distribution (0.547) is the 1989
earnings income of salesworkers. Salesworkers have greater variation
in earnings because they include workers with more variation in hours
(i.e., more part-time workers) and more variation in skills (the occupation includes those who sell candy and those who sell office buildings).
The data in Table 3.1 confirm the patterns suggested by Figure 3.1.
Other than for full-time year-round workers, household income distributions are more equal within MSAs than are the earnings distributions. Household formation patterns and/or the labor supply decisions
of household members apparently mitigate the effects of earnings inequality on household income.

Focusing on Selected MSAs to Illustrate the Issues
Figures 3.2a–c illustrate the 10-year rates of change in
household income inequality and in earnings inequality in
selected MSAs between 1979 and 1989; the panels were
selected to illustrate patterns of earnings and household inequality change across three different sets of MSAs. Figure
3.2a includes MSAs selected because the two rates of change
were more similar than in other MSAs. Note that in Norfolk,
Virginia, there was slight convergence in both household
income and earnings. Figure 3.2b shows the same measures
for MSAs selected from the Mid-Atlantic region. While Philadelphia and New York City show a growth in household
income inequality that is slightly greater than that in earnings
inequality, the other MSAs show substantially greater growth
in household income inequality, both relative to the same measure in Philadelphia and New York City and relative to their
own changes in earnings inequality.
Figure 3.2c shows these measures of inequality for smaller
MSAs selected for divergence in the two rates of change.

Changes in Income Inequality within U.S. Metropolitan Areas

Figure 3.2a 10-Year Rates of Change in Household Income and
Earnings Inequality (1979–1989), Group A

Figure 3.2b 10-Year Rates of Change in Household Income and
Earnings Inequality (1979–1989), Group B
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Figure 3.2c 10-Year Rates of Change in Household Income and Earnings
Inequality (1979–1989), Group C

Changes in Income Inequality within U.S. Metropolitan Areas
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Lowell, Massachusetts, experienced the greatest decrease in
earnings inequality on the chart, but it also had the greatest
increase in household income inequality. All of the MSAs on
this chart had very little change in earnings inequality, but their
household income inequality growth ranged widely.
Unlike the comparisons of the 1989 inequality levels in Figures 3.1a and b, there are no obvious differences between the
MSAs that had their rates of earnings and household income
inequality move together and those that had widely different
shifts in those two measures of inequality. As noted in the discussion of Figures 1.1 and 1.2, those that had widely divergent
changes in income and earnings inequality include large and
small MSAs as well as western, eastern, midwestern, and
southern MSAs.
What accounts for the differences in how household income
inequality changed between these three sets of MSAs? It cannot be changes in the distribution of wages. This study will
develop and statistically test explanations of the variation in
income inequality among all 182 MSAs, and I will return to
these three figures for illustration.
The metropolitan Gini coefficients for each income group listed in
Table 3.1 grew, on average, between 1979 and 1989. Household
income had the greatest increase in inequality, relative to the other Gini
values listed. The average metropolitan area experienced a 10.6 percent increase in its household income Gini between 1979 and 1989.
The largest percentage increase occurred in Lowell, Massachusetts
(where the 1979 index was the lowest among MSAs), rising by 27.9
percent; the smallest increase—in fact a decrease in inequality—
occurred in Stockton, California, where the index changed by –2.4 percent. While the distribution of wage earners among households mitigates the effects of earnings inequality, the extent of this mitigation
diminished during the 1980s: household income inequality increased
10.6 percent, while earnings inequality increased only 2.7 percent.
The mean earnings Gini increased more for full-time, year-round
workers (7.1 percent), and less for workers aged 25 to 34 (1.5 percent).
Men experienced a faster growth in earnings inequality than women,
9.4 percent vs. 1.4 percent, and African Americans experienced more
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rapid growth than whites, 4.7 percent vs. 2.5 percent. The rate of
growth in earnings inequality varied across occupations. Professionals/managers and men in blue-collar jobs experienced increases of 4.1
percent and 4.0 percent, respectively while women clerical workers
experienced essentially no change and the wages of workers in producer service industries became more equal (a 1.7 percent decline in
inequality).
The standard deviation values on Table 3.1 index the extent to
which local markets differ in their relative equality or inequality and in
the rate and direction of change in inequality. There is greater variation (larger standard deviation) among MSAs in the household income
inequality than in earnings inequality. There is greater variation
among MSAs in male wages than in female wages, while younger
workers (aged 25–34) experience less variation than other age groups.
The greatest variation in earnings inequality among MSAs occurs for
African-American wage earners.
Poverty Rates
There is also substantial variation among MSAs and within MSAs
(cities versus suburbs) in another important measure of income distribution, the poverty rate. In 1969, 13.7 percent of the U.S. population
had incomes below the poverty line. This rate dropped to 12.4 percent
in 1979 but increased to 13.1 percent by 1989. Table 3.2 reports the
variation in poverty rates in central cities and in MSAs. In 1979, 11.7
percent of persons in the average MSA had incomes below the poverty
line, growing to 12.7 percent in 1989. Poverty rates in central cities
were higher; an average of 15.9 percent in 1979 and 18.5 percent in
1989. The highest poverty rate in 1989 for the 182 largest MSAs was
in McAllen, Texas, and for central cities, in Benton Harbor, Michigan.
In 1989, the lowest poverty rate for an MSA with a central city was for
Stamford, Connecticut, at 6.3 percent; but the poverty rates within central cities have exceeded both the national rate and the rate for the
MSA they are part of in both 1979 and 1989.
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Table 3.2 Mean and Standard Deviation of 1979 and 1989 Metropolitan Poverty Rates
Area

Mean

Standard
deviation

1979 poverty rate (%)

11.7

4.03

35.2 McAllen TX

5.4 Stamford CT

1989 poverty rate (%)

12.7

5.03

41.9 McAllen TX

4.2 Nassau NY

9.3

19.07

1979 poverty rate (%)

15.9

5.15

38.7 Benton Harbor MI

7.0 Appleton WIa

1989 poverty rate (%)

18.5

6.45

58.0 Benton Harbor MI

6.3 Stamford CTa

change (%)

17.6

20.95

1979 poverty rate

1.41

0.40

3.19 Hartford CT

0.83 McAllen TX

1989 poverty rate

1.53

0.50

3.94 Benton Harbor MI

0.86 McAllen TX

change (%)

0.07

0.07

0.31 St. Cloud MN

Highest value

Lowest value

MSA

change (%)

68

Lafayette LA

–28

Atlantic City NJ

Central city

81

Flint MI

26

Wilmington DE

Central city to MSA ratio

a

–0.18 Lafayette LA

The lowest rate for an MSA having a central city. Because Nassau, New York, has no central city, there can be no poverty rate in the
central city of metropolitan Nassau.
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Poverty Rates and Income Inequality
Figures 3.3a–c illustrate the 1989 poverty rate for all persons
and its change as a percentage of the 1979 value for each of the
MSAs in Figures 3.2a–c; the MSA with the largest change in
household income inequality appears at the left side of each figure and the MSA with the smallest change is at the right.
Figure 3.3a shows that the pattern of poverty and change in
these MSAs is similar to the MSA changes in household and
earnings inequality (Figure 3.2a). These MSAs had similar
levels of poverty in 1989, with some variation in the change
over the previous decade. The two MSAs with the least growth
in household inequality, San Diego and Norfolk, also had the
least growth in poverty: Norfolk experienced a decrease in poverty, and San Diego experienced no change in poverty. Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dallas had slight increases in poverty,
just as they had slight increases in earnings and household
income inequality.
Figure 3.3b shows a pattern of 1989 poverty rates similar to
those on Figure 3.3a, but with much greater variability in the
percentage of change in poverty and a less-apparent relationship between the change in the poverty rate and the earnings or
household income inequality (Figure 3.2b). Newark and
Johnstown, in particular, have changes in poverty that are “out
of line” with the changes in household income inequality.
Figure 3.3c shows an even more puzzling pattern. Figure 3.2c
showed these small MSAs to have little increase in earnings inequality and significant variation in the rate of change in household income inequality, but nothing there helps us understand
why Lafayette, Louisiana, and Lincoln, Nebraska, had sizeable
increases in their poverty rates relative to the other three MSAs.
What accounts for these different experiences in poverty in
the 1980s among these MSAs? Is it jobs and wages? If so,
why don’t the changes in earnings inequality track changes in
poverty or household income inequality?

Changes in Income Inequality within U.S. Metropolitan Areas

Figure 3.3a 1989 Poverty Rate and 1979–1989 Changes: Group A

Figure 3.3b 1989 Poverty Rate and 1979–1989 Changes: Group B
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Figure 3.3c 1989 Poverty Rate and 1979–1989 Changes: Group C

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Many of the characteristics of individuals and of markets or local
economies that affect (or at least correlate with) income inequality and
higher poverty rates are well known. Table 3.3 provides information
about the distribution of demographic, economic, and structural characteristics across the 182 MSAs in 1980 and 1990. This table includes
the means of the characteristics for these MSAs in 1980 and in 1990
and the 182-MSA mean of the percentage change in the characteristic
over the 10-year period. In addition, the standard deviation of the
mean and the highest and lowest values among the 182 MSAs are
listed.
Demographic Structure of MSAs
Several demographic characteristics of individuals are associated
with their personal income levels and therefore with poverty or income
levels of households. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
MSAs with larger proportions of persons whose characteristics are
associated with low income or high likelihoods of poverty have higher
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poverty rates or more unequal income distributions. If these characteristics have more to do with how income is distributed among individuals rather than with the overall productivity of the local economy, then
having more persons with the “individual characteristics” associated
with poverty or low income will have little effect on the MSA poverty
rate or the overall level of inequality. In this case, the demographic
structure of the MSA population (such as race or age composition)
would not be associated with the MSA poverty rate or income inequality, even though such characteristics might well identify the rank ordering of households or individuals in the income distribution. Age, race,
and household formation patterns—represented by the gender of the
householder and the number of earners in a household—are associated
with individual and household poverty rates and low income, but their
effects on overall MSA poverty rates depend on their association with
the productivity of the local economy.
Migration provides an interesting example of a demographic phenomenon that is positively correlated with the productivity of the local
economy but negatively associated with individual income. Other
things held equal, persons who have recently changed their MSA of
residence have lower incomes than those who are longer-duration residents. MSAs that attract in-migrants from other areas are usually
experiencing more economic growth, however. Economic growth generally has greater effects on lower-income persons and therefore is
associated with a decrease in poverty rates. The net relationship
between in-migration and metropolitan measures of income inequality
or poverty rates is difficult to predict a priori. Because in-migrants are
disproportionately attracted to growing MSAs and because economic
growth generally favors lower income groups, MSAs with more inmigration may actually have less poverty and income inequality, even
though in-migrants have lower incomes than nonmigrants.
There is substantial variation in demographic structure among
MSAs. Table 3.3 shows that the rate of in-migration to MSAs was relatively constant, with 18.0 percent of residents in 1990 3 being new to
the area in the last five years, versus 18.9 percent in 1980 (although
some areas, such as Saginaw, Michigan, experienced substantial
increases in in-migration). The connections between in-migration
rates and economic expansion are illustrated by Richland, Washington,
which had the greatest drop in the rate of in-migration and the slowest

Characteristics

Mean
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Table 3.3 1980 and 1990 MSA Characteristics
Standard
deviation

Highest value

Lowest value

Demographica
Female-headed hh.b
1980 (%)

28.0

3.6

39 New York NY

17 Richland WA

1990 (%)

32.0

3.8

44 Macon GA

21 Provo UT

change (%)c

15.3

8.6

76 Lowell MA

–4 Green Bay WI

1980 (%)

15.0

4.7

38 Sarasota FL

1990 (%)

15.0

4.7

7.3

14.7

1980 (%)

52.0

5.1

1990 (%)

54.0

5.1

67 Madison WI

40 Sarasota FL

6.8

5.4

23 Stockton CA

–12 Lafayette LA

9.2

8.5

45 Jackson MS

0 Provo UT

No-earner hh.

change (%)

34 Sarasota FL
68 Richland WA

7 Lowell MA
10 Raleigh NC
–29 Stockton CA

Multiple-earner hh.

change (%)

64 Lowell MA

34 Sarasota FL

African-American pop.
1980 (%)
1990 (%)

11.0

10.0

51 Jackson MS

change (%)

27.9

37.2

201 Lawrence MA

–38 Huntington WV

0 Provo UT

7.6

2.0

40 Bradenton FL

9 Fayetteville NC

Elderly hh. headd
1980 (%)

1990 (%)

20.4

4.5

change (%)

51.5

28.9

42 Sarasota FL

12 Fayetteville NC

63 Richland WA

–7 Bradenton FL

18.9

6.9

44 Temple TX

5 Paterson NJ
Saginaw MI

18.0

6.6

39 Temple TX

6 Johnstown PA

–0.5

17.5

100 Saginaw MI

–40 Richland WA

In-migrant hh.
1980 (%)
1990 (%)
e

change (%)
Persons per hh.
1980

2.73

0.574

4.7 McAllen TX

2.4 Charleston SC

1990

2.08

0.267

3.7 McAllen TX

2.2 Sarasota FL

9.4

20 Dallas TX

–25 Pittsburgh PA

change (%)

–14.6

Skilla
Median education (25–64 years old)
1980 (yr.)

14.1

0.45

16 Tallahassee FL
Ann Arbor MI
Washington DC

12 McAllen TX

1990 (yr.)

15.5

0.52

17 Ann Arbor MI

14 McAllen TX

change (%)

10.1

3.8

25 Brownsville TX

0 Washington DC

Education Gini
1980

0.103

0.018

0.23 McAllen TX

0.08 Lima OH
Janesville WI

1990

0.128

0.019

0.24 McAllen TX

0.10 Fayetteville NC

25

7.6

50 Lawrence MA

–1 Stockton CA
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change (%)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Characteristics
Labor

Mean

Standard
deviation

Highest value

Lowest value

marketa

Earnings Gini
1979

0.454

0.020

0.535 Provo UT

0.398 Fall River MA

1989

0.466

0.022

0.537 Provo UT

0.382 Waterbury CT

change (%)

2.8

3.3

1980

0.699

0.042

0.79 MadisonWI

0.55 Johnstown PA

1990

0.747

0.045

0.85 Madison WI

0.59 McAllen TX

change (%)

6.9

4.1

18 Stockton CA

–5 McAllen TX

56.5

16.6

96 Lincoln NB

18 Benton Harbor MI

10 Pittsburgh PA

–9 Bridgeport CT

Employment/pop. ratio (25–64 yrs.)

Other
Workers in central citye
1980 (%)
1990 (%)

55.1

17.9

change (%)

–2.4

15.5

94 El Paso TX

40.7

15.3

89 El Paso TX

1990 (%)

41.0

18.0

89 Lincoln NB

change (%)

–5.2

7.5

49.8 Fort Collins CO

12 Benton Harbor MI
–49.0 Charleston SC

Residents in central city
1980 (%)

17 Chico CA

13 Benton Harbor MI
12 Benton Harbor MI
–28 Atlanta GA

Change in ratio of % workers/
% residents in central city (%)

3.15

15.5

53.8 South Bend IN

–44.3 Charleston SC

139 Janesville WI

Populatione (000)
1980

812.1

1142.3

8275 New York NY

1990

898.6

1249.3

8863 Los Angeles CA

132 Alexandria LA

13.1

14.8

66.2 Riverside CA

–11.3 Fall River MA

change (%)
Per capita incomea
1979 ($)

7184

780

10210 Stamford CT

4006 McAllen TX

1989 ($)

13906

2523

26402 Stamford CT

6410 McAllen TX

change (%)

93

19.0

158 Stamford CT

50 Richland WA

69.1

11.6

91.0 Bradenton FL

38 Lawrence MA

1990

65.1

11.4

91.0 Fort Wayne IN

40 Santa Cruz CA

change (%)

–5.8

5.3

7.9 Lawrence MA

–21 Melbourne FL

f

Residential segregation index
1980

a

Compiled by author from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. censuses 5% Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS).
= household(s).
c The “change” rows are computed by taking the mean of the change rates for all MSAs in the study. The MSA change rate is computed
by subtracting the 1980 mean from the 1990 mean and dividing the difference by the 1980 mean.
d Elderly = over age 65.
e U.S. Bureau of the Census (1982, 1992).
f As compiled and reported by Farley and Frey (1993).
b hh.
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growth in per capita income among the 182 MSAs between 1979 and
1989.
There were substantial decreases in the size of the typical household, from an average of 2.73 persons in 1980 to 2.08 in 1990: in
McAllen (which had the largest households among the MSAs), the
average household lost a person, dropping from 4.7 to 3.7 persons.
Although a handful of MSAs had increases in family size (including
Dallas, in which the average size increased by 20 percent), most had
decreases in size, with an average of –14.6 percent. These decreases in
household size arise from the increase in one-person households and
also are associated with the age, race, and gender composition of
households.
The change in household size may have profound effects (as discussed in Chapter 2) on the distribution of income and on poverty
rates. Because the distribution of household income and the poverty
rate are measured for the households in which income earners reside,
these measures may change when the income earners redistribute
themselves across households, even if the income flow to individual
earners is unchanged. For example, when couples divorce, a middleincome household may be transformed into two low-income households or one high-income and one low-income household. When
young adults leave home, a high- or middle-income household may be
transformed into two high- or middle-income households.
The average MSA had an increase in the proportion of its households that were headed by women and also in those including African
Americans. In the average MSA, 32 percent of households were
headed by women in 1990, up from 28 percent in 1980; the average
MSA experienced a 15.3 percent increase in the proportion of its
households headed by women. The average African-American proportion of the population increased from 9.2 percent to 11.0 percent, with
the average MSA increasing its African-American representation by
27.9 percent. Jackson, Mississippi, has the highest African-American
proportion of households, and Provo, Utah, the lowest. The households headed by persons over age 65 increased from a mean of 7.6 percent to 11.7 percent, with the average metropolis experiencing an
increase of over 50 percent. Two Florida MSAs had the highest proportions over age 65 in 1980 and 1990, while Fayetteville, North Carolina, had the lowest proportion in 1990.
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Although the ratio of employment to population between the ages
of 25 and 64 increased, Table 3.3 shows that the increase was not
evenly distributed across households. The proportion of households
with no earners increased, with the growth in employment flowing
entirely to households with multiple earners. The average MSA experienced an increase of 7.3 percent in the proportion of in-migrants in
the population, although the mean proportion was 15 percent in both
1980 and 1990. This can be the case because MSAs with smaller proportions of in-migrants in 1980 tended to have greater percentage
increases in that proportion, and MSAs with larger proportions in 1980
tended to have smaller percentage decreases. Households with multiple earners increased from 52 percent to 54 percent of households in
the average MSA, and the average MSA experienced an increase of 6.9
percent in this proportion. Therefore, the effects of increases in the
employment-to-population ratio on household income inequality or on
the incidence of poverty (which is a household income measure) were
mediated by the household formation decisions of employed persons.

Demographic Relationships

Among the MSAs shown in Figures 3.2a–c, there is substantial variation in both the levels of and the rates of change in
household size, the proportion of the population who inmigrated to the MSA in the last five years, and the racial, gender, and age composition of households (Table 3.4). While
there is no obvious pattern in household size among the MSAs
of group A, the MSAs in groups B and C that did not have a
two-digit decrease in household size were those with the least
increase in household income inequality (New York City, Philadelphia, Lawrence, and Lincoln). There appears to be a
strong relationship between changes in the proportion of
households headed only by women and changes in household
income inequality. For all three groups, the MSA with the
greatest increase in female household heads also had the greatest increase in household income inequality (Chicago, Pitts-
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burgh, and Lowell); for groups B and C, the MSAs with the
least increase in female household heads also had the least
increase in household income inequality (Philadelphia and
Lincoln).
Other characteristics showed less obvious patterns.
Although for all three groups, the MSA with the greatest
increase in the proportion of households headed by a person
over age 65 had the greatest increase in household income inequality (Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Lowell), there is no relationship between changes in age composition and changes in
household income inequality for the remaining MSAs.
Changes in the proportion of African Americans and in the
proportion of residents who had moved into the MSA in the
last five years also showed little connection to changes in
household income inequality.
Table 3.4 also illustrates the connections between the race,
gender, and age compositions of households in MSAs. MSAs
with larger proportions of female heads of household usually
have larger proportions of either elderly heads of households
or African Americans. New York City has the largest proportion of female household heads on the list and also has among
the highest proportions of both elderly and African-American
households. Los Angeles had the slowest growth in female
householders of the MSAs on Table 3.4 and also had among
the lowest growth rates for both elderly and African-American
householders.
Skill Composition
The skill composition of metropolitan residents may also affect the
equality of earnings distribution and household income distribution
and the amount of poverty in the MSA. To the extent that inequality in
educational attainment arises from a larger proportion of the population having low levels of education, there is increased competition
among workers for less-skilled jobs, resulting in relatively lower earnings and higher poverty rates. A shortage of persons with higher levels

Table 3.4 Demographic Characteristics of Selected MSAs
Household size

Female
household head

Elderly
household head

African Americans

1990
(%)

Change
since
1980
(%)

–6.3

26.5

–4.1

9.8

–22.7

14.6

–1.7

10.4

–26.2

16.3

0.1

14.7

5.7

3.1

56.1

–12.6

18.7

29.3

5.5

22.0

51.6

27.4

27.6

6.8

21.5

30.0

0.8

15.8

24.2

19.2

8.9

36.8

18.3

15.5

9.3

21.7

22.8

21.5

37.5

12.7

6.6

28.5

11.0

29.2

17.6

1.0

–33.9

5.7

1.7

2.8

43.2

11.3

22.5

11.0

22.8

5.7

14.1

7.1

–3.3

32.8

4.8

21.9

15.0

14.8

–21.5

15.7

15.7

Change
since
1980
1990
(%)
(% of pop.)

1990
(%)

Change
since
1980
(%)

1990
(%)

Change
since
1980
(%)

–2.9

34.7

15.7

20.4

26.7

12.9

2.97

10.4

33.0

4.5

17.3

11.4

Dallas

3.27

20.3

29.5

11.3

13.4

–0.4

San Diego

2.73

4.0

30.8

8.9

18.8

Norfolk

2.64

–5.1

26.3

7.8

18.6

2.47

–25.1

33.8

19.7

Buffalo

2.55

–24.2

35.2

Newark

2.78

–20.9

34.1

Johnstown

2.61

–25.0

New York City

2.63

Philadelphia

2.72

1990

Change
since
1980
(%)

Chicago

2.73

Los Angeles

MSAsa

In-migrants

Group A

Group B
Pittsburgh

(continued)
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Table 3.4 (continued)
Household size

MSAsa

1990

Change
since
1980
(%)

2.89

–12.7

Female
household head

Elderly
household head

1990
(%)

Change
since
1980
(%)

1990
(%)

Change
since
1980
(%)

32.0

76.0

16.6

63.5

African Americans

In-migrants

Change
since
1980
(%)

1990
(%)

Change
since
1980
(%)

1.2

101.3

8.7

38.3

1990
(% of
pop.)

Group C
Lowell

a

Lafayette

2.71

–24.7

29.7

26.4

14.6

31.7

20.4

38.4

15.7

–21.4

Raleigh

2.49

–22.7

33.9

12.1

13.8

6.6

25.0

32.4

43.6

16.2

Lawrence

2.76

4.4

42.7

20.7

22.9

–2.9

4.5

207.9

18.3

21.4

Lincoln

2.52

0.1

30.7

6.3

17.7

10.2

1.7

–3.7

20.5

–6.9

Listed within groups by percentage change in household income Gini, highest to lowest.
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of education increases their already-higher wages, increasing inequality.
The median education of adults aged 25 to 64 increased from 14.1
to 15.5 years in the average MSA, with an average increase of 10.1 percent between 1980 and 1990 (see Table 3.3).4 The distribution of education became more unequal, however, as shown by the Gini
coefficient measuring the distribution of highest year of education
attained: the Gini across the adult population in MSAs increased from
0.103 to 0.128. McAllen, Texas, had both the lowest median education
and the most unequal distribution of education of all MSAs in both
1980 and 1990. The average increase in MSA educational inequality
was 25 percent, a very large rate of growth, especially in the context of
the changes in income and earnings Ginis reported in Table 3.1 (even
though the base for the educational Gini is smaller, allowing a change
to have a greater “growth” effect).

Education Relationships
For the selected MSAs, Table 3.5 shows how education and
its distribution changed among wage earners between the ages
of 25 and 64. Table 3.5 reports the proportion of the earners
who had attained between 12 and 16 years of education and
the educational Gini. The “least educated” 5 MSAs are Los
Angeles, New York City, and Lawrence; the “best educated”
are Lincoln (“college town” and state capital), Norfolk (naval
base), Johnstown, and Pittsburgh.
The MSAs with lower educational attainment also had more
educational inequality. Los Angeles and New York City have
the greatest inequality and the lowest education; Lawrence is
next on both dimensions. Lincoln has the highest education
and the least inequality.
The changes over the decade show a similar relationship
across the columns. MSAs that had greater rates of increase in
the proportion of earners with 12 to 16 years of education tend
to have less increase in educational inequality. The greatest
increases in the proportion of earners with 12 to 16 years of
education were for Norfolk and Lafayette; both had relatively
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modest increases in their education Ginis. Lowell, Lawrence,
and Los Angeles showed modest increases in the proportion of
earners with 12 to 16 years of education, and their increases in
the educational Gini were relatively high. However, these education data do not clearly distinguish patterns that differentiate
those MSAs that had less income divergence, or income divergence seemingly out of line with earnings divergence, from the
others.
Local Labor Market
As the primary source of income for most households, both the
quantity and the quality of jobs available in the local labor market are
likely to influence household income inequality and poverty levels.
The distribution of the quality of jobs (at least in terms of their wages)
is represented by the Gini coefficient for wage and salary income
across all earners in the MSA. Greater earnings inequality is expected
to create more poverty in the MSA. 6 Measures of the availability
(quantity) of jobs must be sensitive to the overall competition for the
jobs. The availability of jobs is measured by the ratio of employment
to the 25- to 64-year-old population in the MSA. As this proportion
increases, workers in the MSA find it easier to find a job and the labor
market is tighter. Increasing tightness of the labor market raises all
wages, but particularly the wages of less-skilled workers relative to
high-skilled workers, which reduces poverty.
The data in Table 3.3 indicate that there was an increase in earnings inequality within MSAs, leading to the expectation that poverty
would increase. The average Gini coefficient for wage and salary
income increased from 0.454 in 1979 to 0.466. The average MSA had
an increase of 2.8 percent in its Gini coefficient for earnings. Counteracting this upwards pressure on poverty rates was the fact that the ratio
of employment to population between ages 25 and 64 increased from
an average of 69.9 percent to 74.7 percent, with the growth in this proportion averaging 6.9 percent between 1980 and 1990. Madison, Wisconsin, had the highest ratio in 1980 and 1990, while McAllen, Texas,
had the lowest in 1990 and also had the greatest decrease in this ratio
between 1980 and 1990.
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Table 3.5 Skill Characteristics of Selected MSAs
Earners with 12–16 years
of education
MSAsa

1990
(%)

Education Gini

Change since 1980
(%)

1990

Change since 1980
(%)

Group A
Chicago

76.7

11.9

0.136

23.1

Los Angeles

71.4

5.2

0.171

35.4

Dallas

77.0

12.9

0.138

26.5

San Diego

80.7

8.4

0.126

26.8

Norfolk

82.0

15.4

0.113

15.2

Group B
Pittsburgh

82.0

8.9

0.114

25.9

Buffalo

79.9

10.9

0.120

24.1

Newark

75.3

9.4

0.138

21.7

Johnstown

82.0

7.9

0.104

24.2

New York City

72.3

11.9

0.152

20.3

Philadelphia

78.6

11.2

0.125

33.9

77.8

2.4

0.130

44.8

Group C
Lowell

a

Lafayette

79.0

15.3

0.131

8.7

Raleigh

77.6

13.3

0.126

13.8

Lawrence

73.8

7.2

0.151

50.1

Lincoln

83.6

9.6

0.107

17.4

Listed within groups by percentage change in household income Gini, highest to lowest.
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Employment Relationships
In the groups of selected MSAs, four—Norfolk, Lowell,
Raleigh, and Lincoln—moved toward greater equality in the
earnings distribution among workers (Table 3.6). Norfolk,
Lincoln, and Raleigh also had strong increases in job availability (employment-to-population ratio), while Lowell had a
smaller increase. Consistent with the observation made by
Freeman (1996) about institutionally set wages being more
equally distributed (discussed in Chapter 2), Norfolk, Raleigh,
and Lincoln are centers for government employment.
For Norfolk, the employment increase translated into a large
decrease in the proportion of households without earners, but
Lowell, Raleigh, and Lincoln all saw their proportion of
households without earners increase. Because these three
MSAs had relatively low proportions of households without
earners (10 or 11 percent in 1989), the increase was on a very
small base. Nonetheless, these data point to the importance of
the number of jobs and their distribution among households in
mediating the effects of shifts in the wage distribution.
If an MSA’s population is aging, then there may be an
increase in the proportion of elderly households that include
retired workers and, therefore, an increase in no-earner households. This appears to have been the case for Lowell and
Lafayette, for example; Lowell had a 63.5 percent increase and
Lafayette a 31.7 percent increase in the proportion of householders that were over age 65 (see Table 3.4). A similar pattern exists for Pittsburgh.
Employment-to-population ratios decreased in only Lafayette and Lawrence. These two MSAs have the lowest employment-to-population ratios in the small MSA group, at 0.70.
Given that within each group, the MSAs are listed in order
of their 1979–1989 change in household income inequality
(greatest to least), both the employment-to-population ratio
and the proportion of no-earner households appear related to
household income inequality. Those MSAs listed first in each
group (Table 3.6) generally have lower rates of growth in
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employment-to-population ratio and higher rates of growth in
no-earner households. The growth in no-earner households
might be more important, however. New York City experienced relatively less growth in household income inequality
and had little change in the employment-to-population ratio;
there was a substantial decrease, however, in no-earner households. Lowell and Lawrence, Massachusetts, also provide
interesting cases. Lowell had a greater rate of increase in
household income inequality, even though it had a slight
increase in the employment ratio and Lawrence had a
decrease. Yet, there is a substantial difference between these
two small Massachusetts MSAs in the rate at which the proportion of no-earner households grew.
While the data on the local labor market from these selected
MSAs are consistent with labor markets strongly influencing
household income inequality, it is very clear that the distribution of employment across households may also be an important consideration. The way that earners form households or
that household members decide about seeking jobs may counteract or expand the influence of local labor market changes.

Structural Characteristics
The geography of an MSA may affect the level of income inequality or of poverty and its distribution between city and suburbs. MSAs
with more population growth are experiencing greater rates of economic growth, resulting in lower poverty levels. MSAs that are
becoming more politically and economically integrated (as represented
by slower decreases in the proportion of the metropolitan population
living in the central city, annexation of surrounding communities by
the central city, and less residential segregation by race) are expected to
have less poverty and income inequality.
Table 3.3 indicates that the average MSA population in the sample
in 1990 was 898,600, with Los Angeles the largest and Alexandria,
Louisiana, the smallest of the 182 MSAs. The greatest population

MSAsa

Earnings Gini
Change since
1989
1979 (%)

Employment/pop. ratio
Change since
1989
1979 (%)

Group A
Chicago
0.462
5.9
0.76
5.8
Los Angeles
0.483
6.5
0.73
2.5
Dallas
0.474
5.5
0.79
2.8
San Diego
0.469
0.7
0.76
8.8
Norfolk
0.438
–0.9
0.77
10.3
Group B
Pittsburgh
0.485
10.1
0.70
9.4
Buffalo
0.467
4.2
0.72
9.7
Newark
0.474
4.0
0.77
7.4
Johnstown
0.451
0.6
0.65
17.3
New York City
0.463
6.1
0.70
3.7
Philadelphia
0.461
2.8
0.76
12.4
Group C
Lowell
0.425
–2.3
0.77
1.4
Lafayette
0.497
2.6
0.70
–1.7
Raleigh
0.456
–0.9
0.82
5.6
Lawrence
0.397
0.7
0.70
–3.5
Lincoln
0.468
–0.4
0.84
6.0
a Listed within groups by percentage change in household income Gini, highest to lowest.
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Table 3.6 Local Labor Market Conditions in Selected MSAs
No-earner hh.
Change since
1989 (%)
1979 (%)
14
14
16
17
11

4.2
–0.4
–0.1
–9.2
–11.0

20
17
12
23
18
15

20.3
10.6
–12.1
12.5
–16.0
–13.5

10
16
10
20
11

48.7
45.9
1.6
16.8
18.2
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growth (66.2 percent) was experienced by Riverside, California, and
the least by Fall River, Massachusetts (–11.3 percent). The proportion
of the metropolitan workforce employed in the central city averaged
0.565 in 1980, decreasing to 0.551 in 1990; El Paso, Texas, had the
highest proportion in 1990 and Benton Harbor, Michigan, had the lowest in both years. The average MSA experienced a decrease of 2.4 percent in this proportion; Fort Collins, Colorado (which engaged in
substantial annexation), experienced the greatest percentage increase
and Charleston, South Carolina, the greatest decrease. A smaller proportion of MSA residents live in the central city, about 0.410 in both
years. Because the average central city’s proportion of MSA residents
decreased more than its proportion of workers, the average MSA
increased the workers/residents ratio in the central city by 3.15 percent
(Table 3.3).
Annexation of surrounding communities by the central city was
common (data not shown) with the average MSA central city increasing its physical territory by 13 percent; a handful of central cities ceded
small areas to other communities.
African Americans residing in these MSAs became less residentially segregated over the decade. The greatest increase in segregation
index was for Lawrence, Massachusetts, which has one of the lowest
absolute levels of segregation in the nation; Melbourne, Florida, had
the greatest decline.

Population Relationships

For the selected MSAs, Table 3.7 shows that, at least for
groups A and B, the MSAs with the greatest growth in household income inequality tended to be losing population. This
was true for Chicago, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Newark, and
Johnstown. The MSAs with the least growth in inequality also
seemed to be growing in population, as was the case for Dallas, San Diego, Norfolk, Raleigh, and Lawrence.
Most central cities lost population share to their surrounding
suburbs, while their share of the MSA’s poor population
increased (see Figure 1.3). Other than New York City (which
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experienced slight growth), the central cities of the larger
MSAs declined in MSA population share. There was no
apparent relationship between changes in household income
inequality and changes in the proportion of MSA residents in
the central city.
There was more variation in the ratio of the central city’s
proportion of MSA jobs to its proportion of the MSA residents. The central cities of Pittsburgh and New York City
decreased in this ratio, indicating that the job market may have
become more difficult for central city residents. Improvement
in the central city job market appears to have little relationship
to changes in household income inequality among these
MSAs.
Racial segregation declined in these MSAs. The MSAs
with the least growth in household inequality (all MSAs in
group A) had larger decreases in segregation; however, there is
no other apparent relationship for the MSAs in Table 3.7
between rates of change in racial segregation and in household
income inequality.

SUMMARY
There are substantial variations in earnings and income inequality;
poverty rates; demographic and skill compositions; geographic structure; and labor market opportunities among MSAs. While for some of
the MSAs highlighted in this chapter, household income inequality and
earnings inequality have changed in similar ways, for others there are
very dramatic differences. Some of these MSAs have experienced
changes in household structure and in the distribution of employment
that may plausibly explain why changes in earnings inequality did not
translate directly into changes in household inequality.
A more systematic exploration of variations in these characteristics
across MSAs provides a potential means for identifying the characteristics of local economies that are associated with growth in income inequality and poverty rates and with differential growth in the
concentration of poverty in central cities.

Table 3.7 MSA Structure, Selected MSAs

MSAsa

Central city
annexation
(%)

Proportion residents
in central city

Change in
population
since 1980
(%)

1990
(%)

Change
since 1980
(%)

Change since
1980 in
jobs/residents
ratio in
central city (%)

Black/white
segregation index

1990

Change
since 1980
(%)

Group A
Chicago

0.2

–7.4

48.1

–6.8

4.0

87

–4.4

Los Angeles

0.9

18.5

48.2

–0.6

9.7

71

–11.3

10.7

30.6

55.0

–9.3

14.7

66

–18.5

San Diego

3.4

34.2

48.8

–3.5

4.7

59

–6.3

Norfolk

0.4

20.3

81.8

–2.5

–3.7

57

–12.3

Pittsburgh

0.0

–7.3

19.3

–6.1

–27.0

75

0.0

Buffalo

0.0

–4.3

35.3

–4.0

15.3

84

0.0

Newark

0.0

–7.2

23.2

–8.8

34.7

83

–1.2

Johnstown

3.5

–9.1

13.2

–12.0

–18.1

82

0.0

New York City

0.0

3.3

86.2

0.2

–7.6

78

0.0

Philadelphia

0.0

3.0

38.3

–8.5

1.6

82

–1.2

Dallas

Group B

(continued)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Proportion residents
in central city
Change
since 1980
(%)

1990

Change
since 1980
(%)

39.5

–4.5

–12.1

65

–5.9

10.0

47.4

–5.1

–5.2

60

–3.2

1990
(%)

7.0

17.2

Lafayette

51.3

Raleigh

MSAsa

Central city
annexation
(%)

Black/white
segregation index

Change since
1980 in
jobs/residents
ratio in
central city (%)

Change in
population
since 1980
(%)

Group C
Lowell

a

66.7

31.6

54.2

–11.4

–11.4

57

–8.1

Lawrence

4.5

39.7

39.0

–20.6

–12.4

41

7.9

Lincoln

5.5

10.9

89.1

0.7

–0.9

49

–3.9

Listed within groups by percentage change in household income Gini, highest to lowest.
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Notes
1. The 182 largest MSAs in this study are those MSAs included in the 200 largest by
population size in both 1980 and 1990. A complete list of these MSAs and the
data used in the analyses appear in the Appendix.
2. The Gini coefficient measures the difference between the actual distribution and a
completely equal distribution of income or earnings. It takes on values between 0
and 1. If, in actuality, all MSA residents had the same income or wage levels,
then there would be no difference between the actual distribution and a completely equal distribution. The Gini coefficient would be 0. At the other extreme,
if all income were received by only one household and the others had no income,
the Gini coefficient would be 1. The Gini coefficient is discussed in greater detail
in the next chapter.
3. In 1990, 2 percent of the residents who were in-migrants came from abroad or
from nonmetropolitan U.S. locations.
4. There was a change in the way that educational attainment was reported between
the 1980 and the 1990 censuses. The 1980 census reported by year of final attainment, while the 1990 census aggregated across some years (such as grades 1 to 4
and 5 to 8) and reported type of education rather than years for those with 13 to 15
years). For 1990, the median value for the aggregated category was assigned to
each individual in the category and a similar “aggregation” and assignment of
median value was done for 1980. Fewer than 1 percent of persons age 25 to 64 in
1990 were in the aggregated categories for the lower levels of education.
5. Assuming that persons who did not fall between 12 and 16 years of education
were more likely to be high school drop-outs than graduate-school attendees.
6. Poverty rates are defined with respect to household income and size. It is important to distinguish the earnings Gini, which results from the labor market conditions facing individual workers, from household income inequality and household
or personal poverty rates, which result from the household formation decisions of
income producers, as well as from the earnings inequality among those producers.
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4

Measuring Effects of MSA
Characteristics on
Income Distribution

The data in Chapter 3 document the wide range of experiences in
both the levels of inequality and poverty among U.S. metropolitan areas
and the different changes in those measures during the 1980s. Can we
get a better understanding of why metropolitan area experiences are different? This chapter discusses several methodological issues raised by
an analysis of the experiences of metropolitan areas, including issues
involved in 1) measurement of income distribution; 2) geographic
boundaries for measuring income distributional differences; 3) methods
for analyzing how demographic factors influence aggregate measures
of distribution; and 4) the models and specifications used to estimate
the correlates of changes in this study.

MEASURING INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The discussion of potential causes and effects of changes in the
income distribution or of policies to alter the income distribution must
be premised on measurements of the relative equality of the distribution.
How Income Is Measured
Current income is the sum of monetary wages and salaries, net
income from self-employment, Social Security income plus cash transfers from other government programs, property income (for example,
interests, dividends, net rental income), and other forms of cash
income (such as private pensions and alimony). Current income does
not include capital gains, imputed rents from owner-occupied housing,
or government or private benefits in-kind (such as food stamps, Medicare benefits, employer-provided health insurance or other fringe bene-
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fits), nor does it subtract taxes (although all of these affect a
household’s or an individual’s consumption levels).
Novak and Green (1986) argued that the patterns of increasing
household inequality and poverty rates are far overstated because of
the increasing importance of in-kind government benefits (such as
health care, food stamps, and public housing) and of fringe benefits in
the compensation package that workers receive. They report that food,
housing, and medical noncash assistance targeted to low-income persons totals more than twice the amount distributed as cash assistance.
Noncash assistance programs were initiated in the late 1960s and
early 1970s and were then expanded. There is little evidence that these
in-kind government benefits compensate, however, for the increasing
inequality documented for the 1980s. The proportion of households
receiving noncash benefits (including food stamps, school lunches,
public housing, and/or Medicaid) actually declined from 17.3 percent
of U.S. households in 1980 to 16.1 percent in 1989. 1 In addition, the
value of the benefits received per household declined in real terms.
Novak and Green also reported that employer contributions for
employee pension and health benefits are three times the level of government noncash assistance targeted to low-income families. Because
these payments are more likely to flow to middle- and upper-income
families, however, they may actually increase income inequality.
Smeeding (1983) reported that the addition of fringe benefits to earnings increased the Gini coefficient for all earners by 3.1 points.
Computations of income equality that include noncash income are
not likely to show less growth in inequality. In fact, Cutler and Katz
(1992) analyzed consumption (as opposed to income) data and found
strong evidence of increasing household inequality.
The analyses presented in this book are based entirely on cash
income reported by respondents to the U.S. census. Because these
respondents do not report on fringe benefits or other non-monetary
sources of income, I am not able to include such income. While those
who have examined these items in more detail in the national economy
have found that their inclusion does not substantially alter the measured changes in equality based on money income, I do not know how
the inclusion of this income would alter the way that inequality
changed across MSAs in the 1980s.
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How Inequality Is Measured
The most commonly used measure of income inequality in the
popular media is the poverty rate, which provides a measure of the proportion of persons whose income is not sufficient to provide for a
defined set of basic needs. It is also possible to examine the share of
total income accruing to various segments of the income distribution,
such as the proportion of total income accruing to each quintile. Studies of earnings or income inequality, however, typically rely on a scalar
measure of income inequality that permits comparisons between the
relative equality of alternative distributions. A typical measure, such as
the Gini coefficient, ranks a set of distributions in terms of increasing
inequality. It is well known, however, that the Gini coefficient does not
necessarily rank a given set of distributions in the same way as other
measures (such as the coefficient of variation or the variance of the natural log of earnings or income [Sen 1973; Slottje 1989; Karoly 1988,
1992]). The poverty rate and the Gini coefficient, used in this study,
are explored in more detail below.
Poverty Rate
Persons or households are considered to be poor, or in poverty, if
their incomes are below the poverty level defined by a threshold developed by the U.S. Social Security Administration in 1963. The index is
based solely on money income and does not reflect the fact that many
low-income persons receive noncash benefits. Income thresholds are
defined separately by family size and the age of the household head, in
each case based on the 1963 cost of an inexpensive, but nutritionally
sound, food plan designed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
This cost is multiplied by three (assuming that households spend onethird of their income on food) and has been adjusted upward by
changes in the Consumer Price Index since 1963. For a household of
four persons, the 1989 poverty-level income was $12,675, based on
inflationary adjustments to the 1963 level of $3,128; for a one-person
household, under age 65, the 1989 poverty-level income was $6,311.
There is an equivalence scaling implicit in the poverty rate that reduces
the necessary per capita income as household size increases.
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Gini Coefficient
The Gini coefficient, a widely used distributional index that takes
on values between 0 and 1, measures the difference between the actual
distribution and a completely equal distribution of income or earnings.
If, in actuality, all incomes were the same, then there would be no difference between the actual distribution and a completely equal distribution, and the Gini coefficient would be 0. At the other extreme, if all
income was received by only one household, the Gini coefficient
would be 1. Unlike the poverty rate, the Gini coefficient does not take
account of household size; i.e., there is no equivalence scaling that
adjusts for well-being based on household size.
The U.S. census tabulates and publishes Gini coefficients only for
the family distribution of income. A family is defined as a group of
two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing in the same household. A household is defined as the person or the
group of persons that occupies a housing unit. Individuals living alone
or with unrelated individuals are not counted as families. Because the
proportion of the population living in families has declined, changes in
the family Gini coefficient over time (or spatial areas) may arise from
changes in who lives in families as well as changes in how income
flows to families. The Gini coefficient for household income, which
includes the entire non-institutionalized population, is not subject to
this selection bias.
Although the Gini coefficient is a commonly used index of inequality, it is harder to interpret than the poverty rate or shares of
income accruing to persons in various proportions of the distribution.
The Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes in the middle of the
distribution than it is to changes at the extreme ends. It also does not
distinguish between inequality caused by very high incomes in the
upper levels of the distribution and that caused by very low incomes at
the extreme bottom.
Many studies that report Gini coefficients use calculations based
on grouped data, frequently computed for the earnings and income data
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in Current Population Reports,
Consumer Income, Series P-60. 2 Gini coefficients computed from
grouped data tend to be lower than those computed from individual
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data because of the “smooth-out” differences within quintiles or
deciles.
In order to evaluate overall changes in income equality, to consider
the effect of income on well-being, and to examine which segments of
the income distribution account for changes, this study will analyze the
poverty rate for individuals, the household Gini coefficient, 3 and the
shares accruing to quintiles of households.

UNITS OF ANALYSIS: RATES OF CHANGE WITHIN
MSA BOUNDARIES
An analysis that attempts to measure the factors that contribute to
changes in the distribution of income must be a macro, or an economywide, analysis. The distribution of income is, by definition, a measure
that aggregates the experiences of individuals, households, etc., in a
particular economy. While data on individuals can be used to analyze
the determinants of individual levels of earnings or of decisions to
form households, the measurement of income distribution differences
requires information on how individuals rank vis-a-vis other individuals in the economy, and also on the magnitude of the differences in
income or wages between any two ranks. These measures can only be
derived in the context of an entire economy.
Subnational areas, for which market exchanges are substantially
greater among areas within the boundaries than they are among areas
outside the boundaries, constitute markets and, in that sense, economies. To the extent that there are several subnational areas that can be
delineated as markets or economies, we have “more data” that can be
used to analyzed the relationship between the characteristics of the
economy or the market and inequality. As explained in the first chapter, metropolitan areas are defined by such exchanges and constitute
economies. Although the nation also represents an economy “for
which market exchanges are substantially greater among areas within
the boundaries than they are among areas outside the boundaries,” inequality within the local market is also of direct policy concern: residents may be more sensitive to local inequality and local area markets
have a substantial influence upon income of residents.
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Cross-sectional studies of areas such as MSAs raise a different set
of difficulties, however.4 There are likely to be many more underlying
differences between any two metropolitan areas at the same point in
time than there are between two time periods within the same metropolitan area or nation. Many, probably most, of these differences are
not easily measured. These differences may be correlated with some
of the measured characteristics that are of prime policy or analytical
interest. For example, consider the case of MSAs dominated by a large
research university—such as Urbana, Illinois, or Gainesville, Florida.
These MSAs have different educational, migration, and labor force
participation characteristics and a different age distribution than other
MSAs of similar size and regional location. They also have a disproportionate share of households and earners with relatively low income
for their educational attainment. These incomes are low because
household members, often working at least part time, are pursuing a
degree or supporting a family member in his or her pursuit of a degree.
Their incomes will rise later, but, for most, at a different location. A
study that examined the effects of labor force participation, education,
and migration on poverty rates or income inequality in these MSAs,
without taking note of the unique situation, would underestimate the
effect of education and labor force participation by the more educated
on income and poverty. It would be misleading. While these particular unique characteristics could be measured, they are illustrative of the
types of differences that exist in MSAs that make cross-sectional comparisons problematic. Other MSAs may offer an amenity that appeal
to a particular class of workers or households and result in their willingness to take lower earnings. It is difficult to measure these subtleties in a large cross-sectional analysis.
MSAs offer a large number of observations of different markets
that permit a statistical analysis of the correlates of and effects of various characteristics on income inequality and poverty, but, any such
study must develop a methodology that considers the “unobserved”
differences between MSAs that are correlated with the study variables.
By comparing changes in the MSA income inequality over a decade,
the effects of “unobserved” differences between MSAs that affect inequality but that do not change over the decade (i.e., fixed effects) can
be eliminated.
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In order to improve our understanding of how the characteristics of
a macro-economy are related to inequality and poverty within the
economy, this study examines changes in inequality and poverty within
MSAs over a decade.

ANALYZING THE ROLE OF DEMOGRAPHICS
Inequality has been measured and analyzed for the distribution of
income or wages among individuals, among households, and among
spatial units such as census divisions or municipalities and census
tracts in the same urban area. As wages accrue to individuals, it is reasonable to measure inequality in terms of differences among individuals. Indexes of wage or earnings equality do not necessarily translate
into indexes of income or consumption inequality among individuals.
With the exception of some studies that have examined the effect
of changes in the return on capital,5 discussion about the distribution of
income or earnings proceeds as if the two distributions and their determinants were the same. Although earnings account for most household income and variations in earnings account for much of the
growing inequality in household income, the growing gap between the
richest and the poorest of households involves more than changes in
earnings rates (or changes in returns on capital). The patterns of
changes in household income inequality and in earnings inequality
illustrated in Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 3.2a–c make it very clear that earnings inequality cannot explain household income inequality. Because
households with no workers account for an increasing share of the
poorest households, any change in the real wages of low-wage workers
has no direct effect on their share of income. Among richer households, there is an increasing likelihood of multiple earners. While the
incomes of such households are affected by the wage rates of their
earners, they are also strongly affected by the number of earners. Inequality in the distribution of household income is also affected, therefore, by marriage, divorce, and fertility decisions, as well as by the
labor force participation decisions of household members.
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How Changes in Demographic Structure Affect Distribution
While measuring the Gini coefficient for subpopulations can be of
assistance in helping us to understand the sources of the overall MSA
shifts in the income or earnings distribution, it is incorrect to conclude
that changes in the relative representation of segments of the population that have more or less unequal distributions account for the overall
changes. For example, the distributions of earnings among women,
African-American workers, and Hispanic workers have become more
unequal during the 1980s, and their representation in the total workforce has increased. But even if the overall distribution did not change,
we still might observe increasing inequality among these subpopulations as opportunities for advancement became more available.
The role of shifts in demographics cannot be measured by a
“decomposition analysis” that sums the effects of changes for each particular demographic subgroup. While a decomposition analysis can
define the direct effects of demographic shifts, it cannot detect interactions. Shifts in the distribution for one subgroup may affect distributions among other demographic groups and a decomposition analysis
cannot detect these interactions. For example, the increasing inequality among women, African-American, and Hispanic workers mentioned above may increase inequality among men and non-black
Hispanics, who now encounter more competition for high wage jobs
and therefore are increasingly likely to have the low wage jobs that
were previously occupied by minorities and women.
The direct effect of demographic characteristics of the population
on income or earnings inequality within metropolitan areas depends on
two factors: 1) the mean income or earnings of those having the characteristic compared with others; and 2) the relative equality of the distribution of income or earnings of those with the characteristic
compared to others. In analyzing changes in income inequality within
MSAs, then, the changes in mean income of the subpopulation and in
their level of income equality relative to the total population are the relevant data. If the mean, or the change in the mean, is substantially
lower (higher) than that of the rest of the population and the distribution, or the change in the distribution, is the same, increases in the proportion with the characteristic will increase inequality; if the mean, or
the change in the mean, is close to the rest of the population, but the
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distribution (or the change in the distribution) is more unequal,
increases in the proportion with the characteristic will increase inequality; all other combinations—i.e., an equivalent mean and equivalent distribution or a substantially lower (higher) mean but greater
equality of distribution—mean that increases in the proportion with the
characteristic will have less effect on the equality of the distribution.
Table 4.1 provides the Gini coefficient (MSA average), the mean
household income (average across the means for MSAs) for various
subpopulations of households for 1979 and 1989, and the change since
1979.
Table 4.1 Mean Gini Coefficient and Income for MSA Subpopulations of
Households
Population

Gini

Multiple of
1979 Gini

Income
($)

Multiple of
1979 income

1979
Total

0.37

–

17,144

–

Female-headed hh.

0.44

–

11,874

–

No-earner hh.

0.57

–

8,503

–

Multi-earner hh.

0.27

–

26,764

–

African-Americanheaded hh.

0.43

–

14,465

–

Elderly-headed hh.

0.45

–

12,238

–

In-migrant hh.

0.38

–

18,986

–

1989
Total

0.41

1.11

31,930

1.86

Female-headed hh.

0.45

1.02

23,891

2.01

No-earner hh.

0.56

0.98

16,772

1.97

Multi-earner hh.

0.31

1.15

49,938

1.87

African-Americanheaded hh.

0.44

1.02

25,715

1.78

Elderly-headed hh.

0.45

1.00

24,832

2.03

In-migrant hh.

0.41

1.08

37,015

1.95
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The proportion of households that have no earners and the proportion that have more than one earner affect income inequality. Households with no earners have substantially higher within-group inequality
(Gini coefficients of 0.57 and 0.56, substantially higher than the 0.37
and 0.41 observed for all households) and lower average income than
other households. Because households with no earners have substantially lower incomes than those with earners, MSAs experiencing
increases in the proportion of no-earner households should experience
increasing income inequality. As the distribution of income among noearner households became more equal both absolutely and relative to
the overall population between 1979 and 1989, however, and as their
average income grew more than that of all households, the effects on
MSA inequality of changes in the proportion of no-earner households
was dampened.
Households with more than one earner have higher incomes than
other households, but the within-group income distribution is more
equal than for other households. Because these two characteristics are
potentially offsetting in their effects on overall MSA inequality, the
effect of increases in the proportion of households with more than one
earner on household income inequality is not clear.
Because African-American households have both lower incomes
and slightly more unequally distributed incomes than other households, increases in the proportion of households headed by African
Americans are expected to increase inequality. The slower growth in
income inequality (1.02) dampens the effect, while the slower growth
in average income (1.78) increases the effect.
Because senior citizens have lower average incomes and more
within-group income inequality than other household categories,
increases in the proportion of households headed by persons over age
65 are expected to increase inequality. The changes between 1979 and
1989 (no change in inequality and greater growth in average income)
would dampen the effect of changes in the age composition of households on overall MSA inequality.
Because households headed by women have fewer potential earners
than households headed by couples and have earners with lower potential earnings, on average, than households headed by men, they have
lower incomes than other households. Table 4.1 also indicates that
female-headed households have slightly greater within-group income
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inequality than other households. Therefore, MSAs with larger proportions of women-headed households are expected to have more inequality in household income. The greater increase in average income and
the slower increase in inequality would dampen that effect, however.
Increases in the rate of in-migration can be a result of inequality or
a cause of inequality. If inequality has prompted a relatively higher
income group to migrate, then the new in-migration should decrease
inequality. If the in-migration is not in response to the level or the distribution of income in the MSA but is prompted by (or is reflective of)
other characteristics of the metropolitan area, then the in-migration
may increase or decrease inequality, depending on the extent to which
the distribution of income among in-migrants is more or less equal
than the distribution among existing residents. Table 4.1 shows that inmigrants in 1979 had within-group inequality (0.38) and income
($18,986) levels similar to those for all households, but in 1989 their
income advantage increased (as a proportion of 1979 income, 1.95 for
in-migrants vs. 1.86 for all households).

THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH
The debate over the sources of rising poverty and inequality in
both income and earnings is not a conceptual debate. The conceptual
framework is clear; it is the relative (or empirical) importance of the
forces that affect income or earnings inequality that is debated.
The theory of earnings inequality is based on the theory of wage
determination. Wages are relatively higher for more highly paid workers than for lower-wage workers when there is relatively greater
demand for highly paid workers, when there is relatively less supply of
highly skilled workers, or when there is an institutional force that sets
wages less equally. MSA differences in demand for workers by skill
level are measured by industrial structure, which reflects differences
arising from different techniques of production as well as differences
in the product produced. MSA differences in supply are measured by
the level and distribution of skills in the labor force and the overall
employment-to-population ratio. Institutional forces that affect earnings equality include the presence or absence of unions, market imper-
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fections, or discriminatory behavior that interferes with the market
determination of wages.
The sources of household income inequality, and poverty that is
based on household income measurement, include the factors that
affect earnings inequality, but also include factors that affect the way
wage earners form households and the decisions of household members on whether and how much to work. Household income is higher
as the number of wage earners residing in the household increases.
The overall relationship between household income distribution and
the number of wage earners depends, however, on whether households
with a relatively high-end wage earner are more or less likely than
those with a relatively low-end wage earner to have additional household members in the workforce.
We attempt to sort out the relationship between household inequality and changes in local labor market conditions from that between
household inequality and changes in demographic or social structure. I
estimate two equations: an equation to measure the systematic relationships between changes in an MSA’s economic and demographic characteristics and changes in its household income inequality or poverty
rate, and an equation measuring the systematic relationships between
changes in an MSA’s economic characteristics and various measures of
earnings inequality.
These equations are estimated across the 182 largest MSAs using
the percentage change6 in the Ginis and characteristics. Specifically,
∆HYGINI j = α 0 + α1∆DEM j + α 2 ∆SKILL j
+ α 3 ∆LOC j + α 4 ∆LM j + ε j
and
∆EARNGINI ji = α 0 + α1∆DEM j + α 2 ∆SKILL j
+ α 3 ∆LOC j + α 4 ∆LM j + α 5 ∆INDj + ε ji

where
∆HYGINIj

= the change in the Gini coefficient for household
income, or the change in the personal poverty rate,
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∆DEMj

= a vector of metropolitan-specific variables reflecting changes in MSA demographic characteristics;
∆SKILLj
= a vector of MSA-specific variables reflecting
changes in the skills of the local labor force;
∆LOCj is a vector of MSA-specific variables
reflecting changes in economic and structural
characteristics;
∆LMj
= a vector of MSA-specific variables reflecting
changes in the labor market, including the distribution of earnings and the employment-to-population ratio;
∆EARNGINIji = the change in the Gini coefficient for wage and
salaries among workers of group i in metropolitan
area j;
∆INDj
= a vector of changes in MSA-specific variables
reflecting the industrial composition of employment; and
= are error terms.
εj, εji
The variables included in ∆DEMj are the change in mean number
of persons per household, the change in the proportions of households
headed by women and by persons over age 65, the change in proportions of the population who are African American and who have moved
into the metropolitan area in the last five years, and the change in proportions of households that include multiple earners and that include
no earners.
The variation in demographic characteristics across MSAs is substantial. Table 3.3 shows that, in the average MSA, there was an
increase of over 50 percent in the proportion of households headed by
someone over 65 and of 15.3 percent in the proportion of households
headed by women. The average MSA increased its African-American
representation by 27.9 percent.
The variables included in ∆SKILLj, the change in median education and the change in a Gini coefficient computed on the distribution
of the highest level of educational attainment across persons over age
25 in each metropolitan area, measure the skill distribution. Increases
in the average level of educational attainment are expected to increase
productivity, and therefore average earnings, but to decrease inequality
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(after controlling for the Gini coefficient on educational attainment),
because increases in education decrease the significance of a year’s difference in attainment. The greater the Gini coefficient for education,
the greater the Gini coefficient for earnings; that is, the more inequality
in the distribution of education across the population, the greater the
inequality in earnings. These variables are also demographic or social
variables that influence the equality of income across households or
families, in that they affect the potential for sorting persons of more or
less equal earnings potential across households. The greater the Gini
coefficient for education, the more inequality in the distribution of education across the population, and the greater the possibility that selective “mating” will magnify inequality in household or family income.
The variables included in ∆LOCj, measuring changes in metropolitan economic and structural characteristics, are changes in mean
income, population size, and the ratio of the proportion of the workforce employed in the central city of the MSA to the proportion of the
MSA’s residents living in the central city. Although there has been
much discussion about the effects of the level or character of economic
development on inequality, there is no conceptual reason to expect that
economic development decreases inequality. Previous studies have
consistently found, however, that inequality levels decrease with
income levels. Therefore, it is expected that increases in mean income
will have a negative effect on changes in the Gini coefficient. Change
in population size is an index that reflects the effects of growth, economies (or diseconomies) of scale, labor market competition, and the cost
of living on the distribution of income or earnings. On one hand, if
increases in income decrease inequality, an increase in the cost of living (which occurs as population size increases) should increase inequality, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, increases in economies of
scale and in efficiency that arise from increases in competition (both
positively correlated with population) should decrease inequality.
Therefore, the effect of changes in population size on inequality is a
priori indeterminant.
Ginis for MSAs in the same region may depend not only on aggregate conditions in that MSA, but also on conditions in neighboring
MSAs. A series of regional dummies was included, but only that for
the South (actually South Central) was close to significant. Although
MSAs in the South have historically had more unequal income distri-
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butions, it is not apparent whether those historic conditions should
affect changes in the 1980s. The proportion of the population resident
in the central city of the MSA measures the extent of municipal government fragmentation. Because greater fragmentation of local governments is both a cause and an effect of spatial variation in income,
decreases in the proportion living in the city represent increases in
fragmentation that are expected to be associated with increased inequality and poverty. The ratio of the proportion of the workforce
employed in the central city of the MSA to the proportion of the population resident in the central city measures the importance of job accessibility to the lower-income persons, who are more likely than higherincome persons to be residing in the central city. Because greater suburbanization of employment is both a cause and an effect of spatial
variation in income, increases in this ratio are expected to decrease
poverty and inequality.
The variables included in ∆LMj are the changes in the employment-to-population ratio and ∆EARNGINIj. ∆EARNGINIj, which will
be defined alternately for all wage and salary workers and for full-time,
full-year workers in the MSA, allows a precise control for the effects of
the earnings structure of the local labor market. Obviously, we expect
that ∆EARNGINIj has a positive influence on changes in the inequality
of household income, but the more important question is the relative
importance of household formation patterns versus the effect of the
earnings structure of the local labor market on household income inequality.
The variables included in ∆INDj are measures of changes in industrial composition. The effects of industrial composition on earnings
inequality depend on both the relationship of the mean wage in the
industry to the mean wage in the region and the relationship of the distribution of wages within the industry to that within other industries in
the region. Because durable-goods manufacturing pays a higher wage
(but a more equally distributed wage) than other industries, MSAs
experiencing an increase in the proportion of workers employed in
durable-goods manufacturing are expected to experience a decrease in
earnings inequality. Because producer services pay a higher but more
unequally distributed wage than other industries, MSAs experiencing
an increase in the proportion of workers employed in producer services
are expected to experience an increase in earnings inequality.
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The results of estimating these models are presented in the next
four chapters.

Notes
1. Computed from data presented in Table No. 585 of Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1991.
2. See, for example, Galster, McCorkhill, and Gopalan (1988); Henle (1972); Henle
and Ryscavage (1980); Ryscavage and Henle (1990); Cloutier (1997).
3. Because the census does not publish household Gini coefficients by MSA, these
data (and all the other Gini coefficients used in this study) were computed by the
author from the 5 percent PUMS sample.
4. The reasons for selecting MSAs as the geographic units of analysis in this study
are discussed in pp. 11–13 of Chapter 1.
5. Cutler and Katz (1992) examine the effects of changes in factor shares. They find
no evidence that the proportion of income distributed as earnings or payment to
labor has declined relative to capital. They do find evidence of a shift in how
returns on capital are paid out, however. They find that a higher proportion of
returns on capital were distributed as dividends rather than retained in firms during the 1980s than in previous years.
6. The percentage change is computed as the difference between the 1990 and 1980
values divided by the 1980 value.

5

Sources of Household
Income Inequality

Data from 182 metropolitan statistical areas are analyzed to measure the relationships between “within MSA” changes in the distribution of household income from 1979 to 1989 and changes in other
MSA characteristics (including changes in demographic and skill composition, the characteristics of the local labor market, and the geographic structure of the metropolitan region). Data from the PUMS
5% sample from the 1980 and the 1990 U.S. censuses are used to compile shares of MSA household income accruing to each quintile and
Gini coefficients for income and earnings distributions among households, workers, and various demographic subgroups in each of the 182
MSAs.
These analyses show that although MSAs that experienced
increases in earnings inequality had significantly greater increases in
income inequality among households, other MSA characteristics had
significant associations with rising inequality. Increases in the relative
amount of employment (represented by increases in the employment-to-population ratio) and changes in the distribution of workers
across households frequently influence the effects of rising earnings
inequality on household income inequality within MSAs.
This chapter presents the analyses of the MSA Gini coefficient of
household income and of the share of MSA household income accruing to each quintile.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Table 5.1 reports the correlates of changes in Gini coefficients for
household income in the 182 metropolitan areas between 1979 and
1989.1 The results of three different specifications are presented. The
first, called the basic model, includes changes in demographic structure
(age, race, gender, household size), skill composition (median education and the Gini coefficient on the distribution of years of education
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Table 5.1 Changes in Household Income Gini Coefficients for 182 MSAs,
1979 to 1989a
Adds local
labor market
and growthb

Basic model

Adds earners
per household

0.181
(4.54)
0.320

0.110
(2.77)
0.193

0.106
(3.24)
0.187

Change in % no-earner hh.

0.106
(3.12)
0.322

0.051
(1.66)
0.153

Change in % multiple-earner hh.

–0.066
(0.87)
–0.074

0.108
(1.47)
0.121

–0.011
(–1.40)
–0.83

–0.007
(–0.75)
–0.042

–0.003
(–0.53)
–0.026

Change in % elderly-headed hh.

0.041
(1.50)
0.099

–0.017
(–0.62)
–0.041

–0.017
(–0.73)
–0.040

Change in mean persons per hh.

–0.239
(–7.29)
–0.466

–0.270
(–8.75)
–0.528

–0.248
(–9.62)
–0.484

–0.034
(–0.52)
–0.027

0.028
(0.44)
0.022

–0.018
(–0.35)
–0.014

0.034
(0.89)
0.054

0.052
(1.43)
0.082

0.016
(0.52)
0.025

Independent variables
Demographic
Change in % female-headed hh.

Change in % pop.
African American

Skill
Change in median education

Change in education Gini

Local labor market
Change in earnings Gini

Change in employment-topopulation ratio

0.542
(7.84)
–0.283
–0.336
(–4.36)
–0.283
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Adds local
labor market
and growthb

Basic model

Adds earners
per household

Change in ratio of % work/% live
in central city

0.011
(0.72)
0.037

0.005
(0.30)
0.015

0.002
(0.13)
0.005

Population in 1980 (in 10,000s)

0.108
(4.59)
0.254

0.126
(5.73)
0.298

0.059
(2.86)
0.134

Change in residential segregation
indexc

0.001
(1.48)
0.078

0.000
(0.95)
0.047

0.000
(0.50)
0.023

1980 Household income Gini

–0.707
(–5.54)
–0.373

–0.497
(–3.78)
–0.262

–0.653
(–6.01)
–0.345

Change in residents in central city

–0.016
(–0.48)
–0.025

–0.012
(–0.40)
–0.019

0.038
(–0.40)
–0.058

South Central U.S.A.

0.026
(3.37)
0.209

0.014
(1.79)
0.109

0.004
(0.58)
0.025

Constant

0.287
(5.20)

0.210
(3.62)

0.290
(5.79)

Adj. R2

0.57

0.63

0.76

Independent variables
Other

a

The top number in each set of three is the regression coefficient. Significance is
defined as a t–statistic absolute value of less than 1.64. Numbers in parentheses are
t–statistics; numbers in italics are beta (standardized) coefficients.
b This specification includes several independent variables highly correlated with economic growth that had coefficients close to zero and were also highly insignificant.
These were the change in the percentage of MSA population migrated into the MSA
in the last five years, percentage change in mean per capita income, percentage
change in MSA population, and MSA boundary changed.
c Four New England MSAs did not have a segregation index. For these MSAs, the
sample median index was used for the residential segregation index and a dummy
variable was included. The coefficients at the dummy variable were small and highly
insignificant.
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among persons 25–64 years of age), and structural characteristics
(whether located in the South Central region, the 1980 household
income Gini coefficient for the MSA, and changes in the proportions of
residents living in the central city, in the proportions of metropolitan
jobs to residents in the central city, and in the levels of residential segregation).
The second specification, “adds earners per household,” includes
another demographic factor: changes in the household formation decisions of earners or in the labor supply decisions of household members
(changes in the proportions of households that include no earners and
that include more than one earner). The number of earners per household is the result of a combination of family and work decisions by
individuals and of the availability of jobs. The number of earners in a
household, then, is determined by the labor force participation decisions of household members, by the household formation decisions of
members of the labor force, and by the availability of jobs (that is, the
strength of the local labor market).
The third specification adds to the column-2 specification the
effects of the local labor market by adding changes in the Gini coefficients for wages across all wage and salary earners in each MSA and
changes in the ratio of total metropolitan employment to population
aged 25–64. The changes in the earnings Ginis fully measure the association between household income inequality and any changes in the
distributions of earnings alternatives in the metropolitan area, while
changes in the employment-to-population ratios reflect changes in the
overall tightness of the labor market.2 This specification also includes
a demographic characteristic (change in the growth in the proportion of
in-migrants) and several structural characteristics (growth in population, growth in mean income, and whether the boundary of the MSA
changed between 1980 and 1990) that are highly correlated with one
another and with economic growth.
By comparing the coefficients of these specifications, one can infer
the robustness of the results and the sensitivity of the correlation
between changes in an independent variable and in the inequality of
household income to the other characteristics included in the estimation. The additional variables permit assessment of the pathways
through which changes in metropolitan characteristics affect inequality. The coefficients in the first column show the relationships between
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household income inequality and demographic and skill compositions
and geographic structure of the MSA without controlling either for
growth or local labor market conditions. The second column’s coefficients show these same relationships adding the combined effects of
changes in employment opportunities, labor supply decisions of household members, and household formation decisions by wage earners
(which are all reflected in the number of earners per household). The
third column’s coefficients, by adding controls for local labor market
conditions and economic growth, allow us to interpret the coefficients
of earners per household as the effect of either household formation
decisions by earners or labor supply decisions by household members.
Demographic Structure
The demographic structure of an MSA is significantly correlated
with the extent of inequality in the MSA. MSAs with growth in the
proportion of households headed by women had significant increases
in household income inequality. An MSA whose proportion of households headed by women was one standard error above the mean MSA
proportion had growth in household income inequality that was 0.32
standard error of the mean MSA inequality when there were no controls for local labor market conditions, economic growth, or household
labor force participation and 0.187 standard error above the mean
when all of those factors were controlled. A comparison of the correlations between the MSA proportions of female-headed households and
MSA household income inequality varies with the controls for local
labor market conditions, economic growth, and household labor force
participation. The decrease in the size of the effect between the first
two columns arises from the addition of controls for the number of
earners per household. Obviously, female-headed households have
fewer earners than couple-headed households, or even male-headed
households. Almost half of the correlation between changes in the
MSA proportion of households that are female-headed and MSA
household income inequality arises because female-headed households
have fewer earners; the remainder arises from the lower incomes of
women.
There is also a substantial interaction between the proportion of
female-headed households, the number of earners per household, and

94

Sources of Household Income Inequality

the overall employment-to-population ratio (which reflects the tightness of the local labor market).3 The effect of the proportion of households with female heads declines slightly when the employment-to-population ratio is included (compare the beta coefficient in
Table 5.1, second and third columns). Because only about half of the
correlation between income inequality and number of earners per
household arises from differential tightness of the local labor market
(third column vs. second), the MSA household formation patterns of
earners or the MSA labor force participation decisions of household
members are associated with MSA household income distribution.
Increases in the MSA proportion of no-earner households are significantly correlated with increased MSA inequality. The effect of
multiple-earner households is not significant and varies in sign
between the second and third columns. When we control for labor
market tightness with the employment-to-population variable (third
column), then the coefficient for multiple-earner households shows the
income distributional effects of household formation decisions of earners. These decisions within an MSA have a statistically insignificant
but positive correlation with MSA household income inequality. When
we do not control for labor market tightness (second column), the coefficient for multiple-earner households is negative, indicating that
increasing proportions of such households are correlated with decreasing MSA inequality; but that effect arises from multiple-earner households being more prevalent in MSAs with tighter labor markets (note
the 0.74 correlation coefficient reported in footnote 3).
An MSA with a mean number of persons per household one standard error above other MSAs had household income inequality 0.466
standard error lower than other MSAs under the basic model and by as
much as 0.528 standard error when controls for numbers of earners per
household are added. This result is sensitive to the variables measuring
inequality and to those included in the analyses. A related analysis
presented later in this chapter (p. 111) does not show such strong correlation between household size and inequality.
The effects of in-migration or of population growth on inequality
were negligible; these variables were included in the regression analyses but are not reported in Table 5.1, column 3. The coefficient of the
change in the proportion of in-migrants was small, positive, and statis-
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tically insignificant, and the coefficient of change in population was
small, negative, and statistically insignificant.
While MSAs experiencing an increase in the proportion of African
Americans in the population or in households headed by persons over
age 65 in their populations tended toward more income equality, these
effects were also small and not statistically significant.
Skill Composition
The influence of the supply of skills in the local market is captured
by the median years of educational attainment of the population aged
25 to 64 and by the equality of the distribution as reflected in the Gini
coefficient computed on the highest year of educational attainment for
those residents of the MSA. Neither MSA median education nor the
education Gini is significantly correlated with MSA household income
inequality.
Katz and Revenga (1989) have argued that wage/salary differences
associated with education are less likely to occur in tighter labor markets. In support of their argument, the effect of the educational Gini
coefficient on the household income Gini coefficient increases when
the controls for number of workers per household (a measure of labor
market tightness) are added (second column).4
Structural Characteristics
The economic and structural characteristics of the MSA are significantly associated with MSA household income distribution, and these
results are consistent with previous studies. Several alternative specifications are analyzed, some including and some excluding variables
that reflect growth rates in the MSAs. A comparison of the coefficients
and of the adjusted R2 across those analyses indicate that metropolitan
growth does not have any statistically significant effect on MSA
changes in household income inequality once MSA labor market characteristics are controlled. Household incomes in South Central5 MSAs
do not have a different rate of change in inequality between 1979 and
1989 after controls for number of earners (second column) and local
labor market conditions (third column) are added.
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MSA population in 1980 is strongly associated with rising household income inequality: larger MSAs experienced more growth in
income inequality. Because the effect in the third column (coefficient
of 0.059, beta coefficient of 0.134) is about half that in the first and second columns, however, the effect is partially due to differences in earnings inequality and labor market tightness in larger metropolitan areas.
Larger MSAs have greater growth in earnings inequality and in overall
labor market tightness, and both of these MSA characteristics are associated with increases in household income inequality. The next chapter
examines the relationship between earnings inequality and a variety of
MSA characteristics, including population size.
Neither changes in the proportion of the MSA population residing
in the central city, in the ratio of the central city’s share of MSA
employment to the central city share of MSA residents, nor in the residential segregation index by race have significant effects on changes in
MSA income inequality. There is no evidence here that residential segregation by race or spatial distributions of jobs and residents are contributing to increases in MSA income inequality.
There are noticeable, albeit insignificant, effects of local labor
market conditions on skill and structural characteristics (determined by
comparing the coefficients in columns two and three). The positive
effects of median education level, inequality of the educational distribution, southern location, and the ratio of the percentage of MSA jobs
in the city to residents in the city decline when labor market effects are
included.
Labor Market Characteristics
Not surprisingly, the equality of the MSA distribution of earnings
across individual workers is strongly associated with the equality of the
MSA distribution of total income across households. A one-standarderror increase in the earnings Gini for all MSA workers between 1979
and 1989 is associated with a 0.365 standard error increase in the MSA
household income Gini. Increases in the MSA employment-to-population ratio, representing increasing tightness of the labor market, are
associated with significant decreases in MSA household income inequality. A one-standard-error increase in the employment-to-popula-
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tion ratio decreases the MSA household income Gini by 0.283
standard error.
The more interesting result is the finding that changes in household
formation patterns are so correlated with the changes in the distribution
of household income. While changes in local labor market conditions
(the distribution of earnings among individuals and the employment-to-population ratio) have substantial and arguably greater effects,
the demographic structure is almost as important (if not more so) and is
associated with a substantial proportion of the variation across metropolitan areas in changes in household income inequality. The most
important correlates of intermetropolitan variation (as indicated by the
size of the standardized coefficient in the third column of Table 5.1),
are changes in the number of persons in a household, the Gini coefficient for earnings distributions, the 1980 Gini coefficient for household
income (reflecting regression toward the mean), changes in the
employment-to-population ratio, the proportion of households headed
by women, and the proportion of households with no earners.
There are two reasons why this analysis, using the MSA as the
market economy, finds household formation to be important when
Blank and Card (1993) and Cutler and Katz (1992), using the nation as
the economy, did not. First, this analysis includes a more varied set of
measures of household formation, including the number of persons per
household and the number of earners per household; and second, as
there is greater variability in the included household characteristics
among MSAs (see Table 3.3) than across years in the nation, this study
provides a more sensitive and powerful test of the effects of macro
household formation patterns on inequality.
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Connections between Wage Inequality and
Household Income Inequality in Selected MSAs
Table 5.2 returns us to the selected MSAs introduced in
Chapter 3 and allows us to continue the comparisons of their
actual and predicted household income Gini coefficients, their
earnings Gini coefficients, their employment-to-population
ratios, and their household characteristics in light of the patterns revealed in the more systematic statistical analysis. The
predicted changes in household income inequality are closer to
the actual change than was the change in the earnings inequality for all MSAs other than Norfolk. (For Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, the changes in earnings inequality are
comparable to the predicted changes in household income.)
The first group includes metropolitan areas where changes
in earnings inequality are close to changes in household
income inequality. Chicago had the greatest difference in this
group between changes in household income inequality and
earnings inequality. Relative to Los Angeles and Dallas that
follow, Chicago had greater growth in employment but concentrated that growth in multi-earner households. Los Angeles
had less growth in employment but more evenly distributed it
among households, possibly accounting for the closer connection between earnings and household income inequalities.
Dallas had a relatively large growth in no-earner households,
but the increase in household size and the relatively smaller
increase in households headed by unmarried women accounted
for earnings inequality more closely tracking household
income inequality. San Diego and Norfolk had substantial
growth in relative employment that appears to arise from
increased numbers of earners within multi-earner households.
This can happen if teenagers in lower-income households take
jobs and young adult children stay with their employed parents
so as to decrease single-earner, low-income households. The
relative increase in household size in San Diego and the modest decrease in Norfolk are consistent with this pattern. The
predicted inequality was closer to the actual when labor mar-

Table 5.2 Changes in MSA Income Inequality and Household Characteristics 1979–1989 (%)
Household income Gini

MSA
Group A
Chicago
Los Angeles
Dallas
San Diego
Norfolk
Group B
Pittsburgh
Buffalo
Newark
Johnstown
New York
Philadelphia
Group C
Lowell
Lafayette
Raleigh
Lawrence

Change in

Earnings
Gini

Employment/
Proportion
population
Proportion multi-earner
ratio
no-earner hh.
hh.

Proportion
femaleheaded hh.

Mean
persons
per hh.

8.8

13.1

11.7

5.9

5.8

4.2

6.0

15.2

–2.9

7.0

7.9

8.8

6.5

2.5

4.5

–0.4

8.1

10.4

5.9

5.4

4.8

5.5

2.8

11.3

–0.1

4.6

20.3

2.4

4.7

2.2

7.0

8.8

8.9

–9.2

13.0

4.0

–1.1

8.2

3.5

-0.9

10.3

7.8

–11.0

14.2

–5.1

23.7

17.0

19.7

10.1

9.4

20.3

6.2

19.7

–25.1

16.9

14.5

15.0

4.2

9.7

15.8

10.6

10.2

–24.2

16.3

12.5

12.4

4.0

7.4

9.3

–12.1

12.1

–20.9

14.5

13.6

10.7

0.6

17.3

11.6

12.5

11.0

–25.0

9.1

8.7

8.6

6.1

3.7

11.3

–16.0

15.9

2.8

4.2

9.2

6.3

2.8

12.4

–13.5

15.7

4.8

–3.3

27.9

28.0

22.4

–2.3

1.4

48.7

2.5

76.2

–12.7

18.6

15.7

15.6

2.6

–1.7

45.9

–11.8

26.4

–24.7

1

14.1

11.1

–0.9

5.6

1.6

3.4

12.1

–22.7

6.3

2.7

6.6

–0.7

–3.5

16.8

–0.2

20.7

4.4

3.3

4.1

4.1

–0.4

0.6

18.2

2.8

6.3

0.5
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Lincoln

Actual
change

Change
Change
predicted by
predicted by adding labor
basic model
market
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kets were included, indicating the relatively greater importance
of labor markets in these two areas.
In group B (the Mid-Atlantic MSAs), the increases in
household income inequality in New York City and in Philadelphia were closer to their increases in earnings inequality
than was the case for other MSAs in the region. New York
City experienced a slight increase in average household size,
while Newark and Buffalo experienced substantial decreases;
this factor is the most obvious reason for the contrast between
these MSAs. Philadelphia had little increase in disparities in
either wages and salaries or in household income, in contrast
to Pittsburgh (which had large increases in both) and to
Johnstown (which had no increase in wage and salary disparity
but a substantial increase in household income disparity).
Philadelphia had a substantial decrease in the proportion of
households with no earners, little growth in female-headed
households, and very little decrease in average household size.
In contrast, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Newark, and Buffalo experienced substantial drops in average household size.
Group C shows the small MSAs that experienced slight
decreases in earnings inequality but increases in household
income inequality. First, compare the two former Massachusetts mill towns, Lawrence and Lowell, in light of the general
patterns. In Lawrence, the increasing equality of wages was
accompanied by a drop of 3.5 percent in the proportion of persons 25 to 64 years of age who are employed. That decrease in
employment was not evenly distributed across households;
there was a substantial increase, 16.8 percent, in no-earner
households and only a slight decrease, 0.2 percent, in multiearner households. Lowell had a slightly greater decrease in
earnings inequality, but a substantially larger increase in
household income inequality. Although there was slight
growth in the proportion employed (1.4 percent), employment
changes, as in Lawrence, resulted in a 48.7 percent increase in
the proportion of no-earner households (from 6.7 percent to
9.9 percent of all households). There was also a dramatic 76.2
percent increase in the proportion of female-headed households (moving from 18 percent to 32 percent of all house-
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holds). Lowell and Lawrence also differ in the changes in
household size, with Lowell decreasing its household size 12.7
percent, from an average of 3.3 persons to 2.9 persons, while
Lawrence increased its average 4.4 percent, from 2.6 to 2.8
persons. Both Lowell and Lawrence have rising disparities in
their household income distribution relative to the changes in
wage and salary disparities; the increases in household income
inequality were correlated, however, with their shifting household structures. The greater difference between wage and salary and household income disparities occurred in Lowell. This
difference can be attributed to Lowell’s greater growth in
female-headed and no-earner households and the drop in average household size.
Lincoln, Nebraska, and Raleigh, North Carolina, are two
mid-size state capitals that also experienced minor decreases in
earnings disparity but growth in household income disparity.
Unlike the two Massachusetts MSAs, both of these MSAs
have increasing proportions of their adult population employed. Lincoln’s growth in no-earner households “accounted” for
its growing household income disparity in the presence of
decreasing earnings disparity and increasing employment.
While Raleigh’s employment growth was more evenly shared
across households, Raleigh experienced a decline in average
household size.
Finally, Lafayette, Louisiana, is an MSA that experienced a
slight increase in earnings inequality and a substantial increase
in household income inequality. The divergence in the two
measures is almost as large as for Lowell. Lafayette had a
slight decrease in employment, a sizeable increase in the proportion of no-earner households, and (like Lowell) a decrease
in average household size.
These examples illustrate the effects of MSA demographic
structure in mediating the influence of the local labor market
on household income inequality.
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Distribution of Household Income by Quintile
Income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) may
change because of shifts occurring within the distribution of income
among the upper segments of the distribution as well as from changes
that move income from the upper segments to the bottom segments.

Examples of MSA Income Shares Accruing to Quintiles
Figure 5.1 illustrates the share of 1989 MSA household
income that accrued to the selected MSAs. The chart shows
that the greater household inequality for Los Angeles, New
York City, and Lafayette (Figure 3.1a) largely arises from the
higher income shares accruing to the top or fifth quintile.
Lowell, Lincoln, and Raleigh, which have more equal distributions of household income (Figure 3.1b), have particularly low
shares accruing to the top quintile. At least for these selected
MSAs, it appears that the top quintile share contributes heavily
to the level of overall income inequality.
Table 5.3 reports the 1979 to 1989 percentage change in
those shares for the selected MSAs. Figure 5.1 shows that
almost half of MSA household income accrues to the households in the top fifth of the income distribution, and Table 5.3
shows that their share increases in each of the selected MSAs
in the 1980s, except for Norfolk and Lincoln. Norfolk experienced a decrease in overall inequality, and Lincoln had the
lowest rate of increase of these MSAs (see Figure 3.2). The
shares of the fourth quintiles decreased for every MSA except
the Massachusetts former mill towns, Lawrence and Lowell.
The shares of the third quintiles decreased for every MSA
except for Lincoln and Norfolk, which had two of the lowest
three values for household income Gini change.

Figure 5.1 Household Income Quintile Shares for Selected MSAs
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Table 5.3 Absolute Changes in Quintile Shares, 1979–1989
MSA

Quintile 1

2

3

4

5

Group A
Chicago

–0.0018

–0.0052

–0.0132

–0.0153

0.0355

Los Angeles

–0.0040

–0.0071

–0.0096

–0.0123

0.0330

Dallas

–0.0068

–0.0152

–0.0142

–0.0103

0.0464

San Diego

0.0027

0.0070

–0.0001

–0.0112

0.0015

Norfolk

0.0000

0.0074

0.0039

–0.0079

–0.0035

–0.0043

–0.0137

–0.0227

–0.0167

0.0573

Group B
Pittsburgh
Buffalo

–0.0047

–0.0088

–0.0132

–0.0085

0.0353

Newark

–0.0049

–0.0085

–0.0132

–0.0155

0.0421

Johnstown

–0.0065

–0.0079

–0.0108

–0.0068

0.0319

New York

–0.0066

–0.0120

–0.0099

–0.0109

0.0394

0.0018

0.0056

–0.0028

–0.0130

0.0084

Lowell

–0.0035

–0.0414

–0.0160

0.0093

0.0616

Lafayette

–0.0078

–0.0249

–0.0215

–0.0019

0.0561

Philadelphia
Group C

Raleigh
Lawrence
Lincoln

0.0044

0.0081

–0.0012

–0.0133

0.0020

–0.0117

–0.0208

–0.0150

0.0057

0.0418

0.0062

0.0111

0.0006

–0.0113

–0.0066

To investigate the segments of the income distribution that account
for the tendencies of the distribution to converge or diverge, changes in
metropolitan characteristics were regressed on the change in the share
of each quintile in the income distribution. The results are reported in
Table 5.4. (Chapter 7 examines intermetropolitan variation in the poverty rate, another way of examining the effects of inequality on the bottom of the income distribution.) The dependent variable in this analysis
is the 1989 share minus the 1979 share accruing to the quintile; it
reflects the absolute change in percent share, not the percentage change
in share. Table 5.1 analyzed the percentage change in the income Gini
coefficient.6 Also, in Table 5.4, I control for the 1980 quintile share for
each quintile. This is comparable to the approach in Table 5.1 where I
control for the 1980 Gini coefficient, but these are different independent variables. The differences in the dependent variable specification
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Table 5.4 Changes in Share Accruing to Income Quintiles for 182
Metropolitan Areas, 1979–1989a,b
Quintile 1
(lowest)

2

3

4

5
(highest)

–0.13
(–2.78)
–0.250

–0.034
(–2.51)
–0.224

–0.013
(–2.05)
–0.145

0.013
(2.14)
0.222

0.045
(2.30)
0.182

–0.003
(0.70)
0.094

–0.018
(–1.50)
–0.206

–0.022
(–3.80)
–0.445

0.006
(1.06)
0.163

0.036
(2.00)
0.251

Change in multipleearner hh.

–0.008
(–0.77)
–0.099

–0.066
(–2.17)
–0.279

–0.036
(–2.56)
–0.264

0.032
(2.23)
0.331

0.082
(1.83)
0.210

Change in % pop.
African American

-0.000
(-0.00)
-0.000

–0.001
(–0.20)
–0.016

–0.002
(–1.94)
–0.119

0.000
(0.22)
0.020

0.003
(0.75)
0.051

Change in % elderlyheaded hh.

–0.001
(–0.27)
–0.023

0.013
(1.40)
–0.123

0.009
(1.93)
0.134

–0.006
(–1.22)
–0.124

–0.016
(–1.16)
–0.090

Change in mean persons
per hh.

–0.004
(–1.11)
–0.081

0.007
(0.66)
0.048

0.002
(0.38)
0.022

–0.001
(–0.28)
–0.023

–0.003
(–0.17)
–0.011

Change in median education

0.008
(1.17)
0.075

–0.005
(–0.22)
–0.14

–0.011
(–1.09)
–0.055

–0.017
(–1.67)
–0.123

0.025
(–1.23)
–0.078

Change in education Gini

0.011
(0.15)
0.011

0.011
(0.95)
0.067

0.008
(1.42)
0.081

0.005
(1.01)
0.081

–0.022
(–1.23)
–0.078

–0.018
(–1.78)
–0.136

–0.083
(–2.87)
–0.212

–0.093
(–7.02)
–0.410

–0.045
(–3.23)
–0.281

0.244
(5.76)
0.376

0.034
(3.22)
0.327

0.107
(3.36)
0.339

0.045
(3.08)
0.249

–0.032
(–2.17)
–0.253

–0.153
(–3.28)
–0.295

–0.002
(–0.98)
–0.061

–0.000
(–0.00)
–0.000

–0.000
(–0.05)
–0.002

–0.001
(–0.62)
–0.044

0.004
(0.50)
0.028

Independent variables
Demographic
Change in % femaleheaded hh.
Change in % no-earner hh.

Skill

Local labor market
Change in earnings Gini

Change in employment-topopulation ratio
Other
Change in ratio of % work/
% live in central city
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Table 5.4 (continued)
Quintile 1
(lowest)

2

3

4

5
(highest)

–0.000
(–0.05)
–0.004

0.000
(0.22)
0.017

–0.000
(–1.24)
–0.073

–0.001
(–1.97)
–0.169

0.001
(1.03)
0.068

Change in residential
segregation index

–0.001
(1.16)
0.087

0.0003
(1.96)
0.145

0.0002
(2.57)
0.151

–0.0001
(–0.72)
–0.061

–0.0006
(–2.25)
–0.148

Change in residents in
central city

–0.011
(2.99)
0.189

0.035
(3.26)
0.208

0.012
(2.35)
0.119

–0.008
(–1.60)
–0.118

–0.049
(–3.04)
–0.156

South Central U.S.A.

–0.002
(–2.52)
–0.200

–0.005
(–2.07)
–0.163

–0.002
(–1.28)
–0.080

0.001
(0.72)
0.065

0.008
(2.00)
0.141

Share of quintile in 1980

–0.159
(–3.09)
–0.246

–0.200
(–3.84)
–0.274

–0.136
(–2.97)
–0.195

–0.146
(–2.08)
–0.157

–0.134
(2.00)
–0.198

Constant

0.003
(1.44)

0.019
(2.44

0.020
(2.70)

0.031
(1.66)

0.068
(2.49)

Adj. R2

0.35

0.41

0.63

0.30

0.53

Independent variables
Population 1980

a
b

Controlling for growth and local labor market.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; numbers in italics are beta (or standardized) coefficients.

and in the 1980 level dependent variable result in a different specification that can affect the results.
Table 5.4 reports the effects of metropolitan characteristics on
changes in quintile shares of MSA residents using the specification that
includes growth and local labor market conditions, similar to the final
column in Table 5.1. While there is substantial agreement between the
results reported in Tables 5.1 and Table 5.4 on the important correlates
of changes in household income inequality within MSAs, there are also
some important differences which arise from the slightly different specifications. The sensitivity of results to these specifications, both of
which seem reasonable, suggest caution in interpreting the results for
those areas where there is disagreement.
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Demographic Structure
Most of the demographic variables affect the shares accruing to the
quintiles comparably to their effect on overall household income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Consistent with the analysis in Table 5.1, Table 5.4 shows that increases in the MSA proportion
of female-headed households are correlated with decreases in the proportion of MSA income accruing to the bottom three quintiles and
increases in the top two quintiles. Similarly, Table 5.4 shows that
increasing proportions of no-earner households or of multi-earner
households had similar effects; increases in either of these MSA proportions correlate with decreases in the share accruing to the middle
quintiles (second and third) and an increase in the share accruing to the
top two quintiles. Changes in this proportion are not significantly correlated with changes in the bottom quintile’s share. These results are
also consistent with increases in these household categories increasing
overall MSA household income inequality.
Although increases in household size within an MSA increased the
shares of the second and third quintiles and decreased the shares going
to the outlying quintiles, the variable has no statistically significant
correlation in the quintile share analyses. This is quite surprising given
the strong significance of this variable in Table 5.1. The sensitivity of
household size to the specification of the analysis warrants caution. In
Chapter 7, a significant negative correlation between household size
and the MSA poverty rate is demonstrated. Because households in
poverty are only a portion (roughly half, on average) of the households
in the bottom quintile, the effects of household size on the Gini coefficient may not be obvious from data as aggregated as quintile data. The
different results with respect to household size in Tables 5.1 and 5.4,
however, indicate that we cannot conclude that MSAs with decreases
in household size experienced rising inequality.
Skill Composition
As in the case of the household income Gini, the shares of MSA
income accruing to each of the five quintiles are not significantly associated with MSA changes in either the median level of education or its
distribution across the adult population. MSAs with increases in edu-
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cational inequality had less growth in the share of income accruing to
their top quintile and more growth in the shares of the other quintiles,
although these results are statistically insignificant.
Structural Characteristics
Large MSAs, measured by population in 1980, had greater
decreases in the shares of their bottom four quintiles and increases in
the share of their top quintiles. The positive association found in Table
5.1 between MSA population size and changes in the household
income Gini arises primarily from the correlation between population
size and the income share of the top quintile. Also, for both the analysis of quintile shares and the household income Gini, the effect of population size arises in part from the differences in the local labor market
changes in larger MSAs. Population size has less effect on quintile
shares after controlling for local labor market conditions and for
growth than when these variables are not included.7
The distribution of population and jobs between city and suburbs is
also of significance. More centralized urban areas had greater growth
in the income shares of the lower three-fifths of the household income
distribution. MSAs experiencing relative increases in the proportion of
residents residing in the central city had greater growth in the income
share of their bottom three quintiles and less growth in their top two
quintiles, with the greatest changes in the first, second, and fifth quintiles. Increases in the ratio of the share of jobs in the central city to the
share of residents in the central city should favor the lower quintiles if
poorer households are more likely to reside in the central city and if
proximity to jobs increases income. There was no evidence of such an
effect here.8
Increases in racial segregation of residential areas reduces the
share accruing to the top quintile and increases the share accruing to
the second and third quintiles. These results are surprising in light of
Table 5.1, where this variable had no effect on overall household
income inequality. As with household size, the different results from
the two specifications require caution in interpretation.
MSAs with more inequality in 1980 experienced less growth in
inequality in the 1980s. When the share of the quintile in 1980 was
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higher, the quintile share declined between 1980 and 1990, showing a
tendency to regress to the mean over time.
Labor Market Characteristics
MSAs with increasing earnings inequality had greater shares of
income accruing to households in the top quintile at the expense of all
other quintiles. One standard error of increase in the MSA earnings
Gini was associated with a 0.376 standard-error increase in the income
share accruing to the top quintile of households and a reduction of
0.410 standard error in the share accruing to the middle (third) quintile.
For MSAs with tightening labor markets (employment-to-population ratio increases), the income shares accruing to the bottom three
quintiles of households increased at the expense of the shares accruing
to the top two quintiles. The share accruing to the bottom quintile
increased more in MSAs with tightening labor markets than in those
with decreasing earnings inequality.9 The opposite is the case for the
top quintile.

SUMMARY
Several factors account for intermetropolitan variations in the
equality of the household income distribution. The principal findings
are as follows:
• Household income inequality within MSAs increased during the
1980s.
• MSAs experiencing changes in the local labor market also experienced changes in income inequality.
– MSAs with rising earnings inequality experienced rising
household income inequality. In MSAs with increases in
earnings inequality, the share of the top quintile increased
and the shares of all others decreased, particularly the second
and third quintiles. But, MSA increases in household income
inequality exceeded MSA increases in earnings inequality.
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– In most MSAs, employment-to-population ratios increased.
For MSAs where this ratio increased at a higher rate, household income inequality decreased relative to other MSAs.
MSAs with greater increases in the employment-to-population ratio had relatively greater increases in the shares of the
bottom three quintiles and relatively greater decreases in the
shares of the top two quintiles.
– As the effects of increases in the employment-to-population
ratio offset the effects of rising earnings inequality on household income inequality in most MSAs, overall changes in the
local labor market do not account for the growth in household
income inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas.
• MSAs with demographic shifts—in particular changes in the
kinds of households formed—had greater changes in income
inequality.
– MSAs with increases in no-earner households and in
multi-earner households had decreases in the share of the
second and third or middle income quintiles of households
and increases in the share of the top 40 percent of households.
– MSAs with increases in the proportion of households headed
by women experienced decreases in the shares of income
accruing to the bottom 60 percent of the household income
distribution, and increases in the share for the upper 40 percent.
• MSAs with changes in the distribution of jobs and residents
between their central city and suburbs and in the extent of residential segregation by race experienced little change in household
income inequality.
• MSAs with changes in educational attainment, including
increases in the average level of educational attainment and
changes in the distribution of educational attainment, had little
change in household income inequality, regardless of whether
labor market conditions are considered.

Changes in Income Inequality within U.S. Metropolitan Areas

111

• MSAs with larger central cities (relative to the suburbs) had less
increase in inequality due to greater increases in income shares
for the bottom three quintiles and a decrease for the top quintile.
The lower 60 percent of the household income distribution fared
better in metropolitan areas with larger central cities.

Notes
1. Because larger Gini coefficients indicate a more unequal distribution, a negative
coefficient for a variable indicates that the variable is associated with decreasing
inequality and a positive coefficient with increasing inequality. Table 5.1 reports
the regression coefficient, the t-statistic (in parentheses), and the standardized, or
beta, coefficient (in italics). The beta coefficient represents the association
between a one-standard-error change in the independent variable and the standard
error of the dependent variable, the household income Gini for metropolitan areas.
Beta coefficients are the result of a linear regression where each variable is “normalized” by subtracting its mean and dividing by its estimated standard error.
The beta coefficient, then, standardizes for differences in the measurement units
across the independent variables, allowing for comparisons of the relative importance of these variables.
2. Other studies (for example, Danziger [1976]), have used measures of industrial
composition to reflect wage distribution and have estimated two-stage equations
in order to infer the effect of the labor market on household or family income distribution. The data used here allow direct measurement of the earnings distribution available to individual workers.
3. The correlation among these four variables is:
Female head
(%)
No-earner
0.54
Multi-earner
–0.45
Empl./pop. ratio
–0.39

No-earner
(%)

Multi-earner
(%)

–0.78
–0.51

0.74

A correlation of 1.00 means that the variables are identical; of –1.00 means that
one variable is the exact negative of the other; and of 0 means that they are not
related in any way.
4. The third column adds the employment-to-population ratio for persons 25 to 64
years of age but also adds the earnings Gini that controls for the wage effects of
the educational distribution. The coefficient of the education Gini is decreased
once its wage effects are held constant.
5. “South Central” includes the East South Central and the West South Central
states, but not the South Atlantic (which showed no significant difference from the
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7.
8.
9.
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rest of the nation). The states included are Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Other regional controls
were tested but were not significant.
The change in the Gini coefficient on household income within MSAs is most
highly correlated with the change in the share accruing to the third quintile (–0.60)
and the fifth quintile (0.50). Consistent with previous analyses of the Gini coefficient, the change in the Gini coefficient across MSAs is most sensitive to changes
in the middle quintile and least sensitive to changes in the first and fifth quintiles.
A regression of the change in quintile shares on the Gini coefficient showed the
third quintile had the largest absolute coefficient (but the sign was, of course, negative).
These regression results are not included here but are available from the author.
All the coefficients (including the beta coefficients) were very close to 0, and none
had t-statistics greater than an absolute value of 1.
See, for example, in Table 5.4, the beta coefficient for the bottom quintile’s
change in share is 0.327 for employment-to-population ratio and –0.136 for the
earnings Gini.

6 A More Detailed Study
of Household Income and
Individual Earnings Inequality
In the last chapter, the overall relationships were defined between
changes in MSA household income inequality within metropolitan
areas during the 1980s, and changes in MSA household demographic
characteristics and in local labor market conditions. MSAs having
greater growth in earnings inequality were shown to have more growth
in income inequality among households, but this relationship is
strongly mediated by changes in the availability of employment, in
household structure, and in the way that wage-earners are distributed
among households.
In this chapter, I examine other components of those relationships,
including a) the characteristics of MSAs associated with changes in
earnings inequality, and b) whether MSA characteristics have similar
relationships to changes in the equality of the distribution of household
income within particular demographic subgroupings of the metropolitan population.

EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION
Several studies, as discussed in Chapter 2, have examined the
sources of earnings inequality, and a large number have concluded that
increasing demand for skills coupled with a relative decrease in the
number of experienced and highly educated workers have resulted in
upward movement of wages for skilled workers. These conclusions
have been reached based largely on national studies. But, as is the case
for household income inequality, no study has examined the characteristics of MSAs that experienced increasing earnings inequality in the
1980s.
The distribution of wages and salaries within a labor market is the
result of the interactions between the demand for labor and the supply
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of labor. The local demand for labor is derived from the demand for
the outputs of local industry. Consumer tastes and the attractiveness of
the MSA as a production site affect local demand for labor. The demographic and skill characteristics of local residents affect local labor
supply (and demand). The market outcome is shaped, then, by MSA
demographic and skill characteristics of the labor force and by the
structure of the MSA and its industrial composition. The demographic
characteristics of MSAs used in the household income inequality analyses that also affect earnings inequality within MSAs are the changes
in the population proportions of African Americans and of in-migrants.
African-American workers have greater earnings inequality and lower
wages than other workers. MSAs with more in-migrants are faster
growing, and growth may affect earnings inequality.1
The number of workers per household and household size measures are pertinent to the income accruing to households but do not
directly affect wages paid to individuals. Similarly, whether the head
is over 65 or female2 correlates with special household income situations (such as pensions, welfare, and alimony, and the labor supply
decisions of household members) that are relevant to household
income but not to individual wages.
The MSA skill and structural characteristics used in the household
income analyses and the employment-to-population ratio (a measure of
labor market tightness) may also affect the equality of the MSA earnings distribution. Increasing skill differentials within the local labor
force should increase productivity differentials and therefore lead to
wage differences, so an increase in the inequality of the distribution of
education (as measured by the Gini coefficient of educational attainment) is expected to increase earnings inequality. Labor markets in
MSAs with relatively greater increases in average education may value
skills more than those in MSAs with less increase in education. If that
is the case, the match between a skill set and a job may have greater
effects on productivity in MSAs with greater growth in educational
attainment, resulting in a correlation between increasing average education in an MSA and increasing earnings inequality. To the extent that
value of skills has grown more important in production and larger or
more populous MSAs have a finer division of labor (or a better match
between skill of worker and task requirements), there will be greater
earnings inequality in larger MSAs. Alternatively, tighter labor mar-
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kets are expected to improve opportunities for less-skilled, lower-wage
workers, so increases in the employment-to-population ratio are
expected to reduce earnings inequality.
There are two measures that reflect the potential effects of a spatial
mismatch between workers and jobs in MSAs, the residential segregation index by race and the ratio of the proportion of the MSA jobs to
the proportion of the MSA residential population in the central city. If
residential segregation affects job access, then there would be more
wage inequality in MSAs with more segregation because the “market”
cannot function as well and greater artificial wage differentials result.
Lower-income households are more likely to live in the central city,
and these households are more likely to include lower-wage workers.
If jobs are moving to the suburbs faster than residential population,
then accessible job alternatives for low-wage city workers are decreasing. Fewer jobs for low-wage workers should lower their wages. The
ratio of the city’s share of jobs to its share of population would then be
expected to be negatively correlated with earnings inequality.
Industrial structure, specifically changes in the proportions of the
workforce employed in durable goods manufacturing and in producer
services, is expected to affect earnings inequality. Because the durable
goods manufacturing industry has better wages for workers with less
formal education and because workers in this industry are more likely
to be unionized, earnings inequality is expected to be lower in this
industry. MSAs with more employment growth in this industrial sector
are expected to have less growth in earnings inequality. Numerous
authors have alleged that the new producer services industry creates
many low-paying and many high-paying jobs, with few middle-wage
jobs. If this were the case, then MSAs with more employment growth
in producer services would be expected to have more growth in earnings inequality.
Earnings Inequality for All Workers
The first column of Table 6.1 reports the correlates/determinants of
the rates of change in MSA Gini coefficients for wage and salary
income between 1979 and 1989 for all workers, the variable used to
measure the wage distribution in the analyses of household income inequality. MSAs experiencing a relatively greater increase in the propor-

Independent variables

All wage All full-time
and salary year-round Management/
earners
earners
professionals
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Table 6.1 Changes in Earnings Gini Coefficients for 182 Metropolitan Areas, 1979–1989a
Men in
precision and
operative

Women in
clerical

Producer
service
workers

Sales
workers

Demographic
Change in % pop. African American

–0.012
(–1.924)
–0.133

–0.019
(–2.112)
–0.160

–0.013
(–1.410)
–0.106

–0.006
(–0.566)
–0.032

0.007
(0.730)
–0.053

0.003
(0.329)
0.025

–0.005
(–0.574)
–0.041

Change in % pop. in-migrant

–0.020
(–1.447)
–0.107

–0.041
(–2.005)
0.160

–0.041
(–1.942)
–0.154

–0.058
(–2.536)
–0.154

–0.029
(–1.389)
–0.109

–0.020
(–1.135)
–0.091

0.018
(0.992)
0.075

Change in median education

0.048
(0.845)
0.056

0.072
(0.852)
0.062

0.083
(0.934)
0.068

0.080
(0.840)
0.046

0.002
(0.024)
0.002

0.002
(0.525)
0.039

0.066
(0.851)
0.060

Change in education Gini

0.025
(0.791)
0.059

0.033
(0.714)
0.057

0.136
(2.749)
0.223

–0.023
(–0.433)
–0.027

–0.027
(–0.574)
–0.044

–0.063
(–1.611)
–0.125

–0.045
(–1.120)
–0.082

–0.121
(–1.933)
–0.152

–0.072
(–0.783)
–0.066

–0.064
(–0.642)
–0.055

–0.092
(–0.886)
–0.057

–0.086
(–0.882)
–0.074

0.071
(0.868)
0.075

0.166
(1.989)
0.160

Skill

Local labor market
Change in employment-topopulation ratio

Other
0.017
(1.239)
0.080

0.028
(1.378)
0.097

0.036
(1.719)
0.121

0.016
(0.688)
0.037

–0.021
(–0.979)
–0.068

–0.004
(–0.205)
–0.015

–0.004
(–0.196)
–0.013

Change in population

–0.019
(–0.961)
–0.085

–0.031
(–1.020)
–0.102

–0.036
(–1.181)
–0.113

0.041
(1.166)
0.093

–0.008
(–0.259)
0.024

–0.019
(–0.698)
–0.071

0.012
(0.471)
0.043

Change in mean income

–0.027
(–1.894)
–0.162

0.030
(1.397)
0.132

0.005
(0.216)
0.020

–0.076
(–3.054)
–0.222

–0.046
(–1.989)
–0.188

–0.039
(–2.028)
–0.197

–0.026
(–1.345)
–0.120

Change in residential
segregation index

0.000
(0.072)
0.005

–0.000
(–0.130)
–0.011

–0.000
(–0.263)
–0.023

–0.000
(–0.014)
–0.001

–0.000
(–0.248)
–0.020

0.000
(0.291)
0.024

0.001
(1.177)
0.095

1980 Population (in 10,000s)

0.034
(1.682)
0.118

0.086
(2.887)
0.220

0.048
(1.545)
0.118

0.094
(2.792)
0.162

0.021
(0.663)
0.050

0.002
(0.083)
0.006

0.021
(0.792)
0.057

Change in residents in central city

0.026
(0.879)
0.059

0.012
(0.271)
0.020

0.051
(1.120)
0.081

0.120
(2.469)
0.137

0.122
(2.709)
0.193

0.111
(2.931)
0.217

0.043
(1.095)
0.076

South Central U.S.A.

0.012
(1.748)
0.137

0.004
(0.368)
0.034

0.008
(0.813)
0.070

0.015
(1.295)
0.086

–0.009
(–0.899)
–0.077

0.014
(1.545)
0.137

0.009
(0.995)
0.082

Change in ratio of % jobs/%
residents in central city
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Table 6.1 (continued)

Independent variables

All wage All full-time
and salary year-round Management/
earners
earners professionals

Men in
precision and
operative

Women in
clerical

Producer
service
workers

Sales
workers

–0.369
(–2.975)
–0.225

–0.740
(–3.643)
–0.336

–0.593
(–3.484)
–0.270

–1.324
(–8.838)
–0.672

–0.871
(–5.720)
–0.433

–0.300
(–2.647)
–0.209

–1.049
(–7.541)
–0.519

Change in % of employment in
durable goods manufacture

–0.034
(–2.461)
–0.178

–0.026
(–1.288)
–0.100

0.006
(–0.263)
–0.021

0.055
(–2.327)
–0.143

0.004
(0.188)
0.014

0.026
(–1.442)
–0.116

–0.004
(–0.215)
–0.016

Change in % in producer services

–0.021
(–1.346)
–0.095

–0.045
(–1.926)
–0.145

–0.050
(–2.079)
–0.156

–0.033
(–1.230)
–0.072

–0.074
(–3.052)
–0.225

–0.055
(–2.721
–0.208

–0.031
(–1.480)
–0.106

Constant

0.216
(3.519)

0.270
(4.056)

0.246
(3.181)

0.542
(9.492)

0.390
(5.630)

0.190
(2.894)

0.609
(7.733)

Adj. R2

0.34

0.22

0.22

0.55

0.24

0.18

0.29

1980 Earnings Gini for group

Industrial Composition

a

Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; numbers in italics are beta or standardized coefficients.
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tion of African-American households, in mean income, in employment-to-population ratio, and in durable goods manufacturing
employment experienced less increase in earnings inequality. Interestingly, MSAs with growth in producer services employment experienced an insignificant decrease in inequality. Larger MSAs and those
in the South Central United States had greater increases in earnings
inequality. As with changes in household income inequality, there is a
tendency to “regress to the mean.” MSAs with larger 1980 levels of
earnings inequality have less growth in inequality during the 1980s.
The results—the significance of changes in mean income and in
employment-to-population ratio—are consistent with the hypothesis
that economic growth decreases earnings inequality. Industrial structure also matters, although not in the way that some expect. Durable
goods manufacturing industries reduce wage inequality, but producer
service industries do not increase, and may decrease, inequality. There
is also evidence that the supply of and demand for skilled workers matters. The positive significance of MSA population size and the positive, albeit insignificant, coefficients on changes in average education
and in the Gini on educational attainment are consistent with skill
changes contributing to increasing earnings inequality.
Earnings Inequality for Full-time Year-round Workers
The coefficients of the various MSA characteristics in Table 6.1
may arise because the characteristics are the cause of the change in inequality, or the change in inequality may cause the change in the characteristics, or the correlation may arise because the characteristics are
correlated with other, unmeasured characteristics of the MSA. One
way to understand better why these characteristics are connected to
MSA wage inequality is to examine their effects on wage inequality
among subsets of workers.
First, I compare the results for the distribution of earnings across
all workers (column 1) to those for full-time year-round workers (column 2, which excludes part-time and part-year workers). Differences
between these results can be attributed to differences in the sources of
inequality for part-time or part-year workers. Variation or inequality in
earnings arise from differences in hours worked, as well as from differences in rates of pay. There is significantly less variation in total work
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hours among full-time year-round workers than among all workers.
Among full-time year-round workers, variation in wages or inequality
is more likely to be attributed to differences in pay rates.
There are interesting differences between the two groups. The rate
of growth in MSA per-capita income (Table 6.1, “mean income” row)
is correlated with a decrease in earnings inequality among all workers,
but with an insignificant increase in inequality among full-time fullyear workers. This result is consistent with increases in work hours
(i.e., expansion of employment) rather than changes in wage rates
being the important source of MSA growth in per-capita income.
MSAs with growing producer service employment have greater
decreases in earnings inequality for full-time year-round workers than
do MSAs with growing durable goods manufacturing employment. If
employees in durable goods manufacturing are more likely than those
in other industries to be full-time year-round workers, then MSAs with
increases in workers in that industry would have less growth in inequality among all workers, but with less change among full-time yearround workers. In other words, MSAs with more durable goods manufacturing jobs have less earnings inequality because these workers have
more work hours, not because they have higher or more equal pay
rates. Similarly, if producer service industries paid wage rates that
were “more equal” than other industries but had more part-time or
part-year workers, MSAs with growth in the proportion of workers in
producer services would have a greater decrease in inequality among
full-time year-round workers than among all wage and salary workers.
The results in Table 6.1 show this to be the case.
The correlation between earnings inequality and MSA size is
greater for full-time workers than for all workers. Based on the same
logic applied to the results for the mean income and industrial employment variables, this result is consistent with larger MSAs having less
variation in hours worked but more variation in rates of pay.
The comparisons of the earnings inequality results between all
workers and full-time year-round workers provide information on the
relative role of work hours and pay rates in creating earnings inequality
in an MSA. It appears that larger MSAs and MSAs with less producer
service employment have more variation in pay rates, while MSAs
with more durable goods manufacturing employment have less variation in work hours. Furthermore, MSAs experiencing greater growth
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in per-capita income have increasing work hours but less variation in
pay rates.
Earnings Inequality within Occupations and Industries
The right-most five columns of Table 6.1 examine MSA earnings
inequality among resident workers in specific occupations and industries. The independent variables are the same as for the first two columns, reflecting characteristics of the entire MSA, not of the industry
or occupation group. Table 3.1 showed that producer services workers
were the only group of MSA residents to experience a convergence of
wages in the 1980s, with an average decrease in inequality within
MSAs of 1.7 percent. Next, women in clerical occupations had the
least change in earnings inequality, an increase of 0.3 percent over the
decade, while the men in skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar jobs (precision and operative occupations) and the professional and management workers of both sexes have increases of 4.0 percent and 4.1
percent, respectively. For sales workers, the average MSA experienced
a 2.7 percent increase in earnings inequality.
Management and professionals are a relatively highly educated
group of workers, women in clerical work are in relatively homogenous jobs, men in blue-collar jobs are relatively less educated, while
producer services and sales workers are in rapidly expanding industries
and occupations. We can examine the characteristics of MSAs with
changes in earnings inequality among these groups in order to assess
whether the changes varied for occupational and industrial subgroups,
and to identify the types of labor markets, or characteristics of workers,
associated with different outcomes.
MSAs with increases in the proportion of African-American residents experienced the same shifts in equality of the earnings within
occupations or industries as other MSAs. This may occur simply
because the Gini coefficients are measured with less precision for the
smaller occupational and industry groups or because the tendency for
MSAs experiencing growth in the proportion of African Americans to
experience less inequality overall for the workforce (Chapter 5) may
arise from the differential distribution of African-American workers
across industries and occupations in these MSAs, rather than from
wage distribution differences within industries and occupations.
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MSAs with more in-migrants experienced less growth in earnings
inequality within occupation and industry groups, suggesting that
in-migration (which is strongly associated with economic vitality)
increases earnings equality. If expanding economies have more
in-migrants and stronger markets for low-wage workers, then there is
likely to be no “direct causation” between in-migration and earnings
inequality; rather, the relationship is that vibrant economies have less
earnings inequality.
MSAs with rising median education levels experienced no statistically significant increase in earnings inequality for any groups in Table
6.1. As the coefficients do not meet normal standards of significance, it
is difficult to conclude very much from these relationships, but there is
some suggestion that in those pools that include more part-time workers—women in clerical, producer services workers, sales workers, and
the all workers category—MSAs with rising education have less
growth in inequality. These subcategories are likely to include more
highly educated persons, especially women, who work shorter hours,
resulting in lower incomes. For those categories where there is less
part-time work—full-time year-round workers, management and professionals, and men in blue-collar occupations—MSAs with rising
education are more likely to have rising inequality; that is, the coefficient on change in median education is of greater magnitude.
MSAs with more unequally distributed education do not have more
earnings inequality for all groups in Table 6.1 with the exception of
managers and professionals, the most educated group. For this group,
MSAs with greater educational inequality have significantly greater
earnings inequality. MSAs with more growth in education also have
more growth in earnings inequality for this group. This result is consistent with MSAs having rising levels of education placing a greater
valuation on education/skill in production and a greater importance on
skill differences or the quality of the match between skills and jobs.
MSAs with relatively greater increases in the proportion of the
MSA population resident in the central city are more likely to be
smaller MSAs, to have experienced increases in female-headed households, and are less likely to have increases in in-migrants, per-capita
income, average education, or population (see correlation coefficients,
Table A1 in the Appendix). The regression analysis shows that these
same MSAs have more-unequal earnings for men in skilled and
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semi-skilled blue-collar occupations, for women in clerical occupations, and for producer service workers. MSAs with changes in their
relative central city size have insignificantly more earnings inequality
for the other groups. The results for this MSA characteristic are probably reflecting the effect of stagnant economies on inequality rather than
reflecting a direct causal relationship between central city size and inequality. More stagnant economies have more wage inequality.
MSAs with growth in per-capita income have insignificant
increases in earnings inequality among professionals and managers,
but have less inequality, in most cases significantly less, for all other
groups. Again, these results provide additional confirmation that
MSAs with more economic growth have less earnings inequality.
Earnings inequality increased most in larger MSAs during the
1980s; this is especially the case for full-time year-round workers and
for men in blue-collar occupations. Generally, MSAs with tightening
labor markets (represented by increases in the employment-to-population ratio) have insignificantly less inequality for all subgroups; sales
workers stand out as an exception.3
The industrial composition of an MSA, not surprisingly, is associated with increases in inequality for some subgroups and decreases for
others. MSAs with more durable goods manufacturing have significantly greater earnings equality for men in blue-collar jobs. MSAs
with more producer service industry employment have greater earnings
equality for managers and professionals, women in clerical jobs, and
all producer services workers. The implication appears to be that
MSAs with larger industrial markets for a set of “occupational” skills
have a more equal wage distribution among workers with those skills.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that economic expansion
increases wage equality. This appears to be the case both for the entire
local labor market, the MSA, and for the industry market within the
MSA.
Overall, MSAs with higher rates of economic growth had less
growth in inequality because they experienced increasing demand for
(and wages and work hours of) lower-skilled workers, and possibly
they experienced changes in skill requirements and technology. Earnings inequality among workers can arise from inequality in the rate of
pay or from inequality in work hours. It is apparent from the analyses
presented here that variation in MSA work hours is a major contributor
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to MSA earnings inequality. While MSAs with more population,
increases in per-capita income, and increases in the proportion of
workers employed in durable goods manufacturing had less increase in
earnings inequality, an important part of this lesser increase comes
from MSA total work hours (as evidenced by the much weaker role of
these MSA characteristics on inequality among full-time, year-round
workers).

DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME WITHIN
SUBPOPULATIONS
We learned in the previous section that subpopulations may yield
important insights into the basis for the correlations observed in analyzing MSA inequality for the entire population. Analyses of subpopulations permit insight into whether a correlation between an observed
MSA characteristic and inequality reflects a direct causation or reflects
correlation between the observed characteristics (or set of conditions)
that are affected by inequality.
Table 6.2 examines which metropolitan characteristics are associated with the household distribution of income within particular demographic subgroups: no-earner households, multi-earner households,
African Americans, households whose head is over age 65, households
whose head moved to the metropolitan area within the last five years,
and households headed by women. The characteristics analyzed are
for the entire MSA, not just for the group being studied; these characteristics, then, are the same measures as used in Table 5.1. The results
are to be interpreted as showing how changes in the overall, macroenvironmental characteristics of the metropolitan area are associated
with changes in income inequality within the identified subpopulation.
In general, metropolitan characteristics are less correlated with
metropolitan differences in the distribution of household income
within these subpopulations than they are for the total population (see
Table 5.1). In part, this is due to the greater error involved in the estimates of the Gini coefficient for smaller populations. The greater
explanatory power of MSA characteristics for income inequality
changes among the no-earner and multi-earner households subpopula-

Table 6.2 Changes in Household Income Gini Coefficients for Subpopulations, 182 Metropolitan Areas,
1979 to 1989a
African-American
hh.

In-migrant
hh.

Female-headed
hh.

Elderly-headed
hh.

No-earner
hh.

Multiple-earner
hh.

Change in % femaleheaded hh.

0.023
(0.26)
0.030

0.111
(1.53)
0.172

–0.009
(–0.50)
–0.059

–0.012
(–0.48)
–0.055

0.023
(0.67)
0.070

0.038
(2.02)
0.197

Change in % no-earner hh.

0.030
(0.38)
0.069

0.071
(1.08)
0.188

0.019
(1.11)
0.206

–0.036
(–1.66)
–0.293

0.029
(0.93)
0.150

–0.003
(–0.18)
–0.027

–0.423
(–2.21)
–0.356

–0.087
(–0.55)
0.085

0.022
(0.52)
0.087

–0.037
(–0.70)
–0.111

0.181
(2.41)
0.348

0.002
(0.05)
0.007

0.031
(1.85)
0.179

–0.016
(–1.14)
–0.106

0.005
(1.25)
0.125

0.001
(0.22)
0.021

0.004
(0.57)
0.050

–0.005
(–1.28)
0.104

–0.014
(–0.23)
–0.026

–0.018
(–0.36)
–0.039

0.004
(0.32)
0.036

0.005
(0.31)
0.033

–0.078
(–3.28)
–0.324

–0.005
(–0.38)
–0.035

0.035
(1.10)
0.095

–0.045
(–1.72)
–0.143

0.007
(1.06)
0.094

0.006
(0.64)
0.054

0.000
(0.03)
0.070

0.000
(0.00)
0.000

Independent variables
Demographic

Change in % multipleearner hh.
Change in % pop. African
American
Change in % elderlyheaded hh.
Change in % pop.
in-migrant
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Table 6.2 (continued)
African-American
hh.

In-migrant
hh.

Female-headed
hh.

Elderly-headed
hh.

No-earner
hh.

Multiple-earner
hh.

0.073
(1.14)
0.111

0.001
(0.19)
0.002

0.020
(1.47)
0.148

0.008
(0.47)
0.045

–0.027
(–1.07)
–0.093

0.005
(0.36)
0.029

Change in median
education

0.026
(0.020)
0.016

–0.008
(–0.07)
–0.005

0.018
(0.64)
0.052

0.009
(0.24)
0.019

–0.073
(–1.39)
–0.099

0.066
(2.30)
0.154

Change in education Gini

0.135
(1.74)
0.162

0.038
(0.59)
0.053

0.018
(1.04)
0.100

0.052
(2.40)
0.221

0.062
(2.01)
0.168

–0.014
(–0.81)
–0.063

Change in ratio of % jobs/
% residents in central city

–0.030
(–0.95)
–0.073

0.043
(1.62)
0.122

0.004
(0.64)
0.052

0.005
(0.58)
0.045

0.004
(0.29)
0.020

0.018
(2.62)
0.171

Change in population

–0.96
(–2.16)
–0.222

–0.051
(–1.37)
–0.136

–0.007
(–0.73)
–0.078

–0.029
(–2.33)
–0.237

–0.011
(–0.61)
–0.056

–0.005
(–0.56)
–0.048

0.024
(0.65)
0.042

–0.058
(–1.35)
–0.120

–0.000
(–0.00)
–0.000

–0.008
(–0.53)
–0.48

0.002
(0.11)
0.009

0.015
(1.32)
0.101

Independent variables
Change in mean persons
per hh.
Skill

Other

1980 Population
(in 10,000s)

Change in mean income

0.044
(1.19)
0.132

0.071
(2.32)
0.250

–0.004
(–0.50)
–0.058

0.014
(1.33)
0.147

0.025
(1.70)
0.170

0.005
(0.59)
0.055

Change in residential
segregation index

–0.001
(–1.05)
–0.097

0.0002
(0.22)
0.019

0.000
(0.28)
0.027

–0.001
(–2.49)
–0.227

–0.000
(–0.27)
–0.022

0.000
(0.10)
0.008

Change in residents in
central city

–0.109
(–1.61)
–0.128

–0.057
(–1.01)
–0.078

0.002
(0.16)
0.013

0.005
(0.26)
0.020

–0.029
(–1.10)
–0.078

–0.002
(–0.13)
–0.008

1980 Household income
Gini

–0.247
(–0.90)
–0.100

–0.386
(–1.70)
–0.179

0.067
(1.14)
0.129

0.135
(1.78)
0.192

0.447
(4.16)
0.408

–0.003
(–0.05)
–0.005

–0.069
(–0.38)
–0.035

–0.130
(–0.87)
–0.077

0.021
(0.53)
0.050

0.027
(0.54)
0.049

0.219
(3.08)
0.254

0.244
(6.28)
0.485

0.261
(0.31)
0.166

–0.220
(–1.33)
0.163

–0.033
(–0.76)
–0.099

–0.017
(–0.31)
–0.038

–0.144
(–1.84)
–0.210

–0.020
(–0.46)
–0.049

0.07

0.13

0.01

0.09

0.25

0.34

Local labor market
Change in earnings Gini

Change in employment-topopulation ratio
Adj. R2
a

Numbers in parentheses are t–statistics; numbers in italics are beta or standardized coefficients.
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tions arises from the greater importance of labor market characteristics
for these populations that are defined, after all, relative to their labor
market outcomes.
MSAs with greater earnings inequality have significantly greater
income inequality among multi-earner households. For these households who have multiple earners in both periods, there is less variation
possible in labor supply, so wages and salaries have larger effects on
inequality.
MSAs with greater change in the employment-to-population ratio
and greater increases in the proportion of elderly households have significantly less income inequality among no-earner households. These
results are consistent with greater MSA equality among no-earner
households when they are “no-earner” by choice. Obviously, households that choose to be “no-earner” are more likely than households
with earners to have incomes from other sources. With fewer households that are no-earner because no household member can find a job
(more likely to be the case when there is less employment relative to
population), the lower tail of the no-earner income distribution is eliminated. Similarly, when a larger share of households are headed by
senior citizens, they are more likely to be no-earner because of retirement and, then, to have other income. The finding that MSAs with
more earnings inequality have more income inequality for no-earners
is more difficult to explain. As with employment-to-population, the
effect must arise from the selection of households into the no-earner
status. Local labor markets with more earnings inequality either
encourage members of households from the extremes of the income
distribution to withdraw from the labor force or, alternatively, encourage those in the middle to enter employment.
It is interesting that MSAs with greater growth in overall earnings
inequality did not have statistically significant changes in the inequality of income among African-American, over-age-65, in-migrant, or
female-headed households. MSAs with changes in the employment-to-population measure (and the correlated proportion of households who are multi-earner) also had no different income inequality for
the over-65, the in-migrant and the female-headed households. These
results suggest that the labor market has less effect on inequality
among these groups.
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MSAs with changes in the proportion of African-American households or of in-migrant households had no significant changes in the
household income distribution among any of the other subpopulations.
African-American household income grew more unequal in MSAs
with greater growth in the African-American population; however, the
distribution of household income among in-migrants grew more equal
as the proportion of in-migrants in the MSA grew. Both of these
effects are of borderline statistical significance.
While MSAs with increases in the proportion of households
headed by women had increased inequality among no-earner households and multi-earner households (which is consistent with the overall
results reported in Table 5.1), there was no effect for the other MSA
subpopulations.
Households headed by persons over age 65 are very likely to have
no earners. For this reason, the growth of elderly households, whose
incomes are tied to pensions and other retirement income, is correlated
with increased income equality among no-earner households. Similarly, the growth in no-earner households is correlated with increased
income equality among over-age-65 households.
In total, the results of Table 6.2 indicate that, to the extent MSAs
experiencing changes in the representation of these demographic
groups have changes in overall income inequality, the association
arises from the position of the group in the overall distribution, rather
than from changes in the distribution of income within the group.

SUMMARY
The principal findings are that, with respect to MSA earnings inequality,
• MSAs with more variation in work hours have substantially more
variation in earnings inequality.
• MSAs with more growth in earnings inequality had less economic growth. MSAs with economic growth had less variation in
both pay rates and total work hours.
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• MSAs with more population and those that experienced an
increase, or less of a decrease, in employment in durable goods
manufacturing industries experienced a decrease in earnings inequality which was mostly due to the effects on total work hours.
• Contrary to much speculation, MSAs with more growth in producer service employment reduced earnings inequality among
full-time workers, and did so to a greater extent than MSAs with
comparable increases in durable goods manufacturing employment. MSAs with more producer service workers did have
greater variation, or inequality, in total work hours, however.
With respect to inequality within subgroups of metropolitan populations,
• MSAs with more change in their local labor market did not have
more changes in the distribution of income within African-American, over-age-65, in-migrant, or female-headed households.

Notes
1. It is also the case that the race and the migration status of a household head also
apply in most cases to all other household members, so that these characteristics
of household heads are also reliable as population characteristics.
2. Gender is a factor in the labor market because women earn less than men, but the
extent to which women head households has no direct effects on the distribution
of wages.
3. A possible reason why sales work is different is that potentially low-wage sales
workers may move to other industries and occupations when the economy heats
up, leaving relatively more workers whose earnings are in the middle range, thus
reducing inequality.

7

Sources of MSA Poverty

As described in Chapter 4, poverty rates are another common
index of how income is distributed among households. Unlike the Gini
coefficient, and unlike the measures of shares of income accruing to
quintiles that measure the relative position of the bottom, the middle,
and the top of the distribution, the poverty index is based on the
income needed by the household to purchase basic levels of food, shelter, and services. The proportion of households with incomes below
the poverty level, then, reflects the proportion of households who are
unable to acquire a minimal living standard; the proportion does not
reflect the difference between high- and low-income households.
Based on an analysis of changes in poverty rates in metropolitan
areas during the 1980s, this chapter presents evidence that MSAs with
more economic growth had less growth in poverty, and MSAs with
increases in earnings inequality had more growth in poverty; but MSAs
of varying racial compositions, MSAs with proportionately larger central cities, and MSAs with more movement of jobs from the city to the
suburbs had no differential growth in poverty.

COMPARING HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITY AND
POVERTY MEASURES
While changes in the poverty rate in a metropolitan area may
reflect changes in the equality of the household income distribution
within the area, poverty rates and income inequality are not the same.
The Gini coefficient measures changes in household income across the
entire distribution of household income; the poverty rate measures the
proportion of households who receive an income below a level defined
as necessary to maintain a minimal standard of living.
Changes in the poverty rate over time are also affected by the accuracy of the Consumer Price Index. For example, if the Consumer
Price Index overstates the rate of increase in the prices of goods and
services consumed by low-income households (either because the
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changes in the prices of these goods change at a different rate from
those consumed by middle- and upper-income households, or because
improvements in quality of goods and services have not been correctly
factored into the consideration of price changes), 1 then the rate of
increase in the poverty rate is also overstated. Changes in the Gini
coefficient or in the shares of income accruing to each quintile are not
affected by changes in or the accuracy of the Consumer Price Index,
because this index is not used in their computation.
There are three important differences in the phenomena indicated
by the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient that are particularly important in studying changes across metropolitan areas.
1. The income necessary to keep a household above a poverty
standard of living is defined for the entire nation; it does not
reflect intermetropolitan differences in prices or climate that
affect the income necessary to maintain a given living standard.
2. The income level that defines poverty for a given household
depends on the age of the persons in the household and the
household’s size. Children and persons over age 65 require less
income to be above the poverty line; larger households require
more. Household income distribution measures such as the Gini
coefficient and the share by quintile treat a dollar amount accruing to each household the same, regardless of household size or
the ages of its members; the designation that a household with a
given dollar amount of income is below the poverty level does
vary, however, with its size and the ages of it members.
3. While distributional measures such as the Gini coefficient are
not dependent on prices and can be sensitive to changes affecting those “in poverty” (i.e., changes in the income accruing to
those at the bottom of the distribution), increases in the Gini can
also arise from other shifts in the distribution.
Chapter 5 demonstrates that growing MSA inequality in the household income distribution can arise from increases in the share accruing
to the top quintile of the MSA at the expense of the third or fourth
quintile. For example, changes in earnings inequality decrease the
shares accruing to the second through fourth quintiles, increase the
share accruing to the top quintile, and have a much smaller but negative
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effect on the share accruing to the bottom quintile. While MSAs with
increases in the proportion of household heads who were African-American had decreases in the share of the middle quintile, and
MSAs with increases in the proportion who were over age 65 had
increases in the middle quintile shares; the bottom quintile was not
affected in MSAs experiencing either of these demographic changes.
Shifts in the household income distribution that do not involve changes
in the share of income accruing to at least the lower-income households within the bottom quintile cannot affect the poverty rate, since
fewer than 20 percent of households are below the poverty level in
more than 90 percent of the MSAs studied here.2 For these reasons, an
analysis of whether MSAs with changes in demographic characteristics, in skill composition, in structural or geographic characteristics,
and in local labor market vitality had different poverty rates may differ
from an analysis of the effects of the same changes on other household
inequality measures.

METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS AND POVERTY
To examine, specifically, how changes in characteristics of MSAs
are associated with changes in their poverty rates, changes in these
characteristics between 1979 and 1989 are regressed on changes in the
poverty rate over the same time period. As in Chapter 5’s analyses of
the Gini coefficient for household income, rates of change rather than
absolute levels of poverty are studied because the absolute levels of
variables are more likely to be correlated with unobserved differences
across metropolitan areas (such as price level differences, for example). Also as in Chapter 5, the analyses are not based on a structural
model of urban poverty. Instead, the analyses sort out the ceteris paribus correlations between changes in poverty rates for metropolitan
areas and changes in their demographic, labor market, skill, and structural characteristics. This exploration, then, begs the question of sorting out endogenous and exogenous variables. While household
formation both affects and is affected by local labor market conditions
and skill composition, no attempt is made to sort cause from effect.
Rather, the emphasis is on sorting out correlations and carefully mea-
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suring the interactions between independent variables by estimating a
variety of specifications.
Table 7.1 reports the results of regressing percentage changes in
MSA characteristics on percentage changes in poverty rates between
1979 and 1989. A negative coefficient for a characteristic indicates
that the characteristic is associated with a decrease in the metropolitan
poverty rate. Table 7.1 uses the same specifications and formats used
in Tables 5.1, 5.4, and 6.2. The first specification, the “basic model,”
includes changes in demographic and skill compositions and structural
characteristics. The second specification, reported in the next column
right, adds changes in household formation decisions by earners. The
right-most column adds to the second specification the effects of the
local labor market and several structural characteristics that are highly
correlated with one another and with economic growth. (See Chapter 5
for additional discussion of how to interpret differences in the regression coefficients across specifications.)
Demographic Structure
In the basic model, MSAs experiencing a relative growth in African-American households also experience a relative decrease in their
poverty rates, while MSAs with a relative increase in households
headed by women experienced an increase in their poverty rates. Once
MSA changes in the number of earners in the household are added,
however, MSAs that changed the racial composition or the gender
composition of their household heads had no significant changes in
their poverty rates. Chapter 5 found similar results for racial composition in terms of household income inequality (although MSAs with
increases in African-American households had significant decreases in
earnings inequality; see Chapter 6), but MSAs with increases in the
proportion of households headed by women had significantly greater
household income inequality. Because the analysis of MSA quintile
shares indicates that this increase in inequality comes from a decrease
in the share of the second quintile and an increase in the share of the
top quintile, it is not surprising that there is no association with the
MSA poverty rate. Households with incomes below the poverty line
are almost totally in the bottom quintile, which experienced no signifi-
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cant change in share as the proportion of female-headed households
changed (see Table 5.4).
MSAs with more growth in the proportion of households headed
by persons over age 65 had greater decreases in their poverty levels,
when either earners per household or local labor market conditions and
economic growth was controlled. The effects of changes in the proportion of households headed by persons over age 65 are large, negative,
and significant for the right-most two columns of Table 7.1. Although
still significant, the effects are smaller when controlling for economic
growth and labor market conditions, suggesting that high growth
MSAs have greater growth in their elderly population. 3 An MSA that
increased its proportion of households over age 65 by one standard
error had a poverty rate lower by 0.169 standard error. Intermetropolitan variation in the rate of change in the proportion of households over
age 65 is one of the most important correlates of intermetropolitan
variation in growth in the poverty rate.
The finding that MSAs with growth in elderly households had less
growth in poverty rates contrasts with the finding in Chapter 5 that
MSAs with changes in this characteristic had no significant change in
household income inequality and no change in the share of MSA
household income that accrued to the bottom quintile. To the extent
that any correlation between household income distribution and the
representation of elderly households is found, it is in (statistically
insignificantly) increasing shares for the second and third quintiles and
decreasing shares for the fourth and fifth quintiles (see Table 6.1). The
effect on the share of the bottom quintile is negative, insignificant, and
small. The poverty income level for elderly households is lower than
for non-elderly households for two reasons: 1) The income necessary
for a household to be out of poverty depends on the size of the household, and households headed by the elderly are smaller; and 2) the poverty income level is defined at a lower level for households with elderly
heads. Because the elderly composition of MSAs has no effect on the
share of income accruing to the bottom fifth of households (which is
the quintile that accounts for most of the households with incomes
below the poverty level), the negative effect of changes in elderly composition on MSA poverty rates is likely the result of the differing
income needs of those households.
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Table 7.1 Percentage Changes in Metropolitan Poverty Rates for 181
Metropolitan Areas,a 1979–1989b

Independent variables

Basic model

Adds earners
per hh.

Adds local
labor market
and growth

0.759
(3.46)
0.329

0.195
(0.99)
0.084

0.078
(0.54)
0.034

0.872
5.44)
0.649

0.187
(1.42
0.139)

Demographic
Change in % femaleheaded hh.
Change in % no-earner hh.

Change in % multipleearner hh.
Change in % pop.
African American
Change in % elderlyheaded hh.

–0.353
(–0.96)
–0.097

–0.255
0.79
–0.070

–0.101
(–2.41)
–0.191

–0.054
(–1.48)
–0.102

–0.017
(–0.61)
–0.032

0.032
(0.22)
0.019

–0.497
(–3.56)
–0.294

–.285
(–2.74)
–0.169

Change in %pop.
in-migrants
Change in mean persons
per hh.

–0.096
(–1.77)
–0.085
–0.086
(–0.53)
–0.041

–0.130
(–0.94)
–0.062

–0.219
(–2.06)
–0.105

–0.436
(–1.21)
–0.085

–0.086
(–0.28)
–0.017

0.264
(1.17)
0.051

0.035
(0.17)
0.014

0.108
(0.62)
0.042

–0.257
(–1.91)
–0.100

Skill
Change in median
education
Change in educational
Gini
Local labor market
Change in earnings Gini

Change in employment-topopulation ratio

1.520
(4.95)
0.251
–0.056
(–0.16)
–0.012
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Table 7.1 (continued)

Basic model

Adds earners
per hh.

Adds local
labor market
and growth

0.085
(0.98)
0.067

0.042
(0.57)
0.033

0.029
(0.53)
0.023

1980 Population (in
10,000s)

–0.012
(–0.09)
–0.007

0.128
(1.17)
0.074

0.131
(1.49)
0.076

Change in residential
segregation index

0.003
(0.95)
0.068

–0.000
(–0.03)
–0.002

–0.000
(–0.19)
–0.010

Change in residents in
central city

0.743
(4.08)
0.283

0.735
(4.76)
0.280

0.375
(3.23)
0.143

South Central U.S.A.

0.092
(2.12)
0.179

0.004
(0.10)
0.007

–0.026
(–0.89)
–0.051

Independent variables
Other
Change in ratio of % work/
% live in central city

Change in mean income

1980 MSA poverty rate

–0.632
(–9.58)
–0.622
–0.009
(–2.14)
–0.183

–0.001
(–0.32)
–0.024

–0.010
(–3.28)
–0.198

Constant

0.171
(1.79)

0.137
(1.56)

0.830
(8.58)

Adj. R2

0.22

0.45

0.71

a

Nassau is eliminated from the poverty analysis because this analysis makes critical
use of the central city/MSA differences, and there is no central city in Nassau.
b Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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The differences in the effects of race, gender, and age of the household head between the basic model and the other specifications arise
from the correlation between these demographic characteristics and the
household formation decisions of earners. Once we control for earners
per household, the negative effect of growth in the proportion of African Americans and the positive effect of growth in female-headed
households disappears. Furthermore, the negligible positive effect of
growth in elderly households becomes a significant negative effect.
The association between the number of earners in the household
and metropolitan poverty rates is as expected. MSAs with increases in
the proportion of households with no earners had large increases in
poverty, but the proportion of households with no earners appears to
reflect metropolitan differences in the overall level of economic opportunity and not differences in labor force participation decisions or
household formation patterns among workers. The evidence for this
interpretation comes from comparing the coefficients of the proportion
of no-earner households in the two right-most columns of Table 7.1.
With no controls for growth or labor market, the proportion of noearner households strongly increases metropolitan poverty, a one-standard-error increase in the proportion of no-earners resulting in a 0.649
increase in the poverty rate. With growth and labor market controls,
however, the coefficient of no-earner households is insignificant. The
correlation between growth in no-earner households and growth in
MSA poverty is fully accounted by differential economic growth and
labor market opportunities in those MSAs with greater increases in noearner households. The regression results that take into account economic growth and labor markets allow us to separate the effects of
work choices of households from the effects of the work opportunities
they face.4
Changes in household size, one of the variables used to define
whether household income places the household in poverty, have a statistically insignificant negative correlation with changes in MSA poverty rates in the first two columns of Table 7.1, but a significantly
negative effect (also twice as large in size of coefficient) once variables
for economic growth and the local labor market are included. These
same growth and labor market variables reduce the effects of changes
in gender, race, and age compositions of households, variables that are
also associated with changes in household size. These results indicate
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that economic growth is the more important MSA characteristic associated with changes in poverty rates among MSAs, but that once economic growth is considered, MSAs with decreases in household size
have higher poverty rates.
MSAs with an increase in the proportion of in-migrants had a
decrease in the rate of poverty growth. If the increase in the proportion
of in-migrants was one standard error above average, the poverty rate
grew at a rate that was 0.085 standard error less than otherwise. As
discussed in previous chapters, an increase in in-migration reflects
expectations of economic growth, and it is economic growth that
reduces the poverty rate.
To summarize, the demographic characteristic that has the strongest association with variation in the poverty rates across MSAs is the
MSA proportion of households over age 65. The correlation between
decreases in MSA poverty and changes in this characteristic are likely
to reflect the fact that poverty incomes for elderly households are set
lower than for younger households. MSAs with larger proportions of
in-migrants have less poverty. This correlation is due to the correlation
of increased in-migration with accelerated growth in economic opportunity. MSAs with growth in economic opportunity reduced their poverty. After controlling for economic growth, however, MSAs with
decreases in household size had significantly greater poverty rates.
The change in household size is the only demographic shift that has
“caused” changes in poverty rates across MSAs.
Skill Composition
Although MSAs with changes in skill composition experienced
different changes in the equality of the earnings distribution for professional and management workers, skill composition had no effect on the
earnings distribution for other workers or on changes in household
income distribution (as analyzed in Chapter 5). For the first two specifications in Table 7.1, neither MSAs with changes in median education
nor those with changes in the distribution of education have a different
rate of growth in poverty rates. The last column (with controls for
local labor market conditions and for economic growth) shows marginal negative significance for the education Gini. An MSA with a rate
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of increase in the education Gini of one standard error (an increase in
educational inequality) had a 0.10 standard error lower poverty rate.
How can an increase in educational inequality decrease poverty?
The amount of education was growing dramatically in every MSA
between 1980 and 1990. An increase in inequality occurs if those in
the middle of the distribution have a smaller overall share of total education in 1990 than they had in 1980. One way this can occur is if
those at the lower end or those at the higher end achieved relatively
more education. If those at the lower end achieved relatively more,
then poverty rates would decrease.
Structural Characteristics
Geographic and structural characteristics of MSAs may also be
significantly associated with the rate of change in their poverty levels.
Chapter 5 (p. 112) reports that population size (measured by 1980
MSA population) is associated with increasing household income inequality, largely due to increases in the share of the top quintile. When
changes in the local labor market and economic growth are added to
the analysis, the effect of population decreases but remains positive
and significant. The poverty results differ somewhat. Larger MSAs
had no significantly different rate of change in poverty, but, when controls for economic growth and local labor market conditions are added,
there is a slightly greater tendency for larger MSAs to have more poverty. Larger MSAs do not have different changes in poverty rates than
smaller MSAs, but they have more economic growth and, because
growth decreases poverty, they should have had less increase in poverty. (Recall from Chapter 6 and Table 6.1 that larger MSAs had a
larger increase in earnings inequality.) Because growth in large MSAs
does not benefit the poor as much as in smaller MSAs, population size
had an insignificantly positive effect on poverty rates in the last column
of Table 7.1.
MSAs that had less of a decrease in the proportion of their residents living in the central city experienced significantly greater rates of
growth in their poverty levels. About half of the difference appears to
arise because MSAs with more population in the central city had
slower growth, as evidenced by the lower coefficients in the right-most
column: a change in the proportion of MSA residents in the central city
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that is one standard error above average increases MSA poverty rate
growth by 0.143 standard error.
This result is surprising. Metropolitan fragmentation—that is,
increasing numbers of municipalities or local governments in a metropolitan area—is expected to worsen poverty by making it easier for the
wealthier to separate themselves from the poor. Metropolitan fragmentation increases as the proportion of the population living in the central
city decreases. As described in Chapter 2, the separation of richer from
poorer results in greater spatial concentration of the poor that in turn
may lead to a spatial mismatch between where the poor live and where
the jobs are, and also to neighborhoods that offer inferior opportunities
for the poor to obtain human capital in the form of information and
skills (Cutler and Glaeser 1997). Both of these effects of decreases in
the proportion of the population residing in the central city are
expected to lead to increases in MSA poverty rates.
The quintile analysis in Chapter 5 shows that decreases in the proportion of the MSA population residing in the central city increased the
share of the bottom three quintiles at the expense of the top two quintiles, with the largest effects occurring in quintiles two and five. The
quintile results can be reconciled with the poverty rate results in two
ways.
1) The positive effect on income share for the bottom quintile may
be attributed to the second decile, with the first decile (where
most poverty households are counted) experiencing the opposite
relationship. The fact that the bottom quintile shows less of a
positive effect than the second quintile in Table 5.4 suggests that
the positive effect of larger central cities on income shares
decreases at the lower levels of income.
2) The differences between the households included in the bottom
quintile and the households included in the group with incomes
below the poverty level, which are defined with respect to age
and household size but ignoring MSA price levels, account for
the differences. The MSAs that have less of a decrease (or an
increase) in the proportion of residents living in the central city
are different with respect to other attributes that are associated
with poverty rates but not with household income shares.
MSAs in California and Florida5 dominate the outlying increas-
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ers and decreasers in central city population. Because the two
coasts generally experienced greater economic growth, their
changes in poverty rates (a measure that depends on income
level, as opposed to income distributional measures like the Gini
coefficient and shares of income to quintiles that do not) may
lead to different results.
Consistent with the results reported in Chapter 5 for both the
household income Gini coefficient and the shares accruing to quintiles,
an increase in the proportion of jobs in the central city relative to the
proportion of residents in the city (a measure of the spatial match
between jobs and center city residents) has a positive but statistically
insignificant effect on the growth in MSA poverty.
Changes in the extent of racial segregation in housing have no
effect on changes in the MSA poverty rate. South Central6 MSAs have
a marginally significant greater increase in their poverty rates in the
basic model. When earners and labor market/growth variables are considered, the South Central has a statistically insignificant and smaller
rate of increase in poverty rates between 1979 and 1989. Obviously,
MSAs with greater income growth have less growth in their poverty
rates. As expected,7 MSAs with higher poverty rates in 1979 tend to
have slower rates of growth in poverty, after considering variations in
local economic conditions.
Local Labor Market Characteristics
Not surprisingly, the structure of the local labor market influences
variations in metropolitan poverty rates. An increase of one standard
error in the change in the earnings Gini coefficient in an MSA is associated with an increase of 0.251 standard error in the change in the
metropolitan poverty rate between 1979 and 1989.
MSAs with tightening of the labor markets, as represented by
increases in the employment-to-population ratio, do not have significantly greater changes in their poverty rates, however, after controlling
for changes in the number of earners per household. Because the lack
of earners in a household contributes to growth of poverty, MSAs with
more equal distribution of wages or jobs have less poverty.
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SUMMARY
Economic growth and local labor market conditions influence the
growth of poverty in MSAs. Based on the beta coefficients from the
right-most column of Table 7.1, the most important variable is the
growth in mean per-capita income. Because the poverty rate is defined
with respect to income levels, this is not at all surprising. The next
variables, in order of importance, are increases in the earnings Gini,
higher 1980 MSA poverty rates, increases in households over age 65
(reflecting that such households require less income to be above the
poverty index), changes in the proportion of MSA residents in the central city, and increases in the proportion of households without an
earner.
The principal findings are that
• MSAs with more economic growth have less poverty; this effect
is stronger for smaller MSAs.
• MSA labor markets that offer a more unequal distribution of
wage and salary opportunities have higher poverty rates.
• MSAs with increases in the proportion of the population that is
African American or in the proportion of households headed by
unmarried women had no different growth in their poverty rates,
once local economic conditions are considered.
• MSAs with increases in the proportion of households headed by a
person over age 65 had greater decreases in their poverty rates.
• Increasing income and racial segmentation within the MSA did
not significantly affect MSA poverty rates.

Notes
1. See Boskin and Jorgenson (1997).
2. In 1990, the only MSAs in this study that had poverty rates in excess of 20 percent
were Fresno, CA (21.4); Visalia, CA (22.6); Gainesville, FL (22.7); Alexandria,
LA (22.6); Lafayette, LA (21.7); New Orleans, LA (21.2); Shreveport, LA (22.0);
Brownsville, TX (39.7); Corpus Christi, TX (21.3); El Paso, TX (26.8); McAllen,
TX (41.9); Waco, TX (20.6); Yakima, WA (20.2); and Huntington, WV (20.3).
3. Presumably, this difference reflects the migration patterns of retired workers.
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4. When number-of-earners-per-household variables are removed while the employment-to-population variable is included, the effects of race and gender composition of households become significant. This result arises because MSAs with
more African-American and/or female-headed households have more poverty
because such households have fewer earners, ceteris paribus.
5. The average MSA decreased this proportion (see Table 4.4). The largest rates of
decrease in the proportion living in the central city after Atlanta (–28 percent)
were Sarasota, FL (–24 percent), Daytona Beach, FL (–24 percent), Lawrence,
MA (–21 percent), West Palm Beach, FL (–20 percent), Riverside, CA (–20 percent), Tampa, FL (–19 percent), Richmond, VA (–19 percent), Augusta, GA (–18
percent), Fort Lauderdale, FL (–18 percent), Atlantic City, NJ (–18 percent), and
Bremerton, WA (–18 percent). The largest rates of increase after Chico, CA (17
percent) were Bakersfield, CA (15 percent), Melbourne, FL (14 percent), Visalia,
CA (13 percent), and Fall River, MA (13 percent).
6. “South Central” includes the East South Central and the West South Central
states: Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.
7. The 1980 level acts as a “standardization” for the percentage change. The negative
effect means that there is regression to the mean in the sense that MSAs with
larger poverty rates grew less, i.e., approaching the mean, and those with smaller
poverty rates grew more, also approaching the mean.

8

The Concentration of Poverty
in the Central City

The association between MSA characteristics and the distribution
of poverty between city and suburb (i.e., the extent of the concentration
of metropolitan poverty in the central city) may differ from their association with the overall poverty rate for the metropolis. In general,
MSAs that are more segregated by income are expected, of course, to
have more of their poor in one place and therefore to have higher concentrations of poverty in the central city. Those MSA characteristics
that are associated with greater residential segmentation are expected,
therefore, to result in greater concentrations of poverty in the central
city. MSAs with greater growth in residential segregation by race,
with more African Americans, or with fewer in-migrants are expected
to have higher concentrations of poverty in the central city.
Based on an analysis of changes in the proportion of MSA poverty
that is in the central city in the 1980s, the analysis presented in this
chapter finds that
• metropolitan area poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated
in the central cities, and the rate of concentration is accelerating
in those MSAs with the highest levels of concentration;
• economic growth, which was shown in the previous chapters to
decrease metropolitan poverty and household income inequality,
has little effect on the distribution of poverty between city and
suburb;
• the racial composition of the metropolitan area, which was shown
in the previous chapter to have little influence on metropolitan
poverty, had slightly greater influence on the extent to which that
poverty concentrates in the central city;
• metropolitan areas with more of their population residing in the
central city are shown to have higher overall poverty rates, but
this chapter finds that there is less of a differential between the
amounts of poverty in the city and the suburbs for MSAs with
larger central cities;

145

146

The Concentration of Poverty in the Central City

• movement of jobs from the city to the suburbs has little relationship with metropolitan poverty rates or the concentration of MSA
poverty in the central city; and
• an increase in earnings inequality in the metropolitan area is associated with increased poverty, but it is also associated with a more
even distribution of that poverty between city and suburb.

METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS AND THE
CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY
We examine the tendency of poverty to concentrate in the central
city of the MSA by measuring the rate of change in the proportion of
total MSA poverty that is in the central city. Because MSAs vary in
the size of the central city relative to the overall MSA, I measure the
percentage change in that ratio during the 1980s, while controlling for
changes in the boundaries of the MSA and of the central city. Table 8.1
reports the association between changes in the concentration of metropolitan poverty in the central city and changes in MSA characteristics.
Demographic Structure
MSAs with different demographic structures experience systematically different changes in the concentration of poverty in their central
cities, and demographic structure has systematically different associations with concentration than it has with the overall MSA change in
poverty.
While MSAs with increases in their African-American populations
had insignificantly less poverty growth (see Table 7.1), these MSAs
had an increase in the concentration of poverty in the central city
(Table 8.1), although the effect is of marginal statistical significance.
MSAs with increases in female-headed households, changes in the distribution of wage earners across MSA households, and changes in
MSA household size had no differential increases in the concentration
of poverty over the decade. (It is interesting to note that changes in
household size had a positive, but insignificant, effect on changes in
the concentration of poverty, presumably arising because larger house-
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holds are less likely to be poor and less likely to reside in the central
city.) MSAs that increase their proportion of households over 65 experience a deconcentration of poverty from the central city. The elderly
population is less likely to be poor and more likely to reside in the city
than is the younger population.
Skill Composition
The analyses reported in Chapters 5 and 7 show that measures of
MSA skill composition have no significant effect on their household
income inequality or poverty rates. Changes in median education have
no significant influence on changes in the concentration of poverty in
the central city, but changes in the distribution of education are associated with central city poverty. MSAs with more unequal distributions
of education (as measured by an increase in the Gini) had poverty more
concentrated in their central cities. An MSA with a change in its education Gini that is one standard error above the mean had an increase in
the concentration of poverty that was between 0.22 and 0.25 standard
error above the mean (Table 8.1). The coefficient of the education Gini
increased when controls for the effects of the education distribution on
labor market outcomes (as measured by the employment-to-population
ratio, the earnings distribution, and other variables correlated with economic expansion) were added.
These results indicate that the distribution of education affects the
concentration of poverty by affecting household residential location
patterns. MSAs that became more educationally unequal were more
likely to have selective migration of nonpoor, more educated persons
from the city to the suburbs.
Structural Characteristics
Geographic and other structural characteristics of MSAs are also
significantly associated with the extent to which poverty is concentrated in the central city. As with the growth in MSA poverty, the
growth in the concentration of poverty is strongly influenced by the
proportion of MSA residents in the central city: increases in this proportion strongly decreased the rate of concentration of poverty in the
central city. An increase that was one standard error above the mean
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Table 8.1 Percentage Changes in the Ratio of Central City to MSA
Poverty Rates for 181 Metropolitan Areas,a 1979–1989b

Independent variable
Demographic
Change in % female-headed hh.

Adds earners
per hh.

Adds local labor
market and
growth

0.034
(2.07)
0.146

–0.004
(–0.05)
–0.004
–0.027
(–0.37)
–0.045
–0.072
(–0.42)
–0.045
0.033
(1.91)
0.139

0.045
(0.50)
0.044
0.010
(0.13)
0.017
–0.223
(–1.09)
–0.139
0.029
(1.63)
0.122

–0.111
(–0.92)
–0.148

–0.106
(–1.62)
–0.141

0.032
(0.48)
0.034

0.028
(0.43)
0.030

–0.104
(–1.61)
–0.139
0.023
(0.65)
0.045
0.033
(0.49)
0.035

0.026
(0.19)
0.012

0.025
(0.17)
0.011

0.063
(0.44)
0.028

0.249
(3.21)
0.218

0.252
(3.22)
0.221

0.288
(3.65)
0.252

Basic model
–0.008
(–0.09)
–0.008

Change in % no-earner hh.

Change in % multiple-earner hh.

Change in % pop.
African American

Change in % elderly-headed hh.

Change in % in-migrant hh.

Change in mean persons per hh.

Skill
Change in mean education

Change in education Gini

Local labor market
Change in earnings Gini

–0.706
(–3.68)
–0.263
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Table 8.1 (continued)

Independent variable
Change in employment-topopulation ratio
Other
Change in ratio of % work/% live
in central city

Basic model

–0.053
(–1.53)
–0.095

–0.055
(–1.54)
–0.098

–0.144
(–2.76)
–0.188
0.002
(1.74)
0.116
–0.473
(–6.07)
–0.406
0.005
(0.32)
0.023
0.033
(1.94)
0.152
–0.000
(–1.50)
–0.096

–0.145
(–2.74)
–0.189
0.002
(1.73)
0.117
–0.477
(–6.04)
–0.410
0.003
(0.18)
0.014
0.032
(1.91)
0.151
–0.000
(–1.54)
–0.100

–0.045
(–1.27)
–0.080
–0.29
(–0.54)
–0.050
–0.079
(–1.42)
–0.103
0.002
(1.42
0.103
–0.463
(–5.81)
–0.400
0.015
(0.85)
0.066
0.025
(1.44)
0.118
–0.000
(–1.53)
–0.110

–0.017
(–0.45)
–0.028
–0.012
(–0.32)

–0.017
(–0.45)
–0.029
–0.006
(–0.15)

–0.043
(–1.02)
–0.072
–0.012
(–0.24)

0.37

0.36

0.41

Change in population

Population in 1980 (in 10,000s)

Change in residential
segregation index
Change in residents in central city

South Central U.S.A.

1980 ratio of central city to MSA
poverty rate
Change in central city area

MSA missing index

Constant
Adj. R2
a

Adds local labor
market and
growth
0.184
(0.87)
0.086

Adds earners
per hh.

Nassau is eliminated from the poverty analysis because this analysis makes critical use of the
central city/MSA differences and there is no central city in Nassau.
b Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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decreased the rate of concentration of poverty by 0.40 to 0.41 standard
error. Because this variable had an opposite effect on MSA poverty,
however, this represents a rearrangement of poverty from the city to the
suburbs in a way that actually increases overall MSA poverty.
MSAs with increases in the ratio of the proportion of their jobs to
the proportion of their residents in the central city had less growth (statistically insignificant) in the concentration of poverty (and insignificant increases in overall poverty also). The results presented here do
not offer much optimism that a relocation of employment within the
metropolitan area can reduce overall poverty or be a promising solution to the increase in its concentration.
Central cities that expanded their boundaries through annexation
(Table 8.1, “Change in central city area”) had less poverty (but generally at a statistically insignificant level), presumably because annexed
areas had less poverty than the rest of the central city.1 MSAs in which
poverty was more concentrated in the central cities in 1979 experienced increased concentrations of poverty into the central cities
between 1979 and 1989. MSAs with a concentration of poverty in the
central city that was one standard error above average in 1979 experienced growth in the central city poverty concentration between 0.12
and 0.15 standard error above the average growth. These results suggest an acceleration of the concentration of metropolitan poverty in the
MSAs with greater concentration rates.
Neither growth in mean income nor population (which were both
significant in decreasing MSA poverty) were significantly associated
with the concentration of poverty in the city (data not shown). While
economic growth was clearly associated with a decrease in MSA poverty, it had no relationship to the distribution of that poverty between
city and suburbs.
Local Labor Market Characteristics
Surprisingly, MSAs with increases in the inequality of the earnings distribution (which were associated with increases in overall MSA
poverty) experienced decreases in the concentration of poverty in their
central cities between 1979 and 1989, at a statistically significant level.
These results hold for the model reported in the third column and also
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when the variables correlated with economic expansion are excluded
(not shown).
One possible explanation of this result is that MSAs with more
earnings equality have more persons earning middle-level incomes—
recall that Table 5.4 showed that decreases in earnings inequality
increased the shares of the second and third quintiles and reduced the
share of the top quintile of households. Middle-level-income households may have been more likely than those with high incomes to
move to the suburbs during the 1980s. If this were the case, MSAs
with an increase in middle-income persons would experience a relatively greater tendency to concentrate low-income persons in central
cities.
Continuing the surprising local labor market results, MSAs with
increasing tightness of the labor market (higher employment-to-population ratios) experienced insignificant increases in the concentration of
poverty in their central cities; the explanation for this is the same as for
the effects of rising earnings inequality, i.e., greater effects on the
shares accruing to the second and third quintiles than on the lowest
quintile. The issue here is one of location within the MSA. As with
earnings inequality, if increases in the employment-to-population ratio
disproportionately benefit middle-income households (which are more
likely to move to the suburbs), then the concentration of poverty
increases. These results suggest that employment-to-population ratios
rise by expanding the employment of middle-income suburban residents (i.e., dependent spouses and children of higher earners) or city
residents who then move to the suburbs, rather than members of lowerincome city households.
The beta coefficients reported in the last column of Table 8.1 summarize the relative importance of changes in MSA demographics, MSA
skill composition, other characteristics, and the local labor market on
changes in the concentration of metropolitan poverty in central cities.
In order of importance, the characteristics most strongly influencing
increases in the concentration of MSA poverty in central cities are
changes in the proportion of residents in the central city (–0.400); the
MSA wage and salary Gini coefficient (–0.263), the MSA educational
Gini coefficient (0.252), proportion of the MSA population over age 65
(–0.139), proportion of households with multiple earners (–0.139), proportion of the MSA population African American (0.122), 1980 ratio of
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central city to MSA poverty (0.118), change in the central city boundaries (–0.110), and increases in residential segregation by race (0.103).

SUMMARY
Several factors account for intermetropolitan variations in the concentration of poverty in central cities. The principal findings are that
• MSA poverty has become increasingly concentrated in the central cities, and the rate of increase appears to be greater for those
MSAs with the greatest concentration.
• Although MSAs with more economic growth had less poverty,
these MSAs have no different distribution of poverty between
their city and suburbs.
• Although MSA labor markets that offer a more unequal distribution of earnings opportunities had higher poverty rates, the poverty is more evenly distributed between suburbs and the central
city.
• MSAs with increases in the proportion of African-American
households and households with the head under age 65 have
greater concentrations of poverty in the central city.
• Increasing the proportion of MSA jobs in the central city was
associated with increases in MSA overall poverty and had no significant effect on central city poverty.

Note
1.

Arguably, annexation is correlated with economic growth and might have been
included only in Column 3 of Table 8.1. The inclusion or exclusion of the annexation variable affected only the third digit of the coefficient of the other independent variables, changing no signs or statistical significance.

9 The Role of the MacroEnvironment in Poverty and
Household Income Inequality
The results detailed in Chapters 5 through 8 show that changes in
MSA demographic structure and in employment, as well as changes in
earnings inequality, are strongly associated with the rising household
income inequality and poverty rates described in Chapter 1.
Rising earnings inequality does not translate directly into rising
household income inequality. If, as was the case for some MSAs, the
rise in earnings inequality occurs with an expansion of employment,
the net effect of these two labor market trends may actually reduce
household income inequality. When earnings inequality increases
because persons who previously had no earnings income (and who
thus were not previously included in the measurement of earnings inequality) become “low earners,” public policymakers need not be concerned. If household income inequality is decreasing, then rising
earnings inequality is less likely to be a problem.
Other characteristics of MSAs were less useful in distinguishing
MSAs with greater increases in inequality or poverty from those with
less. Neither changes in the MSA average level of education nor in the
relative inequality of the distribution of education among MSA residents are correlated with differences in household income distribution
within MSAs. Structural characteristics of MSAs—such as in the size
of the central city relative to the suburbs, the extent of residential segregation by race, and the density of jobs relative to residents in the central city—have little or no connection to changes in household income
inequality. Larger MSAs tended to have more income inequality and
poverty, however. Changes in skills and in metropolitan structure did
not seem to influence or be influenced by household income inequality
and poverty.
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SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
Assume, for the sake of discussion, that we know that the measured correlations between MSA characteristics and their poverty or
income inequality rates reflect causation; that is, the changes in the
characteristics of MSAs caused the changes in poverty or income inequality. Given this assumption, Table 9.1 lists the estimated average
contribution of the various metropolitan characteristics analyzed on the
amount of growth in the household income Gini, the poverty rate, and
the ratio of the central city to the MSA poverty rate. The estimated
contributions reported on Table 9.1 represent the multiplication of the
mean values of the characteristics (reported in Table 3.3) by the regression coefficients reported in the right-most columns of Table 5.1 (for
the household income Gini), Table 7.1 (for the poverty rate), and Table
8.1 (for the ratio of central city to MSA poverty rates).
Demographic Structure
There is evidence that MSAs that experienced greater decreases in
average household size had significantly greater increases in inequality
and poverty rates.1 MSAs experiencing greater growth in the proportion of households headed by unmarried women and of households
without earners had significantly greater increases in inequality. MSAs
with an aging population (i.e., those with increases in the proportion of
households headed by persons over age 65) experienced relative
decreases in their poverty rate. The racial composition of MSAs was
not associated with their poverty rates or the extent of income inequality.
The demographic choices that Americans make about the households in which they live vary across MSAs, and these MSA differences
are associated with the MSA’s levels of income inequality and poverty.
Whether public policy should or could be used to alter the differences
in MSA demographic structure that are associated with rising inequality or poverty of metropolitan areas is not at all clear. First, these MSA
shifts in household structures may be the result of poverty or inequality, not the cause. Second, even if the demographic differences do
cause the changes in poverty and inequality, the changes in family or
household circumstances may make individuals better off, in spite of
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Table 9.1 Major Factors in Growth in Metropolitan Poverty and
Income Inequality

Variable

Household Poverty
income Gini
rate
(%)
(%)

Total increase 1979–1989

10.6

9.4

Ratio of
central city
to MSA
poverty rates
(%)
8.0

Estimated contribution of demographic changes
Female-headed proportion

1.6***

1.2

0.7

No-earner proportion

0.4*

1.4

0.1

Multi-earner proportion

0.7

–1.7

–1.5

African-American proportion

–0.1

–0.5

Elderly-headed proportion

5.9*

–0.9

–14.7***

–0.9

In-migrant proportion

0.0

0.0

0.0

Household size

3.6***

3.2**

–0.5

Estimated contribution of education changes
Mean education
Gini education coefficient

–0.2

2.7

0.4

–6.4*

0.6

0.0

0.1

–0.1

7.2***

Estimated contribution of structural changes
Ratio of % work/% live in central city
Population

–1.6

–0.8

–0.6

Residential segregation index

0.0

0.2

0.0

Residents in central city

0.2

–1.9***

Per-capita income

0.2

–58.8***

–24.4***

1980 Level of dependent variable
1980 Population

2.4***
0.9

–11.4***

3.5

0.5***

1.1

–0.6

1.5***

4.2***

–2.0***

Estimated contribution of local labor market
Earnings Gini
Employment/population ratio

–2.3***

–0.4

1.3

*Computed based on coefficient that was statistically significant at p > 0.10.
**Computed based on coefficient that was statistically significant at p > 0.05.
***Computed based on coefficient that was statistically significant at p > 0.01.
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their income implications, than other options which reduce poverty and
inequality by having individuals live in less-preferred household circumstances.
The clearest public policy implication of the importance of changing family and household structures is that demographic choices may
undermine the efficacy of other strategies aimed at reducing poverty or
income inequality within an MSA. That portion of poverty and household income inequality that arises from changes in household formation patterns will not be changed by public policies that alter labor
demand, skills, or geographical/political structures but do not alter
preferences for household or family composition. To the extent that
additional policy responses aimed at that portion of inequality or poverty that arises from demographic choices are needed, the greatest consensus will be on those policies directed at persons who have not
chosen their household—i.e., the children—to improve their wellbeing and increase their opportunities to acquire skills.
Although MSA changes in racial composition had no relationship
to changes in the income distribution or the extent of poverty within an
MSA, racial changes were associated with changes in the location of
poverty in MSAs. MSAs with more African Americans had no more
poverty than others but were more likely to concentrate that poverty in
their central cities.
Although African Americans are more likely to be poor than other
Americans, MSAs with greater growth in the African-American population did not experience either more poverty or more income inequality. This result is consistent with race affecting who is poor (the
distribution of income and opportunity) but not the extent of poverty or
inequality. The result is also consistent with attributing current racial
differences in income to labor market discrimination, because racial
composition has no apparent effect on the overall productive capacity
(to the extent that productivity variation across MSAs is indexed by the
poverty rate or income level) of the MSA, 2 but it does affect who is
receiving the lower incomes in the MSA. Similarly, the fact that racial
composition does affect whether MSA poverty is concentrated in the
central city is consistent with housing discrimination against African
Americans.
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Skill Composition
MSAs with greater changes in the skill composition of their population did not experience different changes in poverty or income inequality, nor was there any change in the extent to which their poverty
was concentrated in the central city. While the results reported in Table
9.1 are based on an analysis that holds changes in the equality of the
earnings distribution constant, increases in median education were not
significant when the local earnings Ginis were not included (see Tables
5.1 and 7.1) nor were they significant in the analysis of earnings inequality (see Table 6.1).
Research based on the national economy has clearly demonstrated
that education plays a critical role in changing inequality of earnings
over time because education has become more valuable in the labor
market, increasing the wages of those that have it and decreasing the
wages of those who do not. The research also demonstrates that the
increasing return on education is the result of demographic or labor
supply changes that have resulted in a proportional decrease in highly
educated workers entering the market and is also the result of labor
demand changes that have made skill more valuable in production.
Yet, these phenomena do not lead to a statistically significant coefficient for changes in the average education level within a local labor
market. The effects of increases in average educational attainment on
local income inequality depend on how evenly education has increased
across the population. If the increase occurs because a larger proportion of the population moves into higher levels of education, then overall income inequality is expected to decrease. In this case, there is an
increase in supply of persons with “high end” skills and wages, reducing the equilibrium wage for the more highly skilled. If the increase in
education is evenly distributed, there may well be no effects on income
inequality.
The more telling variable, then, is changes in the Gini coefficient
for the distribution of educational attainment among adults. The association of increasing educational inequality with increases in household income inequality was positive but statistically insignificant;
increasing educational inequality contributed to decreases in the poverty rate and was positively associated with the concentration of MSA
poverty in the central city. The quintile analyses showed a decrease in

158

The Role of the Macro-Environment

the share of income accruing to the top quintile and an increase in
share to all other quintiles (especially those in the middle) as the Gini
coefficient for education increased. The inclusion or exclusion of local
labor market characteristics had no effect on these outcomes.
In the end, metropolitan areas with increases in educational inequality experienced no statistically significant changes in income inequality relative to MSAs without such increases. An important reason
is that, relatively, there was not much cross-sectional variability in
changes in educational inequality. Table 3.3 shows a standard deviation for the change in the education Gini that is small (7.6) relative to
the mean change in the Gini (25 percent). Similarly, the standard deviation of the percentage change in median education (3.8) is small relative to the percentage change in education (10.1). The changes in
education and its distribution are relatively larger over longer time
periods in the national data than they are in this cross section of MSAs
in the 1980s.
The relative unimportance of MSA changes in educational attainment or its distribution in terms of MSA changes in household income
inequality arise, then, from two sources. The first is that the increases
in educational attainment inequality across MSAs in the 1980s appear
to have arisen from increases in the proportion of the population with
the highest levels of education, which tended to increase supply relative to demand for the more highly skilled, reducing their relative earnings and increasing income equality. The second is that there was not
sufficient variation in changes in educational equality relative to
changes in income inequality to provide as powerful a statistical test of
the relationships as is the case in longer-duration national data.
Structural Characteristics
The geographic structure of metropolitan areas was only modestly
associated with the changes they experienced in income inequality and
poverty rates. MSAs that became more racially segregated did not
have significantly greater growth in poverty or overall household
income inequality. MSAs with growing segregation did decrease the
share of income accruing to the top quintile while increasing the share
of quintiles 2 and 3, however. This effect is consistent with segregation
having social costs in the sense of decreasing efficiency, that is,
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decreasing the quality of the match between workers and jobs. Segregation may reduce competition from quintile-1 households for jobs
typically taken by members of quintile-2 and quintile-3 households,
increasing the earnings of quintiles 2 and 3 while decreasing that of
quintile 1. Segregation may reduce the productivity and profitability of
MSA businesses, contributing to a reduction in the share of quintile 5.
Larger MSAs had significantly greater growth in inequality and
insignificantly greater growth in poverty (see Tables 5.1 and 7.1). The
income inequality effect is greatest when local labor market characteristics are not included, but remains significant (although half the size)
even with controls for employment and earnings inequality.
Larger MSAs have more earnings inequality. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that technology or productivity changes and
intensity of competition account for increases in inequality. Larger
MSAs allow a finer articulation of skill and tighter matches between
job requirements and worker skills. Earnings, then, are more tightly
tied to skill and more reflective of marginal product, more set by the
“market” and less set by “institutions.” Yet half of the effect of MSA
size remains after controlling for these labor market characteristics.
Larger MSAs are more “anonymous” and have a greater range of
households, as indicated by their tendency to have more female-headed
households. These social “nonconformity” effects associated with size
also contribute to income inequality and poverty.
The strongest evidence on the relationship between structure and
poverty or income inequality is with respect to the size of the central
city and the location of employment. MSAs whose central cities
account for more of the MSA population have greater poverty, but it is
less concentrated in the central city. While the latter result may be a
simple artifact of the central city including more of the MSA population, the difference in concentration affects the fiscal capacity of local
government to address poverty problems.
No relationship between the ratio of jobs to residents in the central
city and poverty or income inequality was evident, suggesting that the
sorting of employment between cities and suburbs is simply not relevant. This study, then, finds no support for the hypothesis that job
access and spatial mismatch contribute to MSA inequality or to MSA
poverty rates. The effect of the ratio of jobs to residents also was not
evident even for the concentration of poverty in the central city (the
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sign was as expected, but the coefficient was not significant). The lack
of statistical significance for this variable does not arise from any lack
of variability in the data set, as was argued above for the educational
measures. Table 3.3 shows that the ratio had a mean of 3.15 and a standard deviation of 15.5.
For both MSA changes in poverty rates and in income inequality,
there was a tendency to “regress to the mean,” in that MSAs with
higher rates of income inequality, with quintiles with higher shares of
income, or with higher rates of poverty, experienced less growth in
these variables. This may reflect a tendency for the system to “selfcorrect” or it may be an artifact of measurement error.3 It is, therefore,
quite surprising that the “regression to the mean” effect is not observed
in the concentration of MSA poverty in central cities. In this case,
MSAs with disproportionate shares of poverty in their central cities did
not tend to have less growth in the concentration, they had more (albeit
at a statistically insignificant rate). This suggests that the concentration
of poverty feeds on itself, in the sense that MSAs with more concentration continue to increase their concentration at a faster rate.
Local Labor Market
Clearly, the local labor market matters, but as we have noted
throughout the study, there is not a perfect translation of earnings inequality into household income inequality. MSAs with a 10 percent
increase in their earnings Gini coefficient averaged a 5 percent increase
in their household income inequality. Earnings inequality does not
translate perfectly into household income inequality because households have varying numbers of earners and changes in the distribution
of earners over households counters the growth in earnings inequality.
To compare the effects of changes in the earnings Gini with the
effects of changes in the employment-to-population ratio or to examine
the effects of either labor market measure on quintile shares or on the
poverty rate, the standardized beta coefficients are more informative.
A 1.0-standard-error increase in MSA earnings inequality is associated
with a 0.37-standard-error increase in MSA household income inequality (see Table 5.1) and a 0.25- to 0.30-standard-error increase in MSA
poverty rates (see Table 7.1). The changes occur primarily at the middle and the top end of the distribution of household income, however,
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with a decrease of 0.41 standard error in the share of MSA income
accruing to the middle (third) quintile, an increase of 0.38 standard
error for the top quintile, and no significant difference in share for the
bottom quintile (see Table 5.4).
The MSA employment-to-population ratio is more consistently
related to the household income distribution. There is a strong positive
relationship to the share of MSA income accruing to the bottom three
quintiles (with the largest effects for the bottom two quintiles) and a
negative effect on the share of the top two quintiles (with the larger
negative effect at the highest quintile).4 This redistribution among the
quintiles means that a 1 percent increase in the employment-to-population ratio was associated with a 0.034 percent decrease in the metropolitan household income Gini (see Table 5.1).
Table 9.1 shows that, although rising inequality in earnings was
associated with increasing rates of household income inequality in
MSAs, the increases in the employment-to-population ratio had a
larger correlation in the opposite direction. Recall that Chapter 1 contended that it was necessary to study household income inequality
(which includes all persons) rather than earnings inequality (which
includes only persons with wages) to judge the total distributional
effects (wages and employment) of changes in earnings inequality.
Overall, changes in the metropolitan labor markets are associated with
decreases in household income inequality. The increases in employment, on average, offset the effects of rising earnings inequality.
Although MSAs with employment-to-population increases
reduced their poverty rates, the result is not statistically significant.
Because the categorization of whether a household has income that
places it below the poverty level is based on household composition as
well as on the income level, the differences in the association of
changes in the employment-to-population ratio with household income
inequality and with the poverty rate arises from the effects of shifting
household demography.
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POLICY CONCLUSIONS
These results strongly support the widely held view that metropolitan economic growth reduces metropolitan poverty. 5 Therefore, all
policies designed to promote growth in jobs are antipoverty policies.
Similarly, household income inequality is substantially reduced by
tightening of labor markets.
Furthermore, the evidence presented here suggests that it does not
matter where in the metropolitan area—city or suburbs—that job
growth occurs: the intrametropolitan location of jobs had no significant
effect on overall MSA poverty rates or household income inequality.
When MSA jobs were more concentrated in the central city, however,
poverty was insignificantly less concentrated in the central city.
Policies which create more jobs, regardless of wage level, lower
household income inequality and MSA poverty rates. The evidence in
this study indicates that the creation of low-wage jobs (which provide
wages to those who previously had none) may increase earnings inequality, but it reduces income inequality, which is the more important
measure of well-being.
The type of jobs that are added as economic growth occurs does
matter, however. Adding middle-income jobs (rather than jobs at the
high or low end of the wage distribution) decreases overall MSA poverty and reduces household income inequality more. However, more
middle-income jobs contribute to a greater concentration of poverty in
the central city, probably because middle-income earners and households with a single earner whose income puts them over the poverty
level are more likely to live in the suburbs.
Finally, the significant association between African-American representation in the MSA and the concentration of poverty in the central
city, coupled with the finding that there is no relationship between race
and overall MSA poverty, indicates the importance of antidiscrimination policies in housing and in the labor market for improving the
income status of African Americans.

Notes
1.

Although there is some concern about how much weight should be attached to
this result given the sensitivity to the way income distribution is measured, there
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2.

3.
4.

5.
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are no significant effects of household size when absolute differences in income
shares to households by quintiles are analyzed in Chapter 5.
In general, economists believe that wages, at least in the aggregate, reflect the productivity of workers. If wages reflect productivity and if wages are correlated
with income and poverty rates, then productivity variation across MSAs would be
correlated with, or indexed by, the poverty rate.
A measurement error correction occurs when the “extreme” values are mismeasured so that in the next period the value is corrected.
Table 5.4 shows that a one-standard-error increase in the employment-to-population ratio is associated with an increase of 0.33, 0.34, and 0.25 standard error in
the share of income accruing to quintiles 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A 1.0-standarderror increase in the employment-to-population ratio is associated with a decrease
of 0.25 and 0.30 standard error in the share of income accruing to quintiles 4 and
5.
The large coefficients on percentage changes in proportions of in-migrants and in
proportions of households with no earners and with multiple earners in Table 7.1
provide evidence of the role of economic growth. Because the coefficients on
number of earners in the household were not significant when economic growth
measures are added in the right-most column of that table, the results point to the
role of job availability in reducing poverty.
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Table A.1 Correlations between MSA Characteristics
Decennial rates
of change in
Living in central city
Proportion African-American

Living in
central city

Proportion
AfricanAmerican

Different
MSA
5 years ago

% Jobs/%
residents in
central city

Hholds
headed by
over age 65

Hholds
headed by
lone woman

Hholds
with no
earner

Hholds
with multi
earners

1.00

0.11

–0.13

–0.17

0.09

0.14

0.05

–0.09

0.11

1.00

–0.04

0.05

–0.13

0.22

–0.11

0.02

Different MSA 5 years ago

–0.13

–0.04

1.00

–0.09

–0.10

–0.27

–0.19

0.27

% Jobs/% residents in
central city

–0.17

0.05

–0.09

1.00

–0.09

–0.07

–0.04

–0.06

Hholds headed by over age 65

0.09

–0.13

–0.10

–0.09

1.00

0.53

0.65

–0.45

Hholds headed by woman

0.14

0.22

–0.27

–0.07

0.53

1.00

0.53

–0.45

Households with no earner

0.05

–0.11

–0.19

–0.04

0.65

0.53

1.00

–0.78

Hholds with multi earners

–0.09

0.02

0.27

–0.06

–0.45

–0.45

–0.78

1.00

Hhold size

0.01

–0.34

–0.06

–0.04

–0.13

–0.10

–0.07

–0.01

Gini coeff on ed

0.00

0.06

0.06

–0.02

–0.01

0.12

0.04

0.10

Median ed, 25–64 yrs. old

–0.11

–0.11

–0.02

0.09

–0.10

0.00

–0.17

0.11

Employ/pop, 25–64 yr. olds

–0.13

–0.07

0.20

0.00

–0.31

–0.39

–0.51

0.74

Per capita income

–0.15

0.09

0.37

0.05

–0.29

–0.31

–0.62

0.54

Gini coeff on earnings

–0.01

–0.24

–0.18

0.10

0.29

0.23

0.42

–0.38

Gini coeff on hhold income

0.01

0.11

–0.01

0.02

0.43

0.42

0.54

–0.36

1980 Gini coeff hhold income

–0.08

–0.13

–0.17

0.07

–0.18

–0.03

–0.23

–0.08

Residential segregation index

–0.04

0.09

0.17

–0.15

0.14

–0.05

0.14

–0.04

Table A.1 (continued)
Decennial rates
of change in
Living in central city

Hhold size

Gini coeff
on educ.

Median educ. Employ/pop.
for 25–64
for 25–64
yrs. old
yrs. old

Per capita
income

Gini coeff
on earnings

Gini coeff
on hhold
income

1980 Gini
coeff on hhold
income

0.01

0.00

–0.11

–0.13

–0.15

–0.01

0.01

–0.08

Proportion African-American

–0.34

0.06

–0.11

–0.07

0.09

–0.24

0.11

–0.13

Different MSA 5 years ago

–0.06

0.06

–0.02

0.20

0.37

–0.18

–0.01

–0.17

% Jobs/% residents in
central city

–0.04

–0.02

0.09

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.02

0.07

Hholds headed by over age 65

–0.13

–0.01

–0.10

–0.31

–0.29

0.29

0.43

–0.18

Hholds headed by woman

–0.10

0.12

0.00

–0.39

–0.31

0.23

0.42

–0.03

Households with no earner

–0.07

0.04

–0.17

–0.51

–0.62

0.42

0.54

–0.23

Hholds with multi earners

–0.01

0.10

0.11

0.74

0.54

–0.38

–0.36

–0.08

1.00

0.11

0.08

–0.12

–0.03

0.09

–0.52

0.39

Hhold size
Gini coeff on ed

0.11

1.00

–0.14

0.14

–0.11

0.04

0.11

–0.40

Median ed, 25–64 yrs. old

0.08

–0.14

1.00

0.04

0.25

0.04

–0.08

0.10

Employ/pop, 25–64 yr. olds

–0.12

0.14

0.04

1.00

0.36

–0.32

–0.32

–0.24

Per capita income

–0.03

–0.11

0.25

0.36

1.00

–0.34

–0.27

0.06

Gini coeff on earnings

0.09

0.04

0.04

–0.32

–0.34

1.00

0.48

0.06

–0.52

0.11

–0.08

–0.32

–0.27

0.48

1.00

–0.47

1980 Gini coeff hhold income

0.39

–0.40

0.10

–0.24

0.06

0.06

–0.47

1.00

Residential segregation index

–0.05

0.01

–0.24

0.04

–0.01

0.01

0.12

–0.18

Gini coeff on hhold income
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Table A.2 Statistics on Income Distribution in 1979 and 1989, by MSA
Gini
1979 Gini
Gini
1979 Gini
coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on
earnings for
earnings for
household
household
all workers
all workers
income
income

Quintile
1

Quintile
2

Quintile
3

Quintile
4

Quintile
5

Birmingham, AL

0.015

0.458

0.066

0.415

–0.0056

–0.0094

–0.0104

–0.0095

0.0348

Mobile, AL

0.070

0.459

0.096

0.417

–0.0084

–0.0199

–0.0162

–0.0088

0.0532

Montgomery, AL

0.044

0.447

0.076

0.413

–0.0020

–0.0094

–0.0124

–0.0094

0.0331

Little Rock, AR

0.074

0.432

0.092

0.389

–0.0072

–0.0152

–0.0110

–0.0095

0.0429

Phoenix, AZ

0.037

0.458

0.078

0.384

–0.0070

–0.0238

–0.0139

–0.0043

0.0491

Tucson, AZ

0.040

0.474

0.082

0.398

–0.0036

–0.0129

–0.0115

–0.0093

0.0373

Anaheim/Santa Anna, CA

0.039

0.457

0.145

0.341

–0.0030

–0.0058

–0.0106

–0.0119

0.0313

Bakersfield, CA

0.020

0.464

0.125

0.372

0.0018

–0.0017

–0.0068

–0.0105

0.0171

Chico, CA

0.024

0.509

0.075

0.406

0.0034

0.0017

–0.0025

–0.0111

0.0085

Fresno, CA

0.048

0.474

0.126

0.387

0.0029

–0.0022

–0.0091

–0.0149

0.0233

Los Angeles/Long
Beach, CA

0.065

0.453

0.070

0.414

–0.0040

–0.0071

–0.0096

–0.0123

0.0330

Modesto, CA

0.010

0.468

0.108

0.375

0.0016

–0.0027

–0.0067

–0.0107

0.0186

Oxnard/Simi Valley/
Ventura, CA

0.012

0.465

0.097

0.344

0.0036

0.0007

–0.0035

–0.0083

0.0075

Riverside/San Ber./
Ont., CA

0.026

0.444

0.116

0.362

0.0003

–0.0240

–0.0129

–0.0058

0.0424

–0.007

0.454

0.082

0.370

–0.0008

–0.0003

–0.0038

–0.0095

0.0145

Sacramento, CA

Please note that the first data column, which is labeled “Gini coefficient on earnings for all workers,” should read “1989 percentage
change in earnings for all workers on the 1979 base”.
Also, the third data column, which is labeled “Gini coefficient on household income,” should read “1989 percentage change in
household income on the 1979 base”.

Salinas/Seaside/
Monterey, CA

0.003

0.457

0.062

0.368

0.0007

0.0172

–0.0006

–0.0134

–0.0039

San Diego, CA

0.007

0.466

0.024

0.397

0.0027

0.0070

–0.0001

–0.0112

0.0015

San Francisco/
Oakland, CA

0.063

0.444

0.117

0.373

–0.0037

–0.0058

–0.0140

–0.0170

0.0404

San Jose, CA

0.013

0.447

0.135

0.334

–0.0029

–0.0049

–0.0098

–0.0092

0.0267

Santa Barbara/S. Maria/
Lompoc, CA

0.039

0.489

0.144

0.372

–0.0037

–0.0100

–0.0057

–0.0096

0.0289

Santa Cruz, CA

0.020

0.495

0.041

0.391

0.0010

0.0031

0.0039

–0.0021

–0.0059

Santa Rosa, CA

–0.013

0.462

0.001

0.389

0.0042

0.0068

0.0006

–0.0124

0.0009

Stockton, CA

–0.043

0.453

–0.024

0.382

0.0092

0.0089

0.0005

–0.0097

–0.0089

Vallejo/Fairfield/Napa,
CA

–0.038

0.451

0.069

0.349

0.0051

0.0077

–0.0021

–0.0100

–0.0007

Visalia/Tulare/Porterville, CA

0.051

0.468

0.123

0.388

0.0057

–0.0033

–0.0086

–0.0076

0.0138

Colorado Springs, CO

0.007

0.461

0.081

0.363

–0.0002

–0.0117

–0.0043

–0.0031

0.0192

Denver, CO

0.044

0.455

0.125

0.352

–0.0041

–0.0079

–0.0093

–0.0071

0.0283

Fort Collins/
Loveland, CO

0.018

0.494

0.115

0.356

0.0025

0.0150

–0.0035

–0.0083

–0.0057

–0.089

0.469

0.085

0.382

–0.0003

0.0008

–0.0029

–0.0020

0.0045

0.029

0.447

0.186

0.355

–0.0029

–0.0078

–0.0141

–0.0135

0.0383

–0.085

0.474

0.071

0.388

–0.0020

–0.0135

–0.0006

0.0043

0.0119

0.039

0.469

0.186

0.371

–0.0071

–0.0107

–0.0168

–0.0156

0.0502

Bridgeport/Milford, CT
Hartford, CT
New Haven/Meriden, CT
Stamford, CT
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Table A.2 (continued)
Gini
1979 Gini
Gini
1979 Gini
coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on
earnings for
earnings for
household
household
all workers
all workers
income
income
Waterbury, CT

–0.056

0.404

–0.009

Quintile
1

Quintile
2

Quintile
3

Quintile
4

Quintile
5

0.387

–0.0057

–0.0004

0.0104

0.0073

–0.0116

Washington, DC

–0.015

0.445

0.035

0.367

–0.0011

–0.0004

–0.0033

–0.0125

0.0173

Wilmington, DE

–0.029

0.472

0.011

0.383

0.0045

0.0090

–0.0034

–0.0117

0.0015

Bradenton, FL

0.011

0.455

0.034

0.386

0.0001

0.0054

0.0004

–0.0021

–0.0038

Daytona Beach, FL

–0.003

0.474

0.039

0.400

0.0001

–0.0239

–0.0015

0.0060

0.0194

Ft. Lauderdale, FL

0.018

0.455

0.131

0.379

–0.0039

–0.0265

–0.0137

–0.0018

0.0458

Fort Myers/Cape
Corral, FL

0.047

0.449

0.067

0.380

0.0003

–0.0111

–0.0072

–0.0066

0.0245

Gainesville, FL

0.010

0.518

0.111

0.425

–0.0002

–0.0161

–0.0122

–0.0133

0.0418

Jacksonville, FL

0.016

0.442

0.069

0.388

–0.0053

–0.0104

–0.0048

–0.0092

0.0296

Lakeland/Winter
Haven, FL

0.017

0.455

0.040

0.379

0.0001

0.0014

–0.0047

–0.0139

0.0172

Melbourne/Titusville/
Palm Bay, FL

0.008

0.459

0.098

0.359

–0.0055

–0.0097

–0.0066

–0.0063

0.0281

Miami, FL

0.032

0.463

0.134

0.417

–0.0052

–0.0129

–0.0130

–0.0104

0.0414

Orlando, FL

0.014

0.457

0.079

0.378

–0.0056

–0.0088

–0.0041

–0.0054

0.0238

Pensacola, FL

0.049

0.452

0.115

0.384

–0.0031

–0.0178

–0.0106

–0.0118

0.0434

Sarasota, FL

0.030

0.475

0.096

0.382

0.0002

–0.0075

–0.0076

–0.0085

0.0234

Tampa/St. Petersburg, Fl

0.010

0.489

0.089

0.406

–0.0022

–0.0180

–0.0064

–0.0036

0.0301

West Palm/Boca
Raton, Fl

0.035

0.459

0.119

0.386

0.0003

–0.0149

–0.0119

–0.0107

0.0372

Atlanta, GA

0.029

0.471

0.099

0.391

–0.0068

–0.0085

–0.0091

–0.0099

0.0344

Augusta, GA

0.068

0.456

0.038

0.414

0.0004

0.0203

0.0089

–0.0037

–0.0259

Macon/Warner
Robbins, GA

0.077

0.450

0.183

0.374

–0.0062

–0.0184

–0.0199

–0.0159

0.0604

Savannah, GA

0.035

0.447

0.085

0.399

–0.0064

–0.0138

–0.0061

–0.0061

0.0324

Cedar Rapids, IA

0.061

0.436

0.159

0.407

0.0027

–0.0034

–0.0104

–0.0074

0.0185

Des Moines, IA

0.044

0.432

0.100

0.325

0.0000

–0.0044

–0.0133

–0.0159

0.0335

Boise City, ID

0.023

0.443

0.056

0.368

0.0030

–0.0006

–0.0062

–0.0135

0.0172

–0.025

0.466

0.069

0.380

0.0002

0.0420

0.0184

–0.0103

–0.0503

Chicago, IL

0.059

0.510

0.088

0.381

–0.0018

–0.0052

–0.0132

–0.0153

0.0355

Davenport/Rock Island/
Moline, IL

0.049

0.426

0.101

0.350

–0.0060

–0.0142

–0.0181

–0.0022

0.0406

Peoria, IL

0.056

0.436

0.151

0.386

0.0035

–0.0062

–0.0106

–0.0019

0.0152

Champaign/Urbana/
Rantoul, IL

Rockford, IL

0.037

0.451

0.157

0.346

–0.0019

–0.0065

–0.0135

–0.0081

0.0300

Springfield, IL

0.022

0.434

0.138

0.335

0.0027

–0.0009

–0.0096

–0.0129

0.0207

Ft. Wayne, IN

0.040

0.443

0.158

0.360

–0.0035

–0.0073

–0.0104

–0.0095

0.0307

Gary/Hammond, IN

0.070

0.439

0.177

0.332

–0.0040

–0.0120

–0.0178

–0.0038

0.0376

Indianapolis, IN

0.041

0.434

0.155

0.339

–0.0005

–0.0056

–0.0122

–0.0130

0.0312
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Table A.2 (continued)
Gini
1979 Gini
Gini
1979 Gini
coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on
earnings for
earnings for
household
household
all workers
all workers
income
income
South Bend, IN

0.041

0.443

0.163

Quintile
1

Quintile
2

Quintile
3

Quintile
4

Quintile
5

0.350

–0.0003

–0.0045

–0.0113

–0.0122

0.0283

Wichita, KS

0.042

0.458

0.070

0.347

–0.0054

–0.0106

–0.0098

–0.0048

0.0306

Lexington, KY

0.029

0.427

0.054

0.376

0.0005

–0.0040

–0.0026

–0.0089

0.0151

Louisville, KY

0.095

0.482

0.093

0.412

–0.0015

–0.0059

–0.0152

–0.0143

0.0368

Alexandria, LA

0.000

0.441

0.098

0.397

–0.0002

–0.0074

–0.0098

–0.0087

0.0262

Baton Rouge, LA

0.049

0.463

0.154

0.415

–0.0024

–0.0131

–0.0158

–0.0119

0.0431

Lafayette, LA

0.026

0.470

0.186

0.386

–0.0078

–0.0249

–0.0215

–0.0019

0.0561

New Orleans, LA

0.051

0.484

0.162

0.388

–0.0067

–0.0293

–0.0237

–0.0139

0.0736

Shreveport, LA

0.047

0.461

0.143

0.412

–0.0083

–0.0233

–0.0180

–0.0037

0.0532

Boston, MA

0.019

0.448

0.126

0.399

–0.0013

–0.0030

–0.0049

–0.0088

0.0179

Fall River, MA

0.006

0.435

0.072

0.294

–0.0068

–0.0149

–0.0045

0.0014

0.0248

Lawrence, MA

–0.007

0.453

0.063

0.400

–0.0117

–0.0208

–0.0150

0.0057

0.0418

Lowell, MA

–0.023

0.400

0.279

0.400

–0.0135

–0.0414

–0.0160

0.0093

0.0616

Worcester, MA

–0.011

0.453

0.034

0.374

0.0001

–0.0087

–0.0005

0.0018

0.0073

Baltimore, MD

0.009

0.398

0.054

0.391

–0.0006

–0.0004

–0.0070

–0.0128

0.0208

Ann Arbor, MI

0.025

0.439

0.147

0.383

0.0002

0.0063

–0.0058

–0.0150

0.0143

Benton Harbor, MI

0.006

0.494

0.103

0.356

0.0000

0.0013

–0.0017

–0.0114

0.0118

Detroit, MI

0.067

0.462

0.097

0.362

–0.0033

–0.0086

–0.0132

–0.0101

0.0351

Flint, MI
Grand Rapids, MI

0.094

0.443

0.193

0.382

–0.0057

–0.0133

–0.0139

–0.0038

0.0366

0.028

0.425

0.115

0.343

0.0026

0.0021

–0.0064

–0.0081

0.0099

–0.002

0.454

0.135

0.341

0.0107

0.0193

–0.0010

–0.0146

–0.0144

Kalamazoo, MI

0.044

0.455

0.152

0.344

0.0047

0.0015

–0.0086

–0.0132

0.0156

Lansing, MI

0.008

0.471

0.043

0.351

0.0063

0.0083

–0.0036

–0.0086

–0.0023

Jackson, MI

Saginaw, MI

0.086

0.472

0.191

0.366

–0.0002

–0.0124

–0.0158

–0.0034

0.0317

Duluth, MN

0.007

0.502

0.058

0.388

0.0001

–0.0408

–0.0317

–0.0044

0.0767

Minneapolis, MN

0.010

0.456

0.070

0.375

0.0023

–0.0005

–0.0105

–0.0146

0.0232

–0.068

0.441

–0.000

0.344

0.0030

0.0449

0.0172

–0.0203

–0.0448

Kansas City, MO

0.035

0.450

0.074

0.384

–0.0036

–0.0061

–0.0119

–0.0153

0.0369

Springfield, MO

0.036

0.453

0.077

0.365

0.0043

0.0030

–0.0046

–0.0256

0.0228

St. Cloud, MN

St. Louis, MO

0.045

0.482

0.080

0.404

–0.0042

–0.0091

–0.0123

–0.0104

0.0360

Biloxi/Gulfport, MS

0.032

0.443

0.109

0.378

–0.0000

–0.0186

–0.0117

–0.0043

0.0346

Jackson, MS

0.061

0.461

0.100

0.391

–0.0056

–0.0243

–0.0162

–0.0105

0.0565

Charlotte/Gastonia, NC

0.003

0.462

0.134

0.424

–0.0045

–0.0108

–0.0090

–0.0045

0.0288

Fayetteville, NC

0.017

0.443

0.055

0.360

0.0003

0.0226

0.0050

–0.0085

–0.0193

Greensboro/Winston/
High Pt., NC

0.022

0.417

0.141

0.378

0.0014

–0.0031

–0.0078

–0.0147

0.0242

Raleigh/Durham, NC

–0.009

0.448

0.100

0.369

0.0044

0.0081

–0.0012

–0.0133

0.0020

Lincon, NE

–0.004

0.461

0.033

0.358

0.0062

0.0111

0.0006

–0.0113

–0.0066

Omaha, NE

0.018

0.470

0.039

0.376

0.0014

0.0006

–0.0064

–0.0123

0.0167
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Table A.2 (continued)
Gini
1979 Gini
Gini
1979 Gini
coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on
earnings for
earnings for
household
household
all workers
all workers
income
income
Atlantic City, NJ

Quintile
1

Quintile
2

Quintile
3

Quintile
4

Quintile
5

–0.067

0.456

0.065

0.386

0.0004

–0.0128

0.0027

–0.0024

0.0121

Jersey City, NJ

0.036

0.458

0.092

0.377

–0.0096

–0.0124

–0.0065

–0.0052

0.0336

Newark, NJ

0.040

0.400

0.163

0.396

–0.0049

–0.0085

–0.0132

–0.0155

0.0421

Trenton, NJ

0.008

0.456

0.127

0.372

0.0033

0.0042

–0.0061

–0.0136

0.0123

Albuquerque, NM

0.036

0.456

0.070

0.358

–0.0048

–0.0114

–0.0104

–0.0062

0.0328

Las Vegas, NV

0.028

0.466

0.058

0.394

–0.0060

–0.0099

–0.0081

–0.0081

0.0321

Reno, NV

0.026

0.437

0.118

0.386

–0.0027

–0.0142

–0.0102

–0.0107

0.0378

Albany/Schnec./Troy, NY

0.004

0.432

0.122

0.375

–0.0029

–0.0056

–0.0070

–0.0087

0.0241

Buffalo, NY

0.042

0.452

0.169

0.350

–0.0047

–0.0088

–0.0132

–0.0085

0.0353

Nassau/Suffolk, NY

0.029

0.448

0.124

0.356

–0.0038

–0.0113

–0.0151

–0.0121

0.0424

New York (incl. N.Y.
suburbs), NY

0.061

0.441

0.091

0.353

–0.0066

–0.0120

–0.0099

–0.0109

0.0394

Rochester, NY

0.007

0.464

0.129

0.350

–0.0044

–0.0070

–0.0077

–0.0073

0.0265

Syracuse, NY

0.003

0.457

0.151

0.348

0.0011

–0.0034

–0.0081

–0.0087

0.0192

Utica/Rome, NY

0.011

0.459

0.133

0.346

–0.0025

–0.0111

–0.0112

–0.0042

0.0290

Akron, OH

0.056

0.436

0.191

0.439

–0.0042

–0.0114

–0.0155

–0.0096

0.0406

Canton, OH

0.071

0.457

0.183

0.348

0.0030

–0.0032

–0.0153

–0.0174

0.0330

Cleveland, OH

0.066

0.431

0.173

0.338

–0.0030

–0.0084

–0.0142

–0.0128

0.0383

Cincinnati, OH

0.053

0.431

0.098

0.377

0.0001

–0.0055

–0.0124

–0.0163

0.0340

Columbus, OH

0.038

0.438

0.078

0.362

0.0028

–0.0001

–0.0089

–0.0159

0.0221

Dayton/Springfield, OH

0.035

0.450

0.079

0.380

0.0004

–0.0057

–0.0118

–0.0095

0.0267

Hamilton, OH

0.026

0.449

0.132

0.375

0.0011

–0.0010

–0.0103

–0.0073

0.0175

Lima, OH

0.083

0.462

0.088

0.342

–0.0091

–0.0179

–0.0144

–0.0033

0.0447

Lorain/Elyria, OH

0.069

0.434

0.167

0.363

0.0027

–0.0045

–0.0137

–0.0073

0.0228

Toledo, OH

0.072

0.451

0.116

0.389

–0.0007

–0.0063

–0.0139

–0.0123

0.0332

Youngstown/Warren, OH

0.091

0.428

0.096

0.324

–0.0054

–0.0103

–0.0171

–0.0077

0.0405

Okalhoma City, OK

0.040

0.455

0.071

0.381

–0.0066

–0.0214

–0.0125

–0.0053

0.0457

Tulsa, OK

0.064

0.453

0.112

0.394

–0.0080

–0.0185

–0.0188

–0.0114

0.0567

Eugene/Springfield, OR

0.017

0.455

0.117

0.396

0.0014

–0.0005

–0.0095

–0.0107

0.0192

Portland, OR

0.027

0.470

0.071

0.386

0.0003

–0.0007

–0.0096

–0.0140

0.0240

–0.007

0.487

0.018

0.371

0.0087

0.0101

0.0016

–0.0111

–0.0094

Allentown, PA

0.015

0.450

0.130

0.381

–0.0005

–0.0014

–0.0089

–0.0094

0.0201

Erie, PA

0.066

0.439

0.164

0.338

–0.0004

–0.0054

–0.0131

–0.0110

0.0299

Harrisburg/Lebanon/
Carlyle, PA

0.003

0.445

0.099

0.343

0.0031

0.0015

–0.0047

–0.0085

0.0086

Johnstown, PA

0.006

0.423

0.145

0.341

–0.0065

–0.0079

–0.0108

–0.0068

0.0319

Lancaster, PA

0.023

0.449

0.096

0.353

0.0036

0.0021

–0.0058

–0.0094

0.0096

Philadelphia, PA

0.028

0.414

0.042

0.327

0.0018

0.0056

–0.0028

–0.0130

Salem, OR

0.0084
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Table A.2 (continued)
Gini
1979 Gini
Gini
1979 Gini
coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on
earnings for
earnings for
household
household
all workers
all workers
income
income
Pittsburgh, PA
Reading, PA
York, PA

Quintile
1

Quintile
2

Quintile
3

Quintile
4

Quintile
5

0.101

0.433

0.237

0.332

–0.0043

–0.0137

–0.0227

–0.0167

0.0573

–0.015

0.440

0.087

0.354

–0.0008

0.0007

–0.0026

–0.0049

0.0077

0.001

0.431

0.101

0.341

0.0052

0.0034

–0.0056

–0.0052

0.0021

Providence, RI

0.050

0.448

0.085

0.394

–0.0079

–0.0312

–0.0206

–0.0018

0.0615

Charleston, SC

0.033

0.448

0.109

0.412

0.0001

–0.0203

–0.0122

–0.0035

0.0359

Columbia, SC

0.006

0.451

0.088

0.370

0.0000

0.0160

0.0033

–0.0108

–0.0084

Greenville, SC

0.050

0.435

0.131

0.371

–0.0004

–0.0078

–0.0100

–0.0083

0.0265

Chattanooga, TN

0.052

0.443

0.098

0.400

–0.0013

–0.0066

–0.0124

–0.0169

0.0372

Johnson City/Kingsport/
Bristol, TN

0.061

0.444

0.070

0.399

–0.0120

–0.0188

–0.0157

0.0022

0.0444

Knoxville, TN

0.024

0.470

0.121

0.391

–0.0023

–0.0069

–0.0114

–0.0111

0.0316

Memphis, TN

0.059

0.462

0.088

0.425

–0.0041

–0.0117

–0.0137

–0.0163

0.0457

Nashville, TN

0.006

0.454

0.061

0.394

–0.0046

–0.0100

–0.0080

–0.0082

0.0307

Austin, TX

0.012

0.472

0.118

0.388

0.0002

0.0029

–0.0053

–0.0145

0.0167

Beaumont/Port Arthur/
Orange, TX

0.066

0.446

0.187

0.361

–0.0067

–0.0187

–0.0233

–0.0031

0.0517

Brownsville/
Harlingen, TX

0.070

0.468

0.117

0.426

–0.0025

–0.0456

–0.0264

–0.0087

0.0832

Corpus Christi, TX

0.039

0.464

0.170

0.381

–0.0083

–0.0369

–0.0243

–0.0010

0.0705

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX

0.055

0.449

0.059

0.386

–0.0068

–0.0152

–0.0142

–0.0103

0.0464

El Paso, TX

0.068

0.454

0.122

0.395

0.0003

–0.0097

–0.0089

–0.0087

0.0269

Houston, TX

0.089

0.443

0.156

0.377

–0.0029

–0.0186

–0.0222

–0.0148

0.0585

Killeen/Temple, TX

0.016

0.429

0.076

0.380

0.0003

0.0388

0.0140

–0.0101

–0.0429

Longview/Marshall, TX

0.026

0.461

0.146

0.374

–0.0033

–0.0094

–0.0139

–0.0066

0.0333

Lubbock, TX

0.053

0.474

0.169

0.384

0.0009

–0.0035

–0.0106

–0.0117

0.0249

McAllen/Edinburg/
Mission, TX

0.060

0.490

0.143

0.427

–0.0007

–0.0327

–0.0258

–0.0122

0.0712

0.064

0.456

0.134

0.394

–0.0021

–0.0132

–0.0136

–0.0113

0.0402

–0.003

0.476

0.095

0.401

–0.0020

–0.0185

–0.0061

0.0036

0.0230

San Antonio, TX
Waco, TX
Provo/Orem, UT

0.003

0.535

0.101

0.351

0.0040

0.0010

–0.0011

–0.0042

0.0005

Salt Lake City/Ogden, UT

0.032

0.462

0.070

0.363

–0.0032

–0.0071

–0.0091

–0.0076

0.0269

–0.009

0.442

–0.011

0.393

–0.0000

0.0074

0.0039

–0.0079

–0.0035

Norfolk/Va. Beach/
Newport News, VA
Richmond, VA

0.023

0.437

0.119

0.356

0.0028

0.0012

–0.0081

–0.0108

0.0149

Roanoke, VA

0.008

0.441

0.068

0.389

–0.0033

–0.0081

–0.0124

–0.0067

0.0304

Bremerton, WA

0.022

0.435

0.096

0.341

0.0041

0.0097

–0.0053

–0.0131

0.0046

Richland/Kennewick/
Pasco, WA

0.066

0.440

0.234

0.319

–0.0004

–0.0174

–0.0248

–0.0066

0.0492
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Table A.2 (continued)
Gini
1979 Gini
Gini
1979 Gini
coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on coefficient on
earnings for
earnings for
household
household
all workers
all workers
income
income
Seattle/Everett, WA

Quintile
1

Quintile
2

Quintile
3

Quintile
4

Quintile
5
0.0174

0.011

0.445

0.128

0.346

0.0040

0.0033

–0.0099

–0.0147

Spokane, WA

0.018

0.465

0.136

0.363

0.0042

0.0004

–0.0091

–0.0114

0.0159

Tacoma, WA

–0.015

0.453

0.066

0.363

0.0068

0.0127

0.0019

–0.0151

–0.0063

Yakima, WA
Appleton/Oshkosh/
Neenah, WI
Green Bay, WI
Janesville/Beloit, WI

0.029

0.476

0.129

0.380

–0.0008

–0.0039

–0.0088

–0.0121

0.0255

–0.009

0.458

0.117

0.326

0.0038

0.0027

–0.0070

–0.0100

0.0105

0.041

0.450

0.149

0.330

0.0048

0.0005

–0.0098

–0.0107

0.0153

0.039

0.434

0.105

0.331

0.0066

0.0080

–0.0075

–0.0089

0.0018

–0.033

0.475

0.064

0.350

0.0116

0.0178

0.0019

–0.0182

–0.0130

Milwaukee, WI

0.049

0.442

0.166

0.342

–0.0011

–0.0063

–0.0113

–0.0097

0.0284

Racine, WI

0.079

0.435

0.174

0.322

0.0014

–0.0027

–0.0117

–0.0131

0.0261

Huntington/Ashland, WV

0.039

0.458

0.112

0.414

–0.0042

–0.0149

–0.0149

–0.0075

0.0417

Madison, WI

a

Quintile data reflect the absolute change in quintile shares between 1979 and 1989.
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